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ABSTRACT

SENSATION REBUILT:
CARNAL ONTOLOGY IN LEVINAS AND MERLEAU-PONTY

By
Tom Sparrow
May 2010

Dissertation supervised by Fred Evans
The phenomenological approaches to embodiment presented by Levinas and
Merleau-Ponty cannot provide an adequate account of bodily identity because their
methodological commitments forbid them from admitting the central role that sensation
plays in the constitution of experience. This neglect is symptomatic of their tradition’s
suspicion toward sensation as an explanatory concept, a suspicion stemming from Kant’s
critique of empiricist metaphysics and Husserl’s critique of psychologism and
objectivism. By contrast, I suggest that only with a robust theory of sensation can the
integrity of the body and its relations be fully captured. I therefore develop—contra Kant
and Husserl’s idealism—a realist conception of sensation that is at once materialist and
phenomenological.
The phenomenologists distort the nature of intercorporeal relations and their most
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significant insights prove to be non-phenomenological. I find this useful for rebuilding
the concept of sensation on materialist grounds. Merleau-Ponty grants too much control
to the lived body, and thereby neglects its passive aspects. His view that relations
between bodies are reversible is thus inadequate. Levinas endows the body with a
substantial passivity, to the point that the susceptibility of the body becomes its defining
feature. I defend a more balanced position that features the body’s plasticity—its capacity
to give form to its environment while receiving form from that same environment. My
theory synthesizes the phenomenologists with other historical figures, from Spinoza to
Deleuze, as well as critical race, feminist, and embodied cognition theorists. To conclude,
I suggest that only the plastic body adequately describes the subject’s aesthetic relations,
and can therefore serve as the basis for an immanent ethics of embodiment.

v

DEDICATION

For my parents, Susan and Joseph, who never once asked me to defend the
practicality of philosophy.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Duquesne University community has been nothing but supportive. Over the
past several years, I have been blessed with a number of allies among faculty, staff, and
students. Without these friendships (for that is truly what they are) I would not have
thrived academically, personally, or philosophically at Duquesne. Fred Evans, my
director, advised and guided me through all of my years as a doctoral student. He
graciously and patiently considered several dissertation topics and saw the current project
through from beginning to end. Without Dan Selcer I would never have come to see the
importance of method in philosophical study, and I would now have a much more routine
grasp of the history of philosophy. George Yancy offered nothing but encouraging words
and careful attention, even when I contacted him without warning at home. I am indebted
to Silvia Benso of the Rochester Institute of Technology for agreeing to review my work
on Levinas; her responses, even when critical, are always enthusiastic. Graham Harman
has also played a crucial role in the formation of my own philosophical position. His
generous e-mail correspondence from Cairo is much appreciated. Each of these
individuals has left their mark on the present work.
Among the Duquesne graduate students, I must single out Pat Craig, John Fritz,
Jacob Graham, Adam Hutchinson, Keith Martel, Ryan Pfahl, and Chris Rawls, all of
whom contributed their insight into my project and helped me think through its basic
problems. My department chair, Jim Swindal, continues to be a vigilant advocate for me
and every one of the graduate students. His letters of support helped me win a dissertation
fellowship from the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, which

vii

partially funded the completion of this dissertation. I must also thank the Center for
Interpretive and Qualitative Research. Their fellowship for the 2007–8 academic year
helped get my research off the ground. Since my arrival at Duquesne, the director of the
Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, first Dan Martino and now Jeff McCurry, has
supported and promoted my work. The Silverman Center is an indispensable resource
and a lovely place to conduct research.
I must acknowledge my grandparents, without whom I would never have come up
with enough money to apply to graduate school. And finally, I am especially grateful to
my wife, Rachel Shandor, who entered this endeavor in medias res and every day cares
for me in ways that cannot be paraphrased.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...iv
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………..vi
Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………….vii
Introduction: The Site of Sensation and Nondualist Ontology...……………………….…x
Chapter 1: Perceptual Primacy and Synchrony of the Lived Body…………………….…1
Chapter 2: Sensing, Reversibility, and the Problem of Violence………………………..49
Chapter 3: Transcendental Aesthetics and the Susceptibility of the Body………………85
Chapter 4: On Corporeal Plasticity……………………………………………………..120
Conclusion: The Integrity of Aesthetics: Toward an Ethics of Embodiment…………..163
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………….171

ix

INTRODUCTION
THE SITE OF SENSATION AND NONDUALIST ONTOLOGY

Like a clever thief hidden inside a house, breathing quietly, waiting until
everyone’s asleep. I have looked deep inside myself, trying to detect something
that might be there. But just as our consciousness is a maze, so too is our body.
Everywhere you turn there’s darkness, and a blind spot. Everywhere you find
silent hints, everywhere a surprise is waiting for you.
– Murakami, What I Talk About When I Talk About Running

PROBLEM AND METHOD
Daily most of us experience our bodies as supported and resisted by the features of their
environments. Occasionally we are given over to the realization that the spaces we move
through possess the power to overwhelm or destroy our bodies. Certain bodily
transformations never present themselves phenomenally, however: most obviously, the
death of our bodies. As Epicurus says: “Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved
is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.”1 The present work
is about the prospects and limits of phenomenology as a means of theorizing the identity
of the body. In it I ask what constitutes the body’s integrity and of what the body is
capable. This is accomplished through a critical engagement with the work of MerleauPonty and Levinas, both of whom I see as offering directives beyond the body of
phenomenology, specifically in their analyses of sensation. Since sensation is not often
featured in phenomenological discussions, and because I see sensation as necessary for
conceiving the activity and passivity of the body, I take it as my focus. The turn to
sensation in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas marks a significant departure from the latent
idealism of phenomenology. The revitalization of sensation has ontological and practical

1

Epicurus, “Principal Doctrines,” II, in The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1926), 95.
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consequences that are nascent in phenomenology, but which cannot be fully captured by
phenomenological analyses. Therefore, I will attempt to move beyond Merleau-Ponty and
Levinas in my treatment of the body, its identity, and its ethical significance.
How we should conduct ourselves and treat other entities has always been an
issue for moral philosophy. Apart from ethical questions, the problem of how we as
individuals actually relate to other individuals, or how it is possible for one person to
interact with, act upon, or know another individual raises altogether different questions.
These questions are of an epistemological or ontological type and have manifested
themselves traditionally as the problem of other minds or, more recently, the problem of
intersubjectivity. Such problems underlie the perpetual discussion of corporeal difference
and its ethico-political consequences in contemporary continental philosophy. The
saliency of these specific problems, however, only really makes immediate sense in a
dualist’s metaphysical framework. It is of course possible to see the ethical and
ontological as articulated or collapsed into each other, as in Spinoza.
Monists like Spinoza must first explain how individuals emerge as such. Only
then can they trouble themselves about how individuals can and should interact. The
dualist problem of how I come to know the mind of another person, when all I perceive is
the behavior of that person, only arises if I actually believe that beyond his or her body
lies an ontologically unique thing called a mind. This is of course the ontology of
Descartes, but it is also the ontology of Kant, who sees personhood as constituted by the
fusion of an extended human body with a nonextended rational ego.
From a practical viewpoint dualist ontology is a brilliant way to safeguard the
freedom and responsibility of the individual because it permits the body to be subject to
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causal laws while at the same time placing the mind/soul/ego at an infinite remove from
the physical world. So, for instance, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which is not
primarily a work in practical philosophy, makes a point of specifying the dual nature of
the self in order to protect the freedom of the will from the determinations of causality.2
The body suffers in the empirical realm while the ego enjoys its isolation in the
transcendental sphere. The integrity (moral and structural) of the person transcends the
corporeal world. Some consequences entailed in this distinction permit Kant to refer his
ethical and political philosophy back to his epistemological, ontological, and aesthetic
philosophy. These provide a firm ontological3 foundation for his critique of practical
reason and metaphysics of morals. By entwining the practical and ontological, Kant can
assert in the Critique of Judgment that it is possible for aesthetic judgment of the
dynamically sublime to “consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us” and
consequently awaken “in our power of reason, a different and nonsensible standard”
which derives from “the superiority [of the mind] over nature itself in its immensity.”4
Since the Kantian subject sits outside of natural events, it is able to feel pleasure in the
face of a terrifying spectacle and even exploit such a moment to reassert its intellectual
power over the material effects of nature.5 The result is a certain feeling of powerlessness
on the part of the subject that is generated by its sensible relation to the sublime.
Ironically, this feeling gets translated into a moral sentiment that triggers a supersensible

2

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), BxxviiBxxvii.
3
In this respect I am following Heidegger’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Kant’s first Critique as a work in
“fundamental ontology,” that is, an exploration of the understanding as the pre-ontological condition which
gives rise to a theory of being qua being (i.e., ontology). This interpretation is given in Martin Heidegger,
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th ed., enlarged, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997).
4
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 260, 261.
5
Kant, Critique of Judgment, 261-262.
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command which “obligates absolutely”6 and evinces the moral superiority of humans
over nature. The systematic link between aesthetics and morality is possible, for Kant,
because the subject is essentially an intellectual being, not a corporeal being susceptible
to the directives of the natural world.
The strength of the dualist position on subjectivity is that it allows the
metaphysical and practical realms to rationally reinforce each other while leaving the
intellectual or spiritual world uncontaminated by concrete, physical events. Moreover, it
opens an ethical space in which the sensible is subject to the judgments of the
supersensible, while the sensible as such is afforded no practical value. The abilities and
freedoms of the individual are in a strong sense immune to other individuals and the
corporeal influences of the natural or social world. The embodied view of subjectivity
that I will unpack in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, among others, contests this
dichotomy along with its ethical and political implications. In so doing it not only gives
itself the task of accounting for the emergence of the subject, it also raises the difficulty
of deriving a nonformal ethical imperative from the sensible realm without committing
the naturalistic fallacy.7 My conclusion will argue that the formality of Kant’s view
neglects the aesthetics of embodiment we find in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and that
this neglect results from a difference of ontology. From the perspective of embodied
subjectivity, we cannot maintain a basic distinction between our aesthetic and moral
sensibilities, as though they belong to two distinct capacities or “faculties.” We cannot
concur with Kant that our moral sensibility operates at a distance which cannot be

6

Kant, Critique of Judgment, 266-267.
The naturalistic fallacy is committed when a person tries to derive an “ought” from an “is,” or when they
deduce a moral claim from a natural (or ontological) fact. G.E. Moore identifies the naturalistic fallacy in
Principia Ethica.
7
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traversed by the directives of our corporeal life; or rather, that our affective life is
ultimately in the service of our intellectual judgment. Instead, a material form of our
moral sensibility and ethical imperatives must be submitted as a replacement for the
Kantian model.
Of course, the monist and materialist traditions, from Democritus to Hobbes,
Spinoza, Marx and beyond have always contested the dualist’s ontology and resolved the
intersubjective problem with different solutions. But at least since Hegel the dualist
framework has been under attack from a perspective that can generally be called
postdualism or nondualism. Hegel responded to Kant’s partitioning of the world into the
noumenal and phenomenal by insisting on the superfluity of the noumenal. The
Phenomenology of Spirit effectively demonstrates that the noumenal realm is unnecessary
and cannot be legitimately garnered from the Kantian perspective. Yet it seems odd to
apply the monist label to Hegel’s philosophy. Likewise, it is not necessarily materialist
because it allows for the existence of forces (Spirit, Concept) that are neither physical in
nature nor subject to causal laws. Bergson’s élan vital is an analogous force. Nietzsche,
moreover, could also be considered a nondualist/nonmaterialist philosopher. He is too
much of a psychoanalyst to be an eliminativist, and his philosophy of the body displays a
complex understanding of both the quantitative and qualitative, physical and
cosmological, as well as the aleatory dimensions of experience. And yet, he is more than
willing to nearly reduce consciousness to a dynamism of forces.8 What is the
metaphysical status of these immaterial elements or their counterparts in the
phenomenological tradition, which worries more about overcoming dualism than it does

8

See, for example, Gilles Deleuze’s explication of the “Active and Reactive” in Nietzsche and Philosophy,
trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 39-72.
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about fending off charges of monism? If they are neither physical nor spiritual, where do
we situate Hegel’s Spirit, Nietzsche’s force, or Bergson’s élan? A central challenge for
postdualism is to overcome dualism without arresting motion, that is, without reducing
animation to mechanism.
It is problematic to situate Merleau-Ponty and Levinas into classical categories.
For instance, why does Merleau-Ponty’s late notion of “the flesh” not result in a monist
ontology, a monism of the flesh, or why does the identification of the self with the body
not admit of a monism?9 Commentators prefer to cast what would otherwise be his
monism as Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of immanence; but it is necessary to see why this
label fits him better than does “monist.” The primacy of perception thesis begins with
things already individuated for perception and ostensibly sidesteps monism; yet, it does
not see subject and object as distinct, but rather as internally related. Thus it avoids the
standard dualism. On the other hand, there is a pervasive conceptual dualism in MerleauPonty’s texts, which Renaud Barbaras has catalogued.10 The ontological situation is no
less conflicted in Levinas. Why should we not consider Levinas’s elemental ontology in
9

Lawrence Hass, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 111,
submits that we cannot regard Merleau-Ponty as a monist because there is always a distance between the
behaving body and the self, as well as between the perceiver and the sensible. But Merleau-Ponty maintains
that we are our bodies; this identification is one of the most innovative moments in his philosophy.
Moreover, it is not enough to cite this distance, it must be also be explained. Otherwise, we preclude
monism a priori. So what are we to make of this self? There is either a new dualism or a new monism at
play in Merleau-Ponty and it seems we are given a choice: either continue to speak of a mysterious self that
operates “in” or “as” the body, or speak of the body as a thing that senses and perceives or a “subjectobject,” as Merleau-Ponty does in “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, trans. Richard C.
McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 166. The latter is the more radical choice, but
preferable. It also puts the burden of accounting for the nonphysical subject on Merleau-Ponty’s readers.
The language is what is difficult here, but it is better to attempt to speak of the body’s subjectivity as a
sensing thing, rather than distinguish between the lived body and the physical body, which runs the risk of
instituting a dualism or perpetuating a theological element in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.
10
See Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, trans. Ted Toadvine
and Leonard Lawlor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Barbaras writes that Merleau-Ponty’s
dualism manifests itself “clearly in the final analysis of the body in terms of sensing and sensed, touching
and touched, subject of the world and part of the world. Such conceptual pairs are just so many displaced
modalities of the duality of consciousness and object” (xxiv).
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Totality and Infinity a monism, but then the question of the human Other (autrui) as a
reformulation of the dualist problem of other minds? What makes these two thinkers
nondualist and what resources do they offer us to build theories of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity that genuinely challenge the Cartesian and Kantian legacies? I contend
that it is their phenomenologically inflected ontology of the body. At the same time, we
also see Merleau-Ponty and Levinas reluctant to fully commit to the centrality of the
body for fear that such a commitment would result in a fully immanent ontology that is
inhospitable to the transcendence of the phenomenon, in Merleau-Ponty’s case, and the
Other, in Levinas’s.
Using Kant as a contrastive perspective, I will elaborate and defend a nondualist
carnal ontology that I assemble from and against the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty
and Levinas. Carnal ontology signifies here a view of the embodied subject as embedded
in, immanent to, and continuous with its material environment and the other bodies that
populate the world. This is not an endorsement of reductionism; to a large extent it is a
phenomenological thesis, and I will use phenomenological evidence to support it
throughout. I suggest, however, that we need to move beyond the phenomenological
perspective in order to account for the elements of embodied subjectivity which
phenomenology’s agent-centered methodology often remains blind to. This requires a
careful articulation of the materiality of the body and its genesis, one which staves off
reduction and ventures certain speculative remarks about the life of the body. In short, the
phenomenology of the body requires a nonphenomenological supplement in order to
provide a comprehensive picture of embodiment. I provide this supplement by attending
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to the sensitive/sensory11 life of the body, by reworking the concept of sensation, and by
enlisting a number of critics of phenomenology to build a picture of embodiment that
remains nascent in both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas.
Contemporary philosophy has seen a turn to the body that threatens the
dominance of dualist ontologies and the practical philosophies they generate. This turn
constitutes one of the most recent attempts to develop the nondualist project and
complicate our picture of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and community. This is because
the body is now largely regarded as the locus of all aspects of subjectivity; the mind is no
longer conceived as independent from, and thus invulnerable to, the operations of the
corporeal environment.12 When the subject is conceived as a body, as identical to its
body, the problems as well as the solutions entailed in dualism begin to dissolve; the
problem of how the mind interacts with the body disappears. But the nondualist
framework also raises a number new questions, particularly about the nature of the
subject and the workings of its mind, its will, and its practical freedom. We moreover see
the epistemological problem of other minds morph into the ontological problems of
alterity and individuation; intercorporeity rather than intersubjectivity more accurately
describes the new problematic. Now, instead of asking how we know other beings, we are
led to ask how it is possible for other beings to be other. What constitutes their difference

11

Throughout this essay I use the terms “sensory,” “sensitive,” “sensuous,” and “sensible” synonymously. I
employ “sensual” only where there is a libidinal or erotic connotation.
12
A notable exception in the phenomenological tradition to the claim that most philosophers of the body
uphold a nondualist perspective is Michel Henry. Henry provides a helpful contrast in the context of
affectivity and we will use Henry’s notion of “autoaffection” as a foil for later discussions of affection.
Indeed, the problem of embodiment as the problem of incarnation is basically theological and calls for a
dualistic solution, and Henry is certainly not the only philosopher who offers a theological phenomenology
of incarnation. On this issue in general, see Natalie Depraz, “L’incarnation Phénoménologique, Un
Problème Non-théologique?”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 55, no. 3 (1993): 496-518.
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and how is it possible to interact with them? What is the nature of this interaction and is it
possible to avoid violence as I engage the other? What makes an individual distinct?
The ontological and ethical aspects of these questions cannot be regarded as
separate in a nondualist framework. Because the subject is always already embedded in a
practical environment and is in many, if not all, ways a product of that environment, what
the subject does must be seen as identical to what the subject is. Ethics and ontology must
be seen as maintaining an internal relation. The remarks that follows attempt to stake out
a position on this new terrain and to situate this position in both a contemporary and
historical context.

THE PERMANENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF EMBODIMENT
Evidence that the embodied subject is currently enjoying great success and will most
likely continue to do so in the future can be gleaned from the proliferation of works in
feminist philosophy, critical race theory, and environmental philosophy, to name just a
few of the places where the body is at the center of analysis. The continuing interest in
the work of Merleau-Ponty and the return of Spinoza in disparate disciplines from
political philosophy to neuroscience, as well as recent attempts to retrieve the embodied
dimension of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger lend further credence to the claim that
the body-subject is uprooting the Cartesian subject.13 This suggests that the narrative
which is premised upon the forgetting or denigration of the body in the Western
philosophical tradition has lost some of its timeliness. This is a promising, if modest,

13

For Hegel, see John Russon, The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001); for Kant, see Angelica Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of
Sensibility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); for Husserl, see James Dodd, Idealism and
Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997);
for Heidegger, see Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in
Heidegger’s Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).
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victory over entrenched prejudices. Perhaps even more suggestive is the fact that the
body has gained momentum in the philosophy of mind, particularly in studies of
embodied cognition, a movement driven by thinkers like George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela, Bernard Andrieu, Antonio
Damasio, and Eugene Gendlin. This movement seeks to provide a nondualist, postCartesian solution to the mind-body problem that not only takes seriously the progress of
cognitive science, but which also honors the first-person or phenomenological
perspective.
As Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge in their Philosophy in the Flesh, the
embodied cognition program owes a tremendous debt to the researches of pragmatism,
especially the work of John Dewey, as well as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.
“We want to honor the two greatest philosophers of the embodied mind,” write Lakoff
and Johnson. “John Dewey, no less than Merleau-Ponty, saw that our bodily experience
is the primal basis for everything we can mean, think, know, and communicate. He
understood the full richness, complexity, and philosophical importance of bodily
experience.”14 Although the challenge to Western dualism expounded in their coauthored
text restricts its engagement with Dewey and Merleau-Ponty to introductory remarks,
Johnson’s more recent book, The Meaning of the Body, delves further into the
philosophical debt incurred by embodiment theorists working in cognitive science.

14

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), xi. Their attention to Dewey and Merleau-Ponty in this
text is unfortunately restricted to the Acknowledgements section. It should be noted that their admiration
for Dewey and Merleau-Ponty comes from the fact that both thinkers were practitioners of what Lakoff and
Johnson call “empirically responsible philosophy,” which I interpret as meaning that it is their synthetic
methodology—the attempt to wed first-person and third-person perspectives—that Lakoff and Johnson find
laudable about the pragmatist and phenomenologist.
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The increased visibility of the body in the study of consciousness and subjectivity
does not necessarily entail the reduction of the mind to the brain, or consciousness to
synaptic or neuronal activity, although this is one possible outcome.15 The fertile
interrogation of the body has produced a variety of diverse approaches to embodiment,
which in turn have yielded unforeseeable problems and possibilities for rethinking the
constitution of the body, its relations with other bodies, and its place in the order of
things, concepts, and meanings. Many approaches to the body can be called materialist,
but we must be careful to not assume that this perspective always implies physicalism or
positivism. As Johnson insists: “The brain is not the mind. The brain is one key part of
the entire pattern of embodied organism-environment interaction that is the proper locus
of mind and meaning.”16 This interaction is comprised of several essential dimensions:
the biological, social, ecological, cultural, and phenomenological.17 Indeed, Johnson
offers a naturalistic thesis that is difficult to construe as reductive: “Meaning,” he writes,
is not just a matter of concepts and propositions, but also reaches down into the
images, sensorimotor schemas, feelings, qualities, and emotions that constitute
our meaningful encounter with our world. Any adequate account of meaning must
be built around the aesthetic dimensions that give our experience its distinctive
character and significance.18
It would seem that a balanced union of the material and meaningful remains a live option
for both analytic and continental philosophers.
In my view, one of the most important efforts made by the embodied cognition
folks is their attempt to undo the entrenched prejudice which holds that our qualitative,
15

Such is the conclusion drawn by the “eliminative materialism” of Paul and Patricia Churchland. See, for
example, Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).
16
Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), 175.
17
Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 275-278.
18
Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, xi-xii.
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imaginative, affective, and aesthetic experiences are merely subjective. This prejudice, as
I have already indicated, only holds up in an ontology that sees subject and object, body
and world, as belonging to two distinct ontological realms. What contemporary cognitive
science is showing, however, is that the subjective (mental) and objective (physical)
worlds are actually continuous with each other.19 Such evidence has consequences for
how we conceive the structure of subjectivity as well as the nature of individuality and
relationality. It means that “there is no Cartesian dualistic person” and “there exists no
Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason
that correctly dictates what is and isn’t moral.”20 Given that this postdualist perspective
undermines the basic distinction between internal psychic life and external corporeal life,
theories of subjectivity are forced to acknowledge the essentially liminal nature of
experience: all experience is the product of the body’s transactions with its environment
and the other bodies that populate it. To quote Johnson again,
meaningful form comes from the nature of our bodies and the patterns of
interaction we have with our environment, and it is therefore shaped by our
values, interests, and purposes as active agents. As Dewey insisted—and
cognitive science confirms—thought is never wholly divorced from feeling,
value, and the aesthetics of our embodied experience.21
Merleau-Ponty likewise advocates a transactional view of embodiment that we will
explore in Chapters 1 and 2. For now it is enough to note that the classical dualist
position not only proves to be prejudicial, it literally becomes senseless since its terms
have lost their reference. In order to foster the postdualist perspective, we have to unpack
the carnal life of the body in its liminal aspects, that is, at its points of intersection with

19

Johnson points to Dewey’s “principle of continuity” as the guiding principle of his naturalistic theory in
The Meaning of the Body, 10.
20
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 5.
21
Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 103.
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other bodies, and to once again see the aesthetics of embodiment as integral to
subjectivity. Aesthetics here denotes the sensory life of the body and sensation is
regarded as the currency with which body-world transactions take place.
At least since Heidegger, phenomenology has defended the nondualist thesis as it
struggles against the prejudices of objectivism and dualism. Of course, there are countless
nonphenomenological precursors to this general perspective: Parmenides and
Anaximander, the Atomists, Hobbes and Spinoza, Marx and Nietzsche, the Pragmatists.
And while the philosophers working on embodied cognition acknowledge and cite from
some of these historical resources, the fruits of their labors are often attributed to the
latest research in cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, or emotion theory. This not only
obscures the history of the problem of embodiment, it also passes over a rich and
conflicted body of literature which has much to contribute to the contemporary debate.
Such methodological decisions tend to reinforce the view that phenomenology is only
valuable as a supplement to the sciences of the mind, but that it lacks rigor or legitimacy
when conducted on its own terms. Thus, Johnson admits that “phenomenology leads us
to the primacy of movement, but it alone is not enough to prove the case. What is
required additionally is empirical research from the cognitive sciences of the embodied
mind.”22 While I do feel that phenomenology is best practiced synthetically, that is, in
conjunction with the human and natural sciences, I think we need to be careful not to
place it in the role of handmaiden or to underestimate its contribution to embodiment
research.23 Thus, my aim here is to excavate the history of phenomenology in an attempt
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to reveal the affinities and disparities between Levinas’s and Merleau-Ponty’s
contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of the body and their relevance to
contemporary research. Although, taken independently, I find their respective views to be
incompatible as well as somewhat resistant to more recent theories of embodiment, I find
both figures indispensable for developing a conception of embodiment which can
reconcile the phenomenologists and nonphenomenologists.
A promising possibility opened up by the corporeal turn in philosophy is the
chance to rethink concepts which have hitherto been criticized out of theoretical
discourse. One of these concepts is sensation. Sensation is a concept with a confused
history and a shifting, equivocal identity.24 It is often conflated with or subsumed by
perception. It is a concept which has been left behind because it belongs to an ontological
and epistemological model that has been surpassed. The installation of the body at the
center of our theories of subjectivity and the apparent collapse of the subject-object
divide effected by Kant and post-Kantian idealism, however, has forced us to produce
new ontologies and to attend to the new philosophical problems which result from this
shift in perspective. Therefore, the question I am particularly concerned with is: What is
the relation between our bodies and their sensory environment? Entailed in this question
is a whole series of ontological considerations which bear on the nature and constitution
of the body, the problem of corporeal individuation, the natural-artificial and humannonhuman distinctions, the ethics of intercorporeal interaction, the reality of violence and
death, as well as the problem of how to conceive sensation vis-à-vis perception and
metaphysical speculation. This principle is even more pertinent given the finite perspective afforded us as
embodied minds.
24
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cognition. If sensation understood in the context of dualism is doomed, what possibilities
for revitalizing sensation exist in the postdualist landscape?
Situated at the intersection of the philosophy and science of the body, the
fecundity of theories of embodied cognition would be enough to warrant a closer
inspection of the history of the problem of the body. At the same time, given the promise
of such research it is important to catalogue the nuances of the philosophical history of
the body, and to raise and respond to the metaphysical questions it poses to contemporary
studies.

THESIS
Phenomenology provides numerous resources for addressing the problem of sensation
and for thinking through its place in carnal ontology. Indeed, sensation constitutes the
material basis of that ontology. The narrative I will tell is about how the return of the
body has enabled the retrieval of sensation as a philosophically rich concept. Claiming
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty as allies, I defend the thesis that sensation, since it
immanently orients and integrates our bodies, is the basis of our intentional and
intercorporeal world. This basis is for the most part preperceptual, preconceptual, and
prepersonal. As a consequence of the immanent constitution of the body, the primary
relation between body and world becomes methodologically problematic from the
phenomenological perspective: without the distance afforded by perception, which opens
up between perceiver and perceived, it becomes difficult for the phenomenon under
consideration to be apprehended as a proper object of reflection. Sensation lacks the
transcendence necessary for the phenomenological observer to figure it against a
background; its contours are never entirely defined or apparent—sensations can transpire
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as nonphenomenal (nonintentional) events. This notion contests Merleau-Ponty’s claim
that “a figure on a background is the simplest sense-given [la donnée sensible] available
to us….”25 Against this, I argue that sensations make sense (sens) or give direction (sens)
to our bodies at a prehorizonal level. I attempt to unfold the sensuous relation and
indicate the need for a synthetic (phenomenological/nonphenomenological) view of
embodiment. Furthermore, I urge the need to develop an ethics that will cultivate our
aesthetic environment in enabling and affirmative ways, that is, according to a standard
of integrity that I specify in Chapter 4.

KANT’S AESTHETICS AND CRITIQUE OF SENSIBILITY
To contextualize my project, it is instructive to begin with Kant and Hegel. Kant carries
out an analysis of the aesthetic capacity of the subject in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant’s analysis marks a turning point in the history of the concept of sensation and
exemplifies an attitude which still holds considerable influence today. To summarize
Kant’s impact, it is fair to say that after him the legitimacy of sensation—as a unit of
experience—becomes suspect; it is now fine to lay claim to perceptions, but sensations
are relegated to an amorphous, unspeakable, and ultimately inaccessible region. Kant
cannot afford to discard sensation completely, however.
The Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason uncovers the a priori
and empirical components of sensibility: it shows the pure forms of intuition, space and
time, to be contributed by the subject and not objective in themselves, as on Newton’s
model; it shows the material of our intuition, sensation, to be provided by the objects we
intuit directly in the world. In his account of the subject-object relation, as well his
25
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understanding of the subject as such, Kant is Cartesian in spirit, but he decisively
advances beyond the Cartesian view by endowing the subject with the power to constitute
the form of its world. Hegel deploys his own brand of phenomenology to criticize Kant’s
residual dualism, but at the expense of the autonomy of objects and the sensations they
produce. What is missing in all three of these views is the practical or embodied
dimension of sensation. It seems that Descartes, Kant, and Hegel are concerned only with
the epistemological or cognitive value of sensation, and thus minimize the philosophical
consequences of the sensory encounter which takes place between the world and the body
of the observer.26 Put otherwise, what they lack is a sense of the volatility of sensibility,
its capacity to both enable and disable the subject. A brief look at Kant’s Transcendental
Aesthetic can reveal this inadequacy and lead us to question the legitimacy of his claim
that sensory content is given unsynthesized by objects and informed by the subject. It will
also provide a bridge to the tacit idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, against which
both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas respond with quasi-realist criticism.
The Copernican revolution effected by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has had a
lasting influence on the history of philosophy. Its impact on modern and postmodern
European philosophy, or the continental tradition, has been foundational. Indeed, it is not
inaccurate to cite the critical philosophy of Kant as the origin of continental philosophy.27
Given Kant’s general importance in this history and his influence on the
phenomenological movement in particular, it is necessary to establish a few key points
entailed in his view. I will focus exclusively here on his view of sensation and his theory
26
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of sensibility since they are the terms that concern us immediately. This will enable us to
draw a parallel between Kant and Husserl in order to connect the Kantian revolution, or
what might also be called the institution of constructivist epistemology,28 to the
institution of phenomenology. Specifically, I am interested in pointing out that subjects
and objects retain their autonomous lives even after Kant has fused subject and object
irrevocably together at the phenomenal level.29 Although I endorse this idea in one sense,
Kant himself is not entitled to it.
Kant’s revolutionary position, which holds that the objects of perception receive
their form from—and so must conform to—our cognition, rather than our cognition to
them,30 takes root in the first Critique’s Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant is concerned
there not with a theory of the beautiful or a philosophy of art, but with the subject’s
capacity to receive sensory input from the external world.31 Kant offers a theory of
sensibility which is formulated at least in part as a response to classical empiricist
accounts of sense experience, particularly those of the British empiricists.
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Kant is in agreement with the empiricists that cognition must begin with the
experience of some object, but he contests the claim that all our knowledge is built up
from what is given empirically, that is, from sensations. “There can be no doubt that all
our cognition begins with experience,” writes Kant. “But,” he adds, “even though all our
cognition starts with experience, that does not mean that all of it arises from
experience.”32 He makes this claim to set up a refutation of empiricism, but also because
he understands “experience” to be a composite phenomenon built up from impressions
received by the intellect, which then applies concepts to produce experience. Ordinarily
we believe experience to be externally given. But, says Kant, “long practice has made us
attentive to [the cognitive element of all experience] and skilled in separating it from the
basic material,” provided by sense impressions.33 Since experience is always more than
the reception of sensory content, the given is never received in basic, raw form; that is,
sensations are never received as such. How can Kant claim that they are given, then? Or
rather, if sensations are always already worked up by the cognitive apparatus, what
allows Kant to claim that anything like a pure, unsynthesized sensation exists at all? He
requires the concept of sensation, or the sensory manifold, to account for the content of
cognition, but beyond its basic architectonic value sensation plays no formative role in
the constitution of experience or identity; nor does it hold sway over our capacity to
constitute experience.
The empiricist position, which Merleau-Ponty thoroughly criticizes and offers a
non-Kantian alternative for in Phenomenology of Perception, maintains that our
knowledge of the world arises out of our firsthand acquaintance with objects as they are
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in themselves. Whereas Kant holds that there is an objective (noumenal) world in itself
beyond the reach of (phenomenal) perception, and that this noumenal world is
unknowable, Merleau-Ponty eschews the notion of an objective realm in favor of a
dynamic theory of object identity. Merleau-Ponty follows Kant to a degree, but transfers
the constitutive power of the subject to the body’s capacity for “practical synthesis”34
rather than locating the synthetic act in the understanding or imagination.
Kant’s epistemological treatment of sensation has a clear ontological significance.
Sensation denotes the material to be processed by the understanding into experience.
Kant writes: “The effect of an object on our capacity for [re]presentation, insofar as we
are affected by the object, is sensation.”35 This material is provided to the subject from
outside; it is given off by the objects which reside in the noumenal realm, the so-called
things in themselves. But Kant’s epistemology cannot maintain this ontological divide
between subject and object, let alone claim any causal interaction between them.36 His
constructivism is precluded from making any reference to things in themselves, as things
are only knowable via phenomenal experience understood in the composite sense
(experience = sensations + concepts). This makes Kant’s account of the givenness of
sensation either speculative (something the critical project aims to avoid) or a formal,
“lifeless schema.”37 In either case, he removes the volatility of sensation by keeping it
34
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always at a distance from the cognitive subject or transcendental ego. This is effectively
what Samuel Todes argues in Body and World,38 wherein he defends the thesis that Kant
“imaginizes” perception and the ego, and thereby overlooks the materiality of
subjectivity. Todes responds to Kant with phenomenological evidence that is meant to
show how the subject is not a disembodied, transcendental synthesizer of sensory content,
but rather a product of that content itself.
Todes argues for a pre-Kantian thesis, but from a post-Kantian/phenomenological,
perspective. Knowledge must conform to objects, says Todes.39 This is a consequence of
the fact that our perception is always practical first and conceptual or imaginative
secondarily. “On our view,” writes Todes, “imagination presupposes practical perception
because we must first become somebody by practical experience in the given world,
before we can achieve self-expression and self-discovery by making a world of our
own.”40 (Levinas extensively argues a similar point in his discussions of separation,
habitation/dwelling, and enjoyment in Totality and Infinity.)41 Kant believes that he can
ascertain a priori knowledge of the world, for example, the pure forms of intuition (space
and time). But this knowledge cannot guarantee that some content exists outside of us
awaiting to be given form. It is the practical field of perception that indicates that objects
await our interaction, but even this lends no certainty about the reality of objects for
Todes.42 What does offer this certainty is the phenomenological evidence of the
perceptual field, which determines the existence of objects “by way of some effective
38
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response to that object, and culminates by determining it as circumstantially outside us.
This response, however, determines not merely the perceptual object upon which it is
directed, but also the percipient from which it issues.”43 Only the dialogical interaction
that constantly occurs between subject and object, so central to Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of perception, can evince the materiality of these two terms. This
dialogism lends subject and object their particular form and function. It is not the
spontaneous synthesis of the ego which performs this feat, it is the responsiveness of the
active body with all of its specific determinations: upright posture,44 front-back
asymmetry,45 physical disability, gravitational attunement, etc.
Todes raises a now common criticism of the Kantian subject when he claims that
Kant “has no sense of how practice makes the practitioner.”46 For Kant, the world is but a
reflection of our constitutive (imaginative, cognitive) capacities and we come to know
ourselves only by first making this world. Against Kant, Todes and other contemporary
proponents of embodiment insist that subjects are produced as they explore and interact
bodily with their world.47 Now, it is possible to argue that Kant does not in fact
completely absent the body from his account of subjectivity. Angelica Nuzzo, for
instance, offers Kant’s aesthetic theory as evidence for the possibility of a nondualist,
embodied view of human sensibility.48 She writes: “[Kant’s and Herder’s] general aim is
to attribute to human sensibility a new central place in philosophy, thereby steering the
philosophical focus from the metaphysics of a ‘disembodied soul’ to the inquiry into an
43
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‘embodied mind’.” Kant’s modern view of sensibility is broad enough to encompass “the
entire realm of the sensual: affections, intuition, sensation, feeling, and imagination.”49
The innovative moment in Kant comes when he makes of the body a transcendental
condition for aesthetics, a condition which is “formal” and “ideal,” but at the same time
corporeal.50 We will see that Levinas is after something similar but less formal. For Kant,
sensibility is the active reception of objects given and is “responsible for the fact that we
are able to confront the reality of given objects.” But sensibility’s activity extends further,
since it also produces representations of objects and does so immediately, unlike thought,
which is always mediated by sensibility.51 Sensibility guarantees that sensations received
are never without form; and since Kant distinguishes between intuition and sensation he
can designate intuitions as objective while assigning sensations a
representational/subjective role as the formal effect of objects on our sensibility.
Nuzzo’s attempt to display the embodied element of Kantian cognition is
emblematic of the broader concern with embodiment in contemporary philosophy. Like
other recent attempts to retrieve the body, it testifies to the inadequacy of the now
familiar narrative which tells of the Western philosophical tradition’s neglect of the body.
This is why I hesitate to take sides against Nuzzo’s reading of Kant: it’s not a matter of
either/or, where we are forced to acknowledge the body in Kant or lament its absence. It
is a matter of degree and I believe that despite the embodied elements of Kantian
cognition highlighted by Nuzzo, sensibility still remains subservient to the understanding
in his philosophy. As a consequence, Kant provides an account which tames sensation by
49
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making of it an epistemological placeholder.52 The question remains: How does the
transcendental ego link up with the transcendental body? Looking to the first Critique, it
would have to be through sensibility, since all judgment must pass through the senses.
But we have already seen the problem with considering objects and sensations as given
corporeally on the Kantian model. Kant distinguishes between intuition and sensation,
qualifying the latter as empirical and the former as either pure or empirical. Since we
only ever intuit the appearances of objects, and thus apprehend objects only through an a
priori formality which provides them with the space and time in which they reside, we are
prevented from claiming that sensation actually comes from somewhere, let alone that it
is given materially. The first Critique excludes sensation from the transcendental realm
precisely because of its materiality.53
It is the third Critique that ultimately makes room for the embodied dimension of
sensibility through its analysis of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nuzzo shows
that this yields the condition under which it is possible for us to “feel ourselves a part of
living (i.e., sensible) nature,” but I do not think it successfully “strengthens the
connection between sensation and feeling,” even if Kant does allow for the possibility of
a nonconceptual intuition.54 Alongside the first Critique, the recasting of sensibility in the
Critique of Judgment does not resolve the problem of how to reconcile the formal role of
sensation with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Are we permitted to conclude that
aesthetic pleasure, which is an embodied response to aesthetic phenomena, is brought
about via sensibility? If it is illegitimate to claim that sensibility actually receives
52
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material sensations, it is not clear how the corporeality of pleasure can link up with the
corporeality of sensation in a nonformal way. Without this link the body cannot be
brought to the center of experience. To allow such a connection, it seems necessary to
forego the unity of the Kantian project and take sides with the third Critique against the
first.
Remaining neutral on this score, I simply want to maintain that Kant has
effectively and influentially tamed sensation by keeping the body separate from the
material content of cognition, that is, by upholding a subject-object dualism that insulates
the constitution of the subject from the material effects of the object. Accordingly,
sensation cannot be regarded as constitutive of the Kantian subject.
The pacification of sensation is ramified in Hegel’s phenomenology. In the
section of the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled “Sense-Certainty,” Hegel addresses the
problem of the given by rejecting the existence of a noumenal realm that provides
sensory input for cognition to process into workable knowledge. Hegel’s refusal to infer
the existence of pure sensory content would seem to eliminate the objectivity of sensation
altogether and situate it exclusively on the side of the subject. In a sense, the symbiosis of
subject and object is no longer present in Hegel because the object has become a concept:
the world becomes the phenomenal appearance of human conceptuality, so the sensory
material of intuition qua material becomes superfluous.
Hegel takes sensation to be a prejudicial concept, one which we use to explain the
phenomena of experience without really comprehending the rationality of these
phenomena. At the same time, he makes of experience only the appearance of
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consciousness, given to itself phenomenally.55 The sensible world is a fable for Hegel and
it is quickly sublated by perception, which is of a “higher” rational order, in his dialectic.
What we believe to be the direct apprehension of a singular sensory object reveals itself
to actually be comprehension of an object endowed with universal qualities: “So it is in
fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty,” Hegel says.56 “I have this
certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty
through something else, viz. through the ‘I’.”57 In Hegel the mediation of the world by
the mind becomes a total mediation, thus ensuring that the alterity and foreignness of the
world can be recuperated by the dialectic.58
Hegel’s discontent with the formalism of Kant’s analysis of our cognitive faculty
leads him to “put flesh on Kant’s architectonic.”59 Hegel’s gripe with Kant is basically
existentialist in character, in that he thinks Kant is trying to understand experience before
actually experiencing something. This is why he begins the Phenomenology with sense
experience; this move is equivalent to jumping right into the stream of consciousness and
investigating its contours from the inside, rather than trying to deduce them beforehand.
But it is also telling that he finds sense experience to be something that is already shot
through with universals, and so neither formless nor immediate at all. Effectively, the
stream of consciousness is shown to be given through perception and not sensation. Such
55
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a tactic is standard not only for Hegel’s phenomenology, but also for Husserl and his
followers. The difference is that Hegel does not allow for the transcendence of the object;
the object is a concept, not a real thing in the world.60 Like Merleau-Ponty, Husserl seems
to allow for a “transcendence in immanence” of the object.61 Just as in Kant, the form of
the Hegelian object is the product of the conscious subject. But unlike Kant, this object
has no other life than the one bestowed upon it by the I of the observer.62
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s dualism is aimed at sensation as a source of knowledge,
specifically as the source of our representations. This is a reformulation of the Cartesian
criticism of empiricism, as demonstrated by the wax example in the Meditations, where
Descartes showed that what we actually perceive in an object as it undergoes myriad
qualitative changes is nothing sensible—which can only lead to skepticism—but an idea
or representation. Hegel’s critique of sensation goes further than Descartes’ skepticism,
however. It leads to the abandonment of the concept of sensation as such. Although
necessary to recount the odyssey of Spirit, sensation is just a rudimentary form of
experience that bears no certain knowledge and can easily be seen as simply prejudicial.
Hegel’s perspective, which is recounted by Merleau-Ponty (PP Chapter 1), restricts the
valence of sensation by considering it only for its capacity to yield certain
60
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representations. But sensation is much more than a means to certainty: it possesses a
carnal quality that eludes the subject’s power of representation and, in fact, threatens our
representational capacity. This dimension of sensation eludes Hegel’s phenomenology.
The non-Hegelian phenomenologists uncover a different ontology of the subject
of sensation. Levinas, for instance, is interested in reviving the affective aspect of
embodiment and considers sensation as a kind of element that nourishes the body and
disrupts any attempt to freeze it in a system. Hegel completely neglects this. MerleauPonty is also not interested in operating within the old epistemological debates. He
instead wants to construct a new framework for thinking the relation of body and world.
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of sensation cannot be comprehended by the old
model, even though I believe it is most powerful when articulated through this model.
This is why I treat twentieth-century phenomenology—occasionally reinscribing it in
older terms and divisions—as an extension of the history of philosophy and not as a
movement that departs from ground hitherto uncharted by this history, which is a
common way to regard the various “reductions” performed by the phenomenologist.
Merleau-Ponty’s nondualist and nonrepresentationalist perspective offers something like
a monism of the sensible as opposed to a subject-object dualism that finds sensation on
either side of this ontological divide. It is necessary to rethink sensation as taking place
between subject and object; this is at least partly made possible by stepping outside the
ontology of Descartes and Hume, Kant and Hegel. However, it is likewise necessary to
note the influence of the moderns on Husserl’s phenomenology and the
phenomenological approaches that follow him.
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What is at stake when breaking with the idealist model that culminates with Hegel
is not only an embodied subject, but also a rehabilitation of the concept of sensation and
an ethical theory that is predicated on the aesthetic life of the body. This ethical theory is
situated not at the intellectual level, like the Kantian imperative, but at the intercorporeal
level: at the site where bodies interact with other bodies, where bodily transactions,
yields, absorptions, resistances, and collisions occur. Sensation is at the heart of all
encounters, constituting and reconstituting the bodies involved.

HUSSERL: HYLETIC DATA (IDEAS I) AND THE BODY (IDEAS II)
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas challenge Husserl explicitly in their texts. A common target
is his residual idealism, which harbors important remnants of both Kant and Hegel. Those
who would defend Husserl against this charge always seem to be fighting an uphill battle.
The call back to the things themselves has a Kantian ring to it, but it is actually for
Husserl more of an Hegelian principle: return to the immediate objects of experience and
proceed with reflection from there, without prejudging the matter at hand.63 Despite his
allegiance to the phenomena as such, however, Husserl retains a basic dualism which
aligns him with Kant. The famous bracketing of the natural world which initiates the
phenomenological method remains neutral about the things themselves and focuses the
phenomenologist’s attention solely on the given.64 This means that Husserl does not
discard the thing in itself, like Hegel, but refuses to speak about it qua phenomenologist.
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Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, Volume 2 (New York: Humanity Books,
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Only natural scientists and ordinary folks believe themselves to be talking about things in
themselves; such talk is suspended by the phenomenological reduction.
The given for Husserl is not what comes from “outside,” but what is present to
consciousness; this includes the sensory material which Kant sees as provided by the
objects of the external world. So, on the one hand, Husserl tacitly retains the
noumenon/phenomenon duality, but in a neutralized form, while at the same time
situating the origin of the given in consciousness and thereby forming another tacit
alliance with a more extreme idealism. This is the case in Ideas I, although the story is
complicated by Husserl’s turn to the body in Ideas II. As for objects and their sensible
features, Logical Investigations complicates the matter further by offering a version of
the sensible that is at odds with the idealism of Ideas I.
We saw how Kant’s relegation of the material of sensation to the noumenal realm,
oddly enough, disqualified him from claiming its objectivity. Consequently, his dualism
has the effect of immunizing the subject from the impact of sensations. Husserl’s
idealism, at least in Ideas I, has a similar effect: he once again domesticates sensation and
mitigates its material dimension by subjectivizing it.65 Like Kant and Hegel before him,
he sees the subject as animating sensory content,66 whereas I would argue, with MerleauPonty and Levinas, that it is sensory content that animates us. We might pose this point
of contrast in terms of what could be called the principle of animation: against the view
which holds that the principle of animation is ideal or mental I offer the view that the
65
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principle of animation is given materially and therefore constitutes the subject as a
corporeal event. Phenomenological idealism keeps the materiality of sensation at a
distance and thus keeps it at a safe remove from the body; sensibility is conceived
intellectually and the carnal aspect of experience is drastically compromised.
It is not easy to figure the sensory/material or so-called “hyletic” layer in
Husserl’s image of consciousness. As James Dodd has said, “it is perhaps the most
volatile concept in [Husserl’sl] corpus.”67 Ideas I explains that the notion of a hyletic
layer is meant to replace what he called “primary contents” in Logical Investigations.
These primary contents Husserl describes as what “would be the contents of ‘external’
sensibility,” although he is quick to point out that this does not refer to “some
metaphysical distinction of outward and inward.” At the level of phenomenological
representation, then, these primary contents are the intuited ground upon which reflection
is founded.68 They include all the sensory content given in concrete experience, such as
color and texture as well as the “sensile impressions of pleasure, pain, tickling, etc.”69
Primary contents no longer works as a concept in Ideas I and Husserl decides there to
speak of hyle instead. In each case, Husserl is reconstituting what would otherwise be
referred to as sensation: “sensation is hyle, that is, matter waiting to be charged with
animating sense, awaiting an apprehension that will give it meaning.”70 The shift to the
language of hyle helps him emphasize the fact that the “sensuous stuff” of consciousness
is immanent to, not independent of, consciousness.
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Ideas I upholds a hylomorphism71 that is Kantian in structure: what Husserl calls
hyletic data is analogous to the first Critique’s sensory given; intentional acts give form
to this data in the same way that the forms of intuition operate for Kant, even though
Husserl refuses to proclaim that hyletic data are subject to an “animating synthesis” and
even questions whether they play a constitutive role in intentionality.72 The pure
objectivity of the hyletic layer must be, as in Kant, inferred from perception—it is never
experienced in its pure form or given to consciousness, as it is always at least minimally
filtered and formed by intentionality.73 Just as in Hegel, perception is the most basic
experience of what is given: “The object-giving (or dator) intuition of the first, ‘natural’
sphere of knowledge and of all its sciences is natural experience, and the primordial dator
experience is perception in the ordinary sense of the term.”74 Nevertheless, the hyle is
what grounds the constitutive acts (noeses) of consciousness in something posited as
nonsubjective: this ground provides an ideal limit—the “noematic nucleus” which
outlasts, as “objective,” all of the adumbrations of any given object75—for subjective
constitution; its role is merely formal, necessary to explain the whence of sensory input.
A tension immediately arises: if the hyletic layer is situated on the side of the subject, but
is supposed to provide the nonsubjective, nonideal ground of noetic acts, what are we to
71
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make of the ontological status of the hyletic material? Husserl is forced to postulate the
reality of a nonintentional source of sensory material in order to avoid idealism, but this
can only occur through a betrayal of his allegiance to the evidence of phenomena qua
phenomena.
Husserl distinguishes sensibility, or what remains phenomenally after the sensory
content of perception has passed through the senses, from the hyletic layer which
functions as the basis for meaningful acts of consciousness.76 Distinguishing both
sensibility and hyle from the animating acts of consciousness or noeses, Husserl regards
the hyletic layer as (formally or functionally) objective while designating the phenomenal
data of sensibility as the subjective manifestation of hyletic material. He writes: “Both
[hyle and sensibility] together compelled the old transfer of the originally narrower
meaning of sensibility to the spheres of sentiment and will, to the intentional experiences,
namely, in which sensory data of the spheres here indicated play their part as functioning
‘materials’.” He continues by concluding that “we need a new term which shall express
the whole group through its unity of function and its contrast with the formative
characters….” This new term is hyle; it encompasses the affective and sensuous material
that is formed by intentionality and given meaning by consciousness.77 He distinguishes
the formative acts as “psychical” to distinguish them from the bodily and sensory,78 but
emphasizes in response to Brentano’s psychologism that both the noetic (Brentano’s
“psychical”) and the material (Brentano’s “physical”) fall within “the stream of
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phenomenological being.”79 Accordingly, both matter and form are circumscribed by
consciousness; sensation loses its nonsubjective feature.80
Because Ideas I is primarily concerned with the correlation between acts of
consciousness and their intentional objects insofar as this correlation can be given a
transcendental significance, the investigation of sensory material for its own sake remains
subordinate to the project of transcendental phenomenology. In Husserl’s words, an
engagement with sensory material as such, or a “pure hyletics,” “wins significance from
the fact that it furnishes a woof that can enter into the intentional tissue, material that can
enter into intentional formations.”81 Ideas I is then not the best place to find Husserl
engaged with the corporeality of sensation, even if it is representative of his general
philosophical perspective. It is best to look at Ideas II, where sensation (Empfindung) is
dealt with explicitly with respect to the body and the hylomorphic structure of
consciousness—which sees sensation as amorphous and innocuous—is contested.82
Since an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body (corps
propre) is informed by Husserl’s lived body (Leib) in Ideas II, it suffices to indicate here
that Husserl’s account of sensation in this text is quite different than the theory of hyle in
Ideas I and primary contents in Logical Investigations. As Alia Al-Saji reads it, the
second book of Ideas shows Husserl focusing “on the way the lived Body is constituted
through the localization of… sensings [Empfindnisse], i.e., the particular lived spatiality
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of the Body.”83 This is the prototypical version of sensation I will be eliciting from the
work of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas as well as defending as the one most faithful to the
aesthetic life of our bodies. It is one which attends to the affective and kinaesthetic life of
the body84 and, perhaps most importantly, attempts to reveal the materiality of sensation
and the subject’s reliance on this materiality.

SENSE DATA AND THE AESTHETICS OF EMBODIMENT
We have sketched some of the problematic aspects of the idealist and/or constructivist
treatment of sensation, focusing specifically on where sensation is localized vis-à-vis the
subject. In the case of Kant, sensation is found on the far side of cognition among the
things in themselves. For the Husserl of Ideas I, sensation as hyle appears within
consciousness, and merely functions as the “external” layer of noetic acts. In both cases,
sensation is cut off from the body and neither enables nor poses a threat to the
constituting subject as such. By contrast, philosophers adherent to empirical realism,
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, for example, often speak of sensations as internal or
subjective signs for something objectively given.85 Because these realists defend an
ontology that posits discrete, fully formed objects existing outside the mind, they believe
that these objects are made known to us via the sensory data they transmit to our minds.
83
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Our minds subsequently reconstitute this data into the objects we perceive as outside of
us. When our reconstitutions correspond to the object in itself, we can claim to know that
object objectively. Merleau-Ponty thoroughly criticizes this model under the name of the
“constancy hypothesis” (PP 7-12/13-19)86 and in so doing steps through the door, opened
by Husserl’s Ideas II, to an embodied view of sensation.
I am a bit more sympathetic to the realist view than Merleau-Ponty, but I am
critical of it for two reasons. First, I think it is wrong to conceive sensation as internal, or
as some kind of epiphenomenon of the mind. It is more than just a feeling or the
subjective correlate of a physiological stimulus. Sensations provide a direct link to the
world of objects, animals, people, and qualities. This link is a bi-directional
communication. Given this, sensations must be seen as in some way external to the mind;
however, this exteriority cannot be complete. Otherwise an unbridgeable ontological
chasm opens between subject and world—this is precisely the view we are calling into
question. The realist does not have a problem positing objects as external, but sensations
are another story. In my view, sensations must be given some external status in order to
preserve their objectivity and to explain their effectiveness. Such objectivity is required
in order to explain how our bodies are responsive to sensations. So, my two points of
praise for the realist are: 1) their objectivist view of objects and 2) the way this
objectivism gives leverage to an externalist view of sensations.
The idealist critique of objectivism remains valid: if it is the case that we never
experience an object in itself, let alone raw sensory material; and that we can only ever
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know the world through the secondary qualities we perceive (à la Berkeley), then talk
about mind-independent reality must be speculative. Such speculation becomes
necessary, however, in order to account for the dependency of our minds and our bodies
on what is other. One could object that this begs the question by appealing to mindindependent bodies to argue for the reality of mind-independent bodies. But I think that
such bodies are necessary to explain such phenomena as the constitution of the body, its
responsive nature, as well as the disintegration of the body. The constitution of the world
may be explicable by transcendental idealism, but it is difficult to see how such a view
can explain the dissolution of the world it constitutes. In a word, if nothing other than the
mind or consciousness or intentional objects exist, then what delivers violence and death
to the subject? The materiality of the subject, that is, its engagement with an autonomous
corporeal world and its means of communication with this world must be accounted for. I
think a revitalized realism about sensation, which risks some speculative remarks, can do
this. As speculative, this realism must go beyond both Kantian criticism and strict
phenomenology.
We should avoid posing the question of sensation in terms of a false dichotomy: it
is not the case that sensation is either a representational content, like Husserl’s hyle, or an
amorphous, discrete data about which nothing meaningful can be said. Instead, sensation
can be seen as fundamentally multiple and composed of at least five main dimensions:
1. Objectivity: sensations belong to independent objects, animate as well
inanimate,87 and make up the singular qualitative constitution of these objects.
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Sensations are effective in so far as they can bring about changes or engender
responses in other objects. For example, sandpaper can smooth wood because it
has an abrasive texture. Or rather: it’s abrasiveness just is its capacity to affect
wood in this way. Similarly, we can enter an illuminated room because a light
bulb or the sun is able to produce brightness.88 Sensations are capacities
possessed by objects, not inert properties; or, if we insist on calling them
properties, they must be conceived as detachable rather than dependent on the
substance in which they inhere.89
2. Relationality: relationality must be taken in tandem with, not as a refutation of,
objectivity. Continuing with the sandpaper example, it can be said that sandpaper
is abrasive only to surfaces that are receptive to abrasion. A piece of wood will
receive sandpaper sensations differently than a piece of glass or marble. So, while
sensations belong to objects as their affective qualities, they only make sense or
manifest themselves when they enter relations, something which is constantly
occurring. Humans are not a necessary condition for the manifestation of
sensations; abrasion “makes sense” to any surface that is susceptible to scratching.
Sensations are therefore liminal and diacritical: they always express themselves
in relation to other objects and are effective in different ways, determined by the
sensory capacity and susceptibility of the objects encountered. For humans,
liminality is made possible by the fact that the body is both part of and, in a sense,
outside of the world.90 Diacriticality means that sensations are always caught up
in a sensory system, each system comprising a distinct, complex environment.91
3. Ambivalence: sensations can be both enabling and disabling, tame or violent.
Because sensations are ambivalent it is not possible to regard them as merely
subjective. Some sensations result in the dissolution of the subject and these must
be accounted for. Neither Merleau-Ponty nor Levinas adequately addresses this
dimension of sensation. Sensory ambivalence provides the chance to build an
explanation. Precisely how this division comes to be, if it actually exists, is a metaphysical problem that
Merleau-Ponty does not resolve.
88
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ethics of embodiment in terms of our vulnerability to and nourishment by
sensations.
4. Alimentation: it has already been said that sensations must be in some sense
objective if we are to explain their effectiveness. This objectivity also accounts
for their capacity to nourish our senses and feed our bodies in the way that a
melody, painting, or landscape has the power to transform or invigorate us, or
how a contour of the ground orients our posture and gait. Without alimentation,
our bodies are left to languish in their habitual sensory circuits.92 Alimentation
and nourishment are two of the most significant elements that I take from
Levinas’s carnal ontology.
5. Anonymity: the anonymity of sensation is what prevents it from becoming an
anthropocentric conception, one which would drive a wedge between the human
and nonhuman realms. Sensations do not need humans for them to be effective;
humans may feel the abrasiveness of sandpaper in ways that a piece of wood
cannot, but this is only because humans (and animals) possess the power to
translate sensations into affections or to process sensations into perceptions or
cognitions or linguistic expressions, thus personalizing them. This is why I would
say that perception is personal while sensation is not. The human ability to
translate sensations into something personal speaks to the relationality of
sensations, not to their objective constitution. It will be said that sensations are
always attached to a particular object (Merleau-Ponty speaks of the unique red of
this carpet), but this by no means renders the quality qua quality proper to any
particular object. I will argue that our identity is constituted by the sensations we
receive as well as the sensations we give off, but I will insist that these sensations
do not belong to us, but rather we belong to them.
These five dimensions arise out of a rereading of the carnal ontologies of Merleau-Ponty
and Levinas. But neither Merleau-Ponty nor Levinas subscribes to all five of the
dimensions. Such adherence requires that we formulate an independent position which is
in some respects at odds with these two thinkers. This is what I try to accomplish in the
chapter on plasticity (Chapter 4), wherein I attempt to develop an original view of the
embodied subject and its reliance on sensation.
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THREE BODY TYPES
I have tried to suggest that the modern view of sensation has not adequately addressed the
reality of sensations. This omission orients my entire thesis. Correlatively, I have
suggested that this inadequacy arises because sensation is always kept at a safe remove
from the subject and that this gesture is supported by a dualist ontology that keeps the
body separate from the perceptual and cognitive operations of the subject. Such a view, I
argue, obscures the subject-object relation. My cursory history of the fate of sensation in
the post-Kantian milieu serves not as an indictment of modern idealism tout court, but
rather as an heuristic with which to understand the carnal phenomenologists’ desire to
rehabilitate sensation. The problem now is to give an account that adheres to the volatility
of sensation and captures aspects of experience that the Kantian/Husserlian model does
not. The resolution of this problem will reveal not only a more complex picture of
sensation as such, but will also demonstrate the central function of sensation in the
constitution of identity and the body-world relation. Such an understanding will enable a
critique of the phenomenology of the body and the development of an ethics of
embodiment.
My own view of the body as plastic will emerge via an exploration of the
phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Chapters 1 and 2 will engage what will
be called Merleau-Ponty’s reversible body, which is developed in response to the modern
theory of sensation and really begins to take form in the chapter on “Sense Experience”
(le sentir) in Phenomenology of Perception. There are traces of the reversible body at
play in The Structure of Behavior and this model is modified in texts like “Eye and
Mind,” “Cézanne’s Doubt,” “The Child’s Relations with Others,” and The Visible and the
Invisible, but the most substantial articulations appear in the Phenomenology.
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Partly in response to what is perceived as an ethical lacuna in Merleau-Ponty’s
own philosophy, Levinas deploys what I will call the susceptible body. If MerleauPonty’s body downplays its passivity in favor of its competence or grasp (prise) of
things, and therefore misrepresents the volatility of its sensitive life and poses a threat to
the solicitations of other bodies, then Levinas has provided an account of the body which
overstates the vulnerability of the body to the detriment of the enabling effects of
sensation. He provides unique resources for thinking sensation in its transcendental and
alimentary functions, as well as its affective and material dimensions. The Levinasian
body will be dealt with in Chapter 3.
The plastic body which I will oppose to both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas is a
reconstruction, built from components found in both thinkers’ texts, most important for
which is the carnal sensibility they offer as a replacement for the Kantian model. The
plastic body tries to balance what I see as two extreme descriptions of the body-world
relation. Once this balance is struck we will have an account of embodiment that provides
an alternative to the Kantian view of sensation and subjectivity, closes the apparent gap
between phenomenology and nonphenomenology (i.e., poststructuralists like Foucault
and Deleuze as well as the embodied cognition movement) and provides the basis for an
ethics of embodiment that is grounded in the aesthetic life of the body. This ethics will be
sketched in my conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1
PERCEPTUAL PRIMACY AND SYNCHRONY OF THE LIVED BODY

The body is a strange thing, and when it is caught up in an accident
involving non-human forces, there is no predicting the result.
– Aira, An Episode in the Life of a Landscape Painter

The Introduction has provided a brief but adequate context in which to situate the
reformulation of sensation in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. The following two chapters
will now focus on what Merleau-Ponty has to say about the body’s constitution, the
aesthetics of embodiment and the nature of sensation, and try to make clear the inherent
divergence between sensation and perception as Merleau-Ponty understands it. The
central text for this reading will be the Sense Experience (Le Sentir) chapter of
Phenomenology of Perception. My purpose is to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s ontology
of the body, with specific attention given to the concrete aspect of its sensibility, and to
challenge his thesis that the intercorporeal relation is fundamentally reversible. My
critique will result in the claim that if we maintain Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the
perceptual life of the reversible body is the bedrock of experience, then it becomes
difficult to explain the asymmetry of violence and the reality of hostility, as well as the
death of the body and therefore the disintegration of perception entailed in death.
It is undeniable that Merleau-Ponty makes the body central to his philosophy of
the subject and that the ideality of the real is contested by his theory of embodiment and
his primacy of perception thesis. By putting the body at the base of his analyses, indeed at
the birth of the world, he puts the body immediately in touch with the objects of
perception and argues for the codependent, dialogical constitution of subject and object.
By making perception primary, he shows how things and persons, minds and ideas—in
1

short, determinacy itself—arises out of the indeterminacy of the perceived world.
Sometimes he equates body and perception; other times he casts the body as an
instrument of perception or consciousness. Most commentaries resolve this inconsistency
by showing that Merleau-Ponty means to overcome mind-body dualism by relocating
consciousness from the mind and into the body. There is no conscious mind “within” the
body: it is just the body itself which is conscious.
It is not always noted, however, that the body is only important for Merleau-Ponty
because it is essential to giving an account of the nature of perception. His introduction of
the body into the discourse of perception is meant to challenge classical philosophers of
mind (Descartes, Hume, and Kant, for instance) as well as the dominant psychological
theories of his day. The body adumbrates the primacy of perception thesis with a
constitutive, practical perspective that redefines the objective world by imbuing it with a
meaning determined by the carnal constitution of the subject. It is this embodied
dimension of perception that is missed by the philosophers. As for Merleau-Ponty’s
opponents in psychology, they fail to acknowledge that a mechanistic view of behavior
overlooks the vital role that meaning plays in human consciousness. Human
consciousness “has the ability to orient itself by the possible, the virtual” and these
possibilities are to be found in the structures of perception.93
In a way, Merleau-Ponty is not really interested in the body as a material entity or
its relations, but with how the body shapes perceptual experience and the meaning of the
world. This means that he is not immediately interested in addressing the metaphysical
questions which surround the body or incarnation, nor is he bothered too much about
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reconciling the phenomenology of embodiment with the research of the physical
sciences. Or, rather, he would prefer to explain the latter on the basis of the former. The
body as perceived and lived—as given phenomenally to the consciousness inhabiting it—
is his object of description. Most of what he says about the lived body is manifest to
perception, neither speculative nor deductive. Thus, he adopts Husserl’s distinction
between Leib and Körper in order to set the latter aside and focus exclusively on the
former. Körper is the determinate, objective body of science. It is the physiological body
that functions in many ways below the level of consciousness and that is constantly
degenerating and regenerating with the passage of time. Leib is the conscious body, the
body that experiences the world as a network of meaning instead of as a field of causeeffect encounters. When the lived body (Leib) is in pain it confronts that pain with horror
or with patience. By contrast, pain for the objective body (Körper) is little more than a
physiological change of state and is legible not by the body itself but only by an external
observer trained to read its biochemistry.94 Whenever Merleau-Ponty is explicating the
life of the body, it is the lived body he intends. His object of study is circumscribed by a
methodological decision: his adoption of phenomenology and its strict adherence to what
appears (is given) to consciousness.
The problem of the body is not for Merleau-Ponty a matter of simple description
or vindication of first-person experience. It is the problem of how “there is for us an initself” (PP 71/86), or how it is possible for perception to immanently order the perceptual
94
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field while at the same time revealing the world as a transcendent phenomenon. To
reconcile this apparent paradox, Merleau-Ponty turns to perception and interrogates the
ontological fact that perception is never divorced from a body’s perspective on things. In
order to disclose the meaning of the perceived, he is forced to come to terms with the
meaning of the body. Therefore, instead of considering the body as an “obstacle” to be
overcome, Merleau-Ponty conducts a critique of the body as the very condition of
possibility for disclosing the world (PP 68/82). “The object-horizon structure, or the
perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want to see the object; for just as it is the means
whereby objects are distinguished from each other, it is also the means whereby they are
disclosed” (PP 68/82). This means that our corporeity not only renders us finite creatures
who are determined by our given spatial and temporal horizons, but that horizonality, or
the figure-ground structure, is basic to perception, knowledge, and individuation.
It must be kept in mind that inserted in the middle of the figure-ground structure
is a “third term.” This is the body (PP 101/117).95 Since the body plays such a pivotal
role in the structuring of perception, it is necessary to determine the ontology of this body
to reveal Merleau-Ponty’s more general ontology. After all, he says that the perceiving
subject is the perceived world (PP 72/86). To understand Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the
subject and how this subject interacts with the world, we must first know what makes up
the body.
It would seem that by beginning with perception Merleau-Ponty is mainly
concerned with epistemological questions, or at least with the question of how we access
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things. This is implied when he says in “The Primacy of Perception” that his project is
“not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation [sentir], but of assisting at the
birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the
consciousness of rationality” (PrP 25/67). Similarly, M.C. Dillon’s Merleau-Ponty’s
Ontology is oddly oriented by a classical epistemological problem: Meno’s paradox.96
This suggests that Merleau-Ponty is occupied with unraveling our knowledge of the
things themselves rather than the things themselves. Moreover, by closely following
Husserl, it would seem that Merleau-Ponty is endorsing some form of idealism,97 even if
not the transcendental type. But Merleau-Ponty actively criticizes idealist presumptions
by repeatedly pointing to the incongruity between perception and thing perceived. Thus,
while his primacy of perception thesis works as a response to a host of epistemological
viewpoints,98 it also advances an ontological position which speaks to the constitution of
both subjects and objects, and finds these entities to manifest an autonomous life of their
own which actively resists a neat synthesis or total comprehension.99
The dual epistemological/ontological concern marks a tension with MerleauPonty’s methodological starting point: the immanence of perceptual phenomena. How
can specifically human perception reveal to us what ultimately exists in itself? The
tension is ostensibly relieved when it is recognized by Merleau-Ponty that the duality of
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subject and object, in-itself and for-itself, is founded upon perception, rather than
presupposed by it.
The first philosophical act would appear to be to return to the world of actual
experience which is prior to the objective world, since it is in it that we shall be
able to grasp the theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective world,
restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways
of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history. Our task
will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience
through which other people and things are first given to us, the system ‘Selfothers-things’ as it comes into being; to reawaken perception and to foil its trick
of allowing us to forget it as a fact and as perception in the interest of the object
which it presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise. (PP
57/69)
The immediacy of perception, which “is no longer the impression, the object which is one
with the subject, but the meaning, the structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts”
(PP 58/70), is now defined in nonobjective terms and cannot be dissociated from the
network of concrete meanings that are exchanged at the intercorporeal level. Perception
is not first a matter of intuitive apprehension or judgment, it is a dialogue of
physiognomies—arrangements whose sense is made determinate and deciphered by the
body’s practical know-how.
John Sallis identifies three important characteristics of perception that summarize
the consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s primacy of perception thesis. By designating
perceptual experience as primary, Merleau-Ponty shows that perception is original,
autonomous, and foundational.100 All of our reflections, and thus everything we know,
have their origin in perception. The fund of perceptual experience is already there before
our senses, full of animation, form, and meaning. Perception is not produced by the
subject: the subject always finds itself inhabiting, from a singular perspective, a
phenomenal field whose horizon is forever receding. For phenomenology, the resistance
100

John Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), 30.

6

this field offers to our gaze reveals it to be beyond our comprehension and in some sense
prior to us. This open field that Husserl calls the Lebenswelt comprises phenomenology’s
transcendental (PP 61/74; VI 185-186/239).
Whereas for Kant the transcendental ego is what unifies the sensible order, for
Merleau-Ponty only a subject situated within an environment is able to negotiate the
coordinates that characterize our experience and furnish itself with the material that
founds understanding, judgment, and reflection. “A subject so aloof from the world as to
be able to constitute space as pure form would be no more capable of distinguishing ‘up’
from ‘down’ than would a subject so subordinated to the world as to be merely receptive
of non-oriented sense-content,” says Sallis.101 Perception takes place between subjects
and objects; it therefore belongs neither to the subjective nor the objective, but rather
involves (folds, envelopes) the subject and the object. The fundamental opacity or
ambiguity of this involutionary movement resists appropriation and prevents the evidence
of perception from being “absorbed into the circuit of reflective thought.”102 The object
given in perception is never given completely, yet we observe it as a unified thing (PrP
15/47).
By designating perception as the birthplace of the world while at the same time
imbuing this place with an irreducible ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty poses a considerable
challenge for anyone asking, “What exists?” It seems necessary to always reformulate
this question as “What can I make sense of, given my finite, corporeal constitution?” Of
course, this is echoes the Kantian critical question, “What can I know?” But Merleau101
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Ponty modifies the Kantian problem, which attempts to draw the limits of rational
knowledge, by turning the synthetic act of the understanding into a problem whose key is
the lived body. “The body, to which is linked the whole series of reductions that indicate
the need for synthesis, is, in a sense, the agent of the synthesis that is needed.”103 This
does not mean that Merleau-Ponty simply replaces Kant’s transcendental ego with a lived
body that would remain free of the effects of history. The body is always already
“saturated with its object” (PP 215/249); the body which performs the synthesis of
perceptual experience is never completely “aloof” from the world because there is always
something impersonal and improper about the body (PP 215/249), unlike its self-identical
doppelganger, the transcendental ego. Despite its capacity to “withdraw” from the world
in reflection, the lived body always remains tied to its world by an intentional thread (PP
72/86).104
The need for a transcendental faculty of synthesis becomes superfluous since the
body accomplishes the coordination of experience. “In positive terms, Merleau-Ponty’s
task is to retrace, beginning at the level of profiles, the constitution of the object, in such
a way as to show how at each level there is already a synthesis initiated within the matter
itself without there being any need for an extrinsic act of synthesis.”105 The body is
inserted directly into the perceptual horizon insofar as it is the anchor “in a total system
of possible profiles in their correlation with certain motor possibilities”106—the body is
always practically converging upon an optimum perspective, or an increasingly coherent
system of appearances, but never absolute knowledge (PP 301-303/347-350). The object
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is always evading the reach of perception despite our increasing ability to make sense of
or manipulate it. Although foundational, perception discloses objects as independently
constituted.
In a frequently cited working note to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty
acknowledges that by beginning with perception in Phenomenology of Perception he
prevented himself from articulating the kind of nondualist ontology that was being
worked out in his later texts. When he admits that “The problems posed in Ph.P. are
insoluble because I start there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction” (VI
200/253), he realizes that it is impossible to bridge the gap between subject and object, or
lived body and objective body, if these binaries are cast as ontologically distinct. By
beginning with perception, subject and object are supposed to achieve their (abstract)
distinction from out of the unity of perception, considered as a dynamic intentional
nexus. Ultimately, it is the body’s practical competence that traces the contours of reality:
“My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to
the perceived world, the general instrument of my ‘comprehension’” (PP 235/272). It is
clear that it is only through the body—here portrayed as a prosthetic of the
understanding—that the world is organized for perception.
The lived body possesses a kind of double life. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty
wants the body and its practical aims to provide the background against which perception
is generated (cf. the privileging of “spatiality of situation” over intelligible space in PP
100/116). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty insists that the body always finds itself
caught up in a world populated with objects, people, meanings, and ideas. He maintains
the first position in order to escape a naturalistic or positivistic conception of subjectivity.
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He maintains the second position in order to avoid charges of idealism. These evasions
force him to maintain a view of the embodied subject as both generative of and generated
by its perceptual world. The generated world would be identical to the perceived subject
insofar as the subject is what gives form to the world, by orienting its spatiality, for
example (cf. PP, Chapter 3). The objective world which generates the body would weave
the perspectival and practical environment that we always find ourselves within. This
latter would be the world in which things store their unseen profiles, the forgotten world
of anonymous, nonintentional sensory existence which lines the visible world (PP 215216/250-251).
By bracketing the objective world as well as the objective body, and beginning
with the world as perceived, Merleau-Ponty gives himself over to phenomenological
interrogation of the aporia of how my body can be both the origin of the world and its
product. He details the ways in which the body interacts with its world at the phenomenal
level, that is, at the level of perception. This interaction is several times characterized as a
dialogue or reciprocal determination (PP 127, 129, 132/148, 150, 154). But this
methodological maneuver raises questions about the pre-perceptual genesis of the body,
particularly at the level of sensation. Some of these questions are addressed by MerleauPonty, but we must ask whether his account of the pre-perceptual genesis of the body
falls within the scope of phenomenology or whether it must have recourse to a
speculative metaphysics. I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does draw
upon a certain metaphysics of the body, but that this metaphysics is spurred by his
phenomenological investigations.

10

Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the primacy of perception thesis remains bound
to an idealist epistemology which assumes the constitutive power of consciousness in the
form of the lived body. But if the body is what makes perception part of the objective
world while at the same time serving as the condition of that world’s appearance, then a
kind of distance must be introduced between the material world in which the body is an
object of science and the lived world in which the body engages a meaningful existence.
As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “If my consciousness were at present constituting the world
which it perceives, no distance would separate them and there would be no possible
discrepancy between them” (PP 238/275).
What makes the body more than a physical object is the distance opened within
consciousness by the binding polarization of subject and object that is intentionality.
Intentionality is both what animates the body as a subject, but also what keeps it
necessarily correlated with the world. Like the figure-ground structure, intentionality is
an ontological fact of existence (PP xvii/xii): this principle says that our conscious life
and knowledge are inextricably bound up with the historical horizon in which we exist.
At the corporeal level, intentionality denotes a fundamental connection between my lived
body, my objective body, the body of the other, and the objects of the world.
Merleau-Ponty’s lived body must belong, in a realist sense, to the material world
for his phenomenology to challenge the constitutive phenomenology of Husserl. To
achieve this materialization, he must posit a pre-perceptual life of the body; that is, he
must allow for a body whose capacity for perception is not the result of its own ideal
activation and whose constitution is comprised of “existentials”107 that “operate in
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perceptions” but remain unperceived themselves (VI 178, 180, 189/232, 233-234, 243; cf.
PP 238/275). Upon reflection, the phenomenal field must show itself to have already
been a field full of already extant bodies. Without this site of intercorporeity MerleauPonty would have to resort to a quasi-theological account of the incarnation of
consciousness in the body, or leave the birth of consciousness shrouded in mystery.
Despite the constraints placed on his discourse by the phenomenological
perspective, he does not pass over in silence the pre-phenomenal constitution of the body.
However, he delimits its material constitution from an ontological, rather than
physiological or biological, perspective. This requires some speculative deviation from a
strictly phenomenological method.
When I say that Merleau-Ponty “speculates” about the constitution of the body, I
mean that he admits elements into his account of subjectivity that are not disclosed
phenomenologically. Methodologically, his phenomenology is synthetic rather than pure,
a mixture of phenomenological description, empirical research, and metaphysical
speculation. This is partly what enables him to escape the fate of subjective idealism; it is
what Lakoff and Johnson admire when they call Merleau-Ponty an “empirically
responsible” phenomenologist.108 For instance, in order to explain the rigidity of
psychological prejudices (like racism) and their influence on the structuring of
perception, Merleau-Ponty appeals to the genetic, historical, and physiological
dimensions. He does this not to show that perception is always forced to conform to a
reified biological or social structure (Child 107/15), but to argue that heredity and social
are the “unconscious” “articulations of our field” (VI 180/233-234) and seem to be analogous to what
Heidegger intends by existentialia, or the ontological structures of Dasein, in Being and Time. Cf. Martin
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: HarperCollins,
1962), §9.
108
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conditioning are co-constitutive of the individual and his or her attitude toward others. He
writes that it is not the case that “the way in which the child structures his social
environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous
system” (Child 108/16). The individual is never simply determined by his or her
environment. The individual operates between the biological and the social, “takes a
position in the face of [these] external conditions” (Child 108/17, my emphasis). This is
the phenomenological point. The child’s perceptual prejudices are the result of a “single
global phenomenon” that emerges from certain natural determinations and social
conditioning, but against which the child is able to make his or her own meaning (Child
108/17). To comprehend the genesis and alteration of this meaning it is necessary to see
how perception is both something given (as social prejudice and physiology) and enacted
(in the body’s meaningful responses to its perceived environment).
Unfolding the constitution of the body means giving an account of the genesis of
its dimensions with a view to exposing how these dimensions make up the “new
definition of the a priori” discussed at several points in the Phenomenology of Perception
(e.g., PP 220-222/255-257). This corporeal a priori is addressed from at least three
aspects which do not always display a coherent picture: the primacy of perception thesis,
the body as the hinge109 of perception, and sensation as the body’s original communion
with the world. The primacy of perception thesis says that the things we encounter are
conditioned by, which is to say oriented according to, our field of perception. This field is
coordinated by the (partially anonymous) constitution of our bodies and their (often
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impersonal)110 capacity to practically synthesize the world (PrP 14/45-46). Of particular
importance for this synthesis is the schéma corporel, or body schema,111 and a number of
other concepts which function transcendentally to inform Merleau-Ponty’s view of the
body as reversible. These will be examined in the following section.
Although it operates as a transcendental, the lived body is never detached from
external bodies, objects, other persons.112 The material world and the body as subject are
“co-transcendentals,” we might say. This is Merleau-Ponty’s original philosophical
innovation.113 The body for Merleau-Ponty is not “an agency underlying the organization
of experience” or “the foundation of transcendental constitution.”114 Merleau-Ponty does
show that the body organizes the space it inhabits into functional and practicable places,
but he does not want to say that places are generated spontaneously. Instead, the body’s
organizational capacity “is a response to the questions the world raises,” which means
that its transcendental function “is inconceivable apart from its receptive, responsive,
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centripetal role before the givenness of the world, its existence as flesh amidst the flesh of
the world.”115 When we speak of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental perspective, we must
always keep in mind that his is an impure transcendental, a set of conditions that are
themselves conditioned by the body’s mutable history. This “historical a priori is
constant only for a given phase and provided that the balance of forces allows the same
forms to remain” (PP 88/104). Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habit, which we will
examine below, fills out the meaning of the historical a priori.116
Sometimes he speaks to the contrary, but there is neither a pure a priori nor a pure
a posteriori in Merleau-Ponty.117 For instance, he says that the habituated body schema
“remains forever anterior to perception” (PP 238/275), which would seem to indicate that
115
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the body schema is always prior to existence, and thus belongs to an a priori plane. The
body and perception would be disidentified in this case, the former being always already
constituted prior to the appearance of temporal events. But temporality is always central
to embodiment for Merleau-Ponty. “We must understand time as the subject and the
subject as time,” he says (PP 422/483).118 If the body and perception are identical—that
is, if there is no body before perception and no perception before body—it is necessary to
make sense of the latent body, the body lived unconsciously,119 prior to reflection and in
the background of explicit perception. As Merleau-Ponty writes in “Eye and Mind:”
“There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but
there is also that which reaches from below—the profound postural latency [latence
posturale] where the body raises itself to see…” (EM 187/85-86). This is the body in the
grip of the corporeal world, constrained by the exigencies of its embodied experience.
When posited from the phenomenological point of view, the primacy of
perception thesis has the disadvantage of not really explaining how it is possible for the
body—its habits, body and postural schemata, behavioral circuits, style, or
physiognomy—to be constituted prior to perception. Indeed, it does not allow us to speak
of an “anonymous” or “impersonal” body that underlies conscious perception and
precedes the differentiation of my body from the body of the other (PP 240/277; Child
119/33). Like Merleau-Ponty (VI 200/253), I see this as a methodological problem that
limits his early work but which can be overcome by adopting an ontological perspective,
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as he does most explicitly in The Visible and the Invisible when he shifts from the
language of consciousness and object (dualism), to the language of the flesh of the
sensible (monism).120 Despite his focus on first-person perception, however, MerleauPonty’s earlier texts have plenty to say about pre-perceptual and anonymous elements of
the body and, while an adequate metaphysics of corporeal individuation may be lacking
in the Phenomenology of Perception, there is a healthy ambiguity that attends the
transcendental status he assigns to the body. For instance, the body schema might be
designated a pure a priori if it can be shown to possess an immutable element (PP
142/166; SB 189/204).
What I am suggesting in this discussion of the primacy of perception thesis is that,
if perception is in a strong sense essential to all constitution, it is not clear how we are to
conceive the materiality of the body prior to perception. And yet, if it is the body that
perceives (PP 238/275), and this body is the product of “a past which has never been
present” (PP 242/280), then we are obliged to elucidate the metaphysics of this originary
constitution. On Merleau-Ponty’s view we are forced into the position of thinking the
body as a condition of possibility of experience while simultaneously upholding the view
that both body and world are the products of perception. To resolve this issue it seems
necessary to distinguish the body from perception and lend a certain primacy to the body
as a thing that perceives only secondarily. Such a view challenges the primacy of
perception thesis by undermining the transcendental character of perception and shifting
the transcendental to the level of corporeal sensibility. This can be accomplished by a
120
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examining the Sense Experience chapter of the Phenomenology, where the privilege of
perception is called into question as Merleau-Ponty attempts to delimit the difference
between sensation and perception. It is here that we see the most radical elements of
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental philosophy, as well as his most fertile attempts to
rehabilitate the concept of sensation in the name of a carnal ontology.
To illustrate these points I will defend the deliberately provocative thesis that
Merleau-Ponty gives priority to sensing, not perceiving, as he attempts to account for the
body’s relation to its world. This priority is granted from an ontological/metaphysical
perspective, but not from a phenomenological one. Along the way, the basic question I
attempt to answer is: What constitutes this body that orients our perceptual field?
Merleau-Ponty has plenty to say about this. I will also pursue a second question: Where
does this body come from; how is it individuated from the ambiguous field of the
sensible? I will first unpack some of the primary elements of the body and show that
Merleau-Ponty mainly conceives the body as reversible, that is, synchronized with its
environment.
Now that we have seen how the problem of the body is a problem of perception,
we must ask: What is this body that coordinates and conditions the subject’s capacity for
perception, indeed is this capacity, and gives meaning to the world as perceived? Where
does it come from and what is it made of? Here we will review some of the components
of the lived body and determine in what sense these components enable perception.
The lived body is not explicitly thematized in our daily operations, although we
are always in some sense aware of it; some of its components exist in the background as
we carry out our mundane activities, and we rely on its stability as we go about our
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business. When the body becomes ill or is disturbed in some other way, it announces
itself like Heidegger’s broken hammer121 and becomes an object to be examined.122 In
these cases, it presents itself as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a tool that allows
us to move with facility about our environment. Under normal circumstances our body’s
are attuned to their environment and function together as an uninterrupted unity. As
Shaun Gallagher puts it,
When the lived body is “in tune” with the environment, when events are ordered
smoothly, when the body is engaged in a task that holds the attention of
consciousness, then the body remains in a mute and shadowy existence and is
lived through in a non-conscious experience. But when the lived body loses its
equilibrium with the environment, it suddenly appears at center stage, announcing
itself as painful, fatigued, distorted, clumsy, embarrassed, etc.123
This does not mean that we inhabit two ontologically distinct bodies or that the body can
be divided up into multiple ontological levels.124 It means that the lived body is most of
the time absent from perceptual experience while at the same time conditioning that
experience.125 It assumes various levels of disclosure, but for the most part remains
inconspicuous.
Given this image of the normal mode of embodiment, I want to argue here that the
texts prior to The Visible and the Invisible catalogue a series of correlations between body
and world that prefigure the concept of flesh, a concept which provides a problematic
image of the body-world relation. These correlations can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s
discussions of, for example, habit, style, physiognomy, and body schema. Admittedly, the
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language of “correlation” prejudges the matter at hand by smuggling in objectivist terms
when these terms are precisely what Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology aims to dispel.
However, given that perception always “takes advantage of work already done” (PP
238/275) it is clear that there is a (qualified) ontological realism at play in MerleauPonty’s phenomenology that authorizes the term. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s use of
terms like “communion,” “dialogue,” and “synchronization” suggests that perception in
the Phenomenology can be thought within a dualist framework, even if this framework is
only to be understood as the result of a more originary unity of subject and object.
The emphasis on synchronization expresses Merleau-Ponty’s desire to take the
middle road between rationalism and empiricism, and to strike a balance between active
and passive conceptions of the embodiment. The body is not fully responsible for
creating the world in which it exists, but neither is it completely vulnerable to all of the
impressions inflicted upon it by material events. It is an entity whose actions are partly
enacted according to its desires and partly dictated by the impersonal contours of its
physical locale. As Madison puts it, “The subject of perception is not the free subject, the
master of itself which realizes itself to be a unique individual.”126 Because the body is
bound up with the world and given a form or “logic”127 that it does not give itself, its
capacity for action, its constitution as an “I can” rather than an “I think,” is determined
within the “unreasonable promiscuity”128 it carries on with its environment when it is not
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reflecting on itself. The prepersonal unity of the body first informs perception and all that
perceptual experience entails.129
Perhaps the central correlation of body and world involves habit. Merleau-Ponty’s
account of the habituated body is closely linked to his discussions of the body/postural
schema, physiognomic perception, and behavioral circuits, each of which is supported by
what he calls an “intentional arc.” The intentional arc subtends consciousness and draws
the various threads of the practicable environment together into a meaningful horizon of
possibilities. It does this by first unifying the senses into a synchronized system. This is
what Merleau-Ponty means by “synaesthetic perception” (PP 229/265). The body is not
just a reflex mechanism; it is a physical entity that interprets and makes sense out of the
disparate stimulation it receives. The “personal core” (PP 134/156) of the body “brings
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility” and “goes limp”
in illness, as the Schneider case reveals (PP 136/158-159). Habits are crucial because
they provide the body with its corporeal identity, in the form of latent or sedimentary sets
of actions that makes our surroundings familiar and workable, that enables our body to
sense and perceive without always having to explicitly appeal to the personal core of
consciousness.
Habits give our bodies their stable form. They are not merely supplemental or
ancillary modifications of a bare corporeity. Or rather, insofar as we acquire them from
our cultural and social environments they are a kind of original prosthetic, like language
(Child 99/4-5). Habits allow us to sink our attention in the present without having to
attend at each moment to the body. The body as a unified system is, Merleau-Ponty says,
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“my basic habit” [l’habitude primordiale] (PP 91/107). In order to free itself from the
environment, the body adopts “pre-established circuits” that give it the space to pursue its
intellectual projects. As he says, “it is an inner necessity for the most integrated existence
to provide itself with an habitual body” (PP 87/103).130 This is a view shared with
William James, who maintains that habit condenses and simplifies the movements
required to complete a particular task, thus habit “diminishes fatigue” by freeing up
attention.131
Habit, for James, is a material phenomenon that is registered both on and in our
bodies. He holds that our habit sets “depend on sensations not attended to,” which means
that our “body’s attitude” or proprioception132 subtends the series of movements which
make up a given habitual action, like buttoning one’s shirt.133 The body’s attitude is
written in the body and, like Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc, what enables the body to
make sense of a particular series of sensations and unify them into a coherent habitual
action. As he writes in The Principles of Psychology, “the phenomena of habit in living
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beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are
composed.”134
Merleau-Ponty does not share James’s naturalistic/neuroscientific interpretation
of habit. For Merleau-Ponty, habits are not stored in the physiology of the body as muscle
memories or neurological patterns. Habits are an acquired “power”135 that is built upon
the body’s unified capacity to grasp an environmental directive and imbue that directive
with a meaningful “motor significance” of its own (PP 143/167). The sedimentation of a
habit in the body is always permeated, as Edward Casey notes, by the “intentional threads
that go back and forth between the body and its ever-changing phases, which are
continually reanimated by current experience.”136
The acquisition of a habit involves the “rearrangement and renewal of the body
schema,” which underlies the habitual process as an “immediately given invariant” (PP
141, 142/165, 166; translation modified). The body schema is an open system of motor
potentiality that is receptive to the cultivation of habit. It remains open because it is
arranged according to the practical objectives of the subject. Practical objectives are not
determined in a vacuum, however; they are horizonal, and thus always motivating new
projects. The subject sets his or her tasks according to the layout of his or her situation
and the practical possibilities it presents, while habits rearrange the body schema
according to the singular way these possibilities are inhabited. Correlatively, the body
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schema is structured as a response to concrete conditions; it is a dynamic form that is at
once shaped by material forces and ordered by the intentional arc of the embodied agent.
Casey writes, “the habituation which such inhabitation accomplishes involves a delicate
dialectic between the implied passivity of enclosure…and the activity of getting to know
our way around in a given circumstance.”137 There is never a point at which this dialectic
is not underway, which is why Merleau-Ponty can say that space “is already built into my
bodily structure, and is its inseparable correlate” (PP 142/166).
The sedimentation of habits in the lived body release the subject from the
immediacy of the present and enables the “movement of transcendence” that
characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s conception of being in the world. In his discussion of
being in the world we find one of the strongest statements of Merleau-Ponty’s
correlationist view of embodiment:
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but
a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a
world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the
world remains ‘subjective’ since its texture and articulations are traced out by the
subject’s movement of transcendence. (PP 430/491-492, my italics).138
As we know, this is not an endorsement of idealism. It does, however, indicate that
Merleau-Ponty sees our capacity to transcend any present situation as predicated upon the
immanent organization of that situation by the body’s perceptual activity. Conversely,
this activity must also be seen as a fundamental passivity of the body. The world, too,
turns the subject into a project. Despite the apparent symmetry, there is a sense in which
the strict correlation of body and world—i.e., the immanence of embodiment—described
by Merleau-Ponty is dominated by the projects/projections of the subject. This is because
137
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world is an articulation of the subject’s practical freedom, which means that the
constraints imposed on the subject are, in a sense, self-imposed. Moreover, it is as though
the world would be a deprived wasteland without the “texture” provided to it by
subjectivity. It is not so much that the subject possesses a mysterious power to escape
immanence, but that Merleau-Ponty’s immanence is never pure. It is always already
permeated by avenues of transcendence traced out by the subject. Perception guarantees
the complicity (rather than identity) of subject and world by permeating their immanence
with an intentionality that binds while its liberates. This complicity remains
dissymmetrical, however, for it is the subject that introduces intentionality and initiates
the movement of transcendence. The dissymmetrical relation accounts for the ability of
the subject to cultivate its own habits.139 Without the movement of transcendence the
habits of the body would only be imposed on the body from outside influences.
Just as tissue, neurons, blood, etc. work together to form our physiological
system, the habits we adopt, cultivate, and inherit make up the lived body’s nonbiological armature. Without the economizing effect of habits our bodies are destined to
expend their energy on simple reflexive behavior or waste it relearning how to perform
operations they have performed many times before. Our bodies are normally not
restricted to these modes of existence. Much of our lives are routinized and we carry out
many daily tasks as if we were automata. But automation is only apparent. Our habitual
activities actually enable us to expand our range of spontaneous actions, which is what
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Merleau-Ponty means when he says that “habit expresses our power of dilating our being
in the world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments” (PP 143/168).
The armature of habit is no less fundamental than the biological constitution of
the body. It is true that Merleau-Ponty says that habit is “merely a mode” of the body’s
fundamental capacity to transform a spontaneous action into a personal gesture (PP
146/171, translation modified), that habit particularizes the body through repetitious and
regular acts. But he also points to habit as ontologically basic to the body. As Casey
shows, this primacy is two-fold. First, habit is the corporeal manifestation of a past that
lives on in my body as its unreflective history. “In this way habit takes the lead over the
very body it requires for its own realization.” Second, habit forms the basis upon which
corporeal style and personal expressivity rest. It mediates between the general,
anonymous body and the sculpted body built up by our culture and conduct.140 Habits are
what enable our bodies to understand their environment, to achieve a “harmony between
what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance” (PP
144/169). This understanding is of course not mental, but inscribed in the body as the
physiognomy and corporeal sens that at once opens and limits our field of perception (PP
152/178).
Before we achieve the freedom to cultivate our own habits we must have reached
a workable state of equilibrium. The forces and impulses we are born with must be tamed
in order to become manageable. Only at this point are we free to take up the world as a
field of equipment. In a sense, this is done for us as we enter into the circuits of behavior
140
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maintained by our culture. As Alphonso Lingis puts it, “One is born with forces that one
did not contrive. One lives by giving form to these forces. The forms one gets from the
others.”141 As human beings, we are delivered directly into a world whose form has been
shaped by human artifice. These forms are technologically produced and conducive to the
kinds of beings that we are. Cultural artifacts are ideally made to enable the postures that
we normally adopt as we take our position in the environment. The built places that
receive us as newborn infants already have us in mind, or they at least anticipate that our
bodies will resemble those which came before. When they do not, we rebuild them or
adapt our postures accordingly; or, the body endures the labor of forced adaptation and
potential debilitation. The network or circuit of places made to accommodate our
corporeal physiognomies constitutes the meaning of our built environment.
The development of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is supported not
just by the foresight of architects, but also by atavisms of culture that live on in our
human bodies. Following André Leroi-Gourhan, Lingis explains,
Unlike other mammals, which make their way head first, the nose is no longer in
contact with the environment; the eyes have become the directing organ. The
upright posture disengaged the hands from the terrain; they now become
coordinated with the eyes. As humans begin to alter and reconstruct the
environment about them, new functions are taken on by different body parts and
organs.142
So it is not just that our bodies are born into inhabitable spaces that will enable the
acquisition of habits. The ways in which we as humans have come to inhabit our
environment are ingrained in the physiology of our species, and therefore operate to
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construct the postures we assume. This point echoes, from an evolutionary perspective,
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about the symbiotic relation between the child and his/her
world:
In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been
molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise
of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp,
in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social
conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in
which the child structures his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or
constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. […] And so the internal
characteristics of the subject always intervene in his way of establishing his
relations with what is outside him. It is never simply the outside which molds
him; it is he himself who takes a position in the face of the external conditions.
(Child 108/16)
Ultimately, the individual is neither social nor natural to begin with. He or she is both at
once. The space between these two organizational forces—nature and culture—possesses
an “elasticity” [élasticité], says Merleau-Ponty, because it can manifest both reactive and
active responses within the child (Child 108/16).
Similarly, the body is always caught up in circuits that are basically affective.
Affective circuits lend our bodies an emotional identity by economizing the things we
feel. 143 Since the body is never without its passions, never without a certain emotional
disposition or mood, its affectivity must be regarded as constitutive of embodiment.144 It
can be argued, as Lawrence Hass does, that it is affectivity that separates us from the
world of inanimate things.145 Our affects imbue our intercorporeal encounters with a
resonance that can energize us (joy) or enervate us (sadness). But it is not just personal
encounters that are laced with affectivity—it is the entirety of aesthetic experience. This
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insight is behind the discussion of color in the Phenomenology of Perception, where
colors are said to have a “felt effect” and a “motor significance” that explains why, for
instance, “red signifies effort or violence, green restfulness and peace” (PP 209-211/242244).146 This is not to say that our bodies are hopelessly at the mercy of their sensory
environment. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “The subject of sensation is neither a thinker
who takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a
power which is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or
is synchronized with it” (PP 211/245). Sensory and affective circuits carry our bodies
along, pushing and pulling them, because our bodies are of the sensible realm and
informed by its sensory countours. Yet we retain the ability to seize upon and transform
their meaning, and thus transcend ourselves through aesthetic/affective creation. “I
cannot be caught in immanence,” says Paul Klee.147
Gail Weiss notes that it is the intentional arc that enables a series of disparate
affects to be drawn together into a personal circuit. The intentional arc acts as a kind of
internal circuit of the lived body insofar as it is what is always running in the background
as the (normal) subject sets out to enter into new and habitual series of tasks. Unlike the
habitual circuits that we find in James, where the body runs according to an established
set of neural pathways that correspond to its observable behavior, for Merleau-Ponty it is
the body’s intentional arc that allows it to engage in habituated activities unthinkingly.
“This intentional arc,” writes Weiss, “provides human beings with an affective sensibility
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that enables the integration of quite dissimilar experiences into a synthetic whole.”148 For
Merleau-Ponty, it is the intentional arc (which is not reducible to a physical event) that
underpins the body’s competence, its coherent and almost effortless way of moving,
acting, gesturing, and expressing itself corporeally. Or more specifically, it is the
habituation of the body’s intentionality through practical interaction with the environment
that establishes the intentional arc as the grid upon which the world is always
projected.149
There is evidence to suggest that the emotional life of the brain is at least as
fundamental to the lived body’s normal functioning as the meaningful dialogue it carries
out at the perceptual level. The point here is not merely that the lived body cannot
perform without having an emotion, and that this emotion emerges in the brain, it is the
more salient point that the meaning culled from the world by the lived body is always in
part produced by the affective valence of our situations. A “situation,” as Mark Johnson
understands it, is a complex event which occurs between an organism and its
environment. It is very close to what Merleau-Ponty means by our existential situation, or
being in the world. Drawing from the philosophy of Dewey as well as the neuroscience of
Antonio Damasio, Johnson argues that
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Emotions are key components of complex processes of assessment, evaluation,
and transformation. As such, they are integral to our ability to grasp the meaning of a
situation and to act appropriately in response to it. Most of this ongoing processing and
action is never consciously entertained, but it is nonetheless meaningful to us, insofar as it
constitutes an important part of our maintaining a workable relation to our
surroundings.150
Without emotions, it is difficult (or impossible) for our bodies to determine
whether or not their present environment is safe to inhabit. Without such assessment, the
body cannot act rationally or free itself from the defensive posture in which it remains
vigilant against imminent threats. By the same token, the body cannot read hostility or
security into the land without having fashioned an intentional arc that will allow it to
judge another body as congruent or incongruent with itself. Affectivity and intentionality
are woven together to infuse the body’s sensibility.
Anticipating a bit, I would say that Merleau-Ponty too often focuses on the
intentional life of the body while neglecting its affective and material life. In this he
remains very much a proponent of the subject as primarily an active agent. It is not that
he fails to see that these two dimensions of embodiment are intertwined and
equiprimordial,151 but that he tends to pathologize those moments when the body loses its
competent hold on the world or when its intentional arc loses its coherence. This results
in an inadequate view of how the body acquires its identity and maintains its integrity
vis-à-vis the environment. Similarly, he tends to overlook the physical or material aspects
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of how objects and emotions orient the body’s activity.152 The dialogue of subject and
object—which forms the kernel of Merleau-Ponty’s narrative regarding the primacy of
perception—is driven by the exchange of meanings intended by bodily consciousness,
not by unregistered signals (autonomic) received from the environment or mundane
sensations that fail to solicit attention. It is, for the most part, only figures which stand
out against a horizon that interest Merleau-Ponty. He has considerably less to say about
insignificant and “neutral”153 situations, as well as situations where the body is so
overwhelmed that its intentional threads are severed and the figure-ground structure is
torn asunder.154
Shannon Sullivan explains that for Merleau-Ponty objects regulate the body
intentionally as well as materially. “The keyboard,” for example, “has a particular shape
and manner of operating that call for a specific bodily comportment in order to use it.”155
There is a plurality of significance transmitted to the body by the keyboard that can be
accommodated in a variety of ways; but the body must adapt itself if it wants to dialogue
with, rather than dominate, the object. My body does not perceive the material world
without that world confronting me with a meaning that I or someone else has projected
onto it. Sullivan writes: “The keyboard has a meaningful place within my world because,
through my body’s familiarity with the keyboard gained through the repeated use of it, a
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piece of plastic and metal has become an extension of my intentionality.” And: “My
intentionality turns a heavy object into a paperweight; it is because of my need to hold
papers down that a random stone nearby becomes a cultural object.”156 These
descriptions imply that the lived body controls the order of perceptual significance and
the circuits of meaningful behavior.
There are instances, however, when the materiality of the world seizes upon our
bodies and perception becomes unhinged. Lingis describes the orgasmic body as one
whose seizure is not merely a failure of the intentional arc, but the result of a
decomposition of the body’s postural schema itself.157 In a different context, George
Yancy describes a scene wherein the body of a white woman is given over to involuntary
gestures that cannot be explained with a Pavlovian reflex theory or a theory of dialogical
perception. Something else is required to account for the “ambush”—the visceral
response solicited in the white woman when the body of a black man enters her elevator.
She may tell herself that she knows this body; that she has a handle on what a black body
is; that she has no reason to clutch her purse closely. Yancy writes how “she may come to
judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically false, but her racism may
still have a hold on her lived body.”158 Despite herself, she tenses up, her body recoils.
She does not search the man’s body to bring its sense into relief; nor does she objectify
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him. She has no need to: his darkness symbolizes a threat. Conversely, she becomes selfaware, nearly to the point of paralysis; she averts her eyes and fixes them straight
ahead.159 But it is not that the black man’s gaze has turned her into an object, as Sartre
would say. It is the very darkness of the man’s body, his sensory and symbolic
constitution, that arrests the white woman’s movement. He remains an ambiguous
presence, his darkness gripping her.
Yancy’s work draws insight from Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, a
book wherein Fanon explicitly takes up the concept of the body schema to interrogate its
function in intercorporeal relations. Ordinarily, the body schema is described as the
“implicit knowledge” possessed by the body that enables it to reach for the cigarettes at
the corner of the desk, or lean backward to retrieve the matches buried in the desk’s
drawer.160 Such postural facility is experienced by the white body whether it is in its
office or out in public. The black body, by contrast, is not afforded this facility when the
gaze of a white person descends upon it. Recalling such an encounter, Fanon describes
himself as “completely dislocated” by the white gaze, which apprehended and returned
his body to him “sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning….”161 “What else
could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole
body with black blood?”162 What gets excised from Fanon’s subjectivity is precisely his
body schema, or at least its enabling function. It is replaced by a “racial epidermal
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schema”163 that, if anything, disables his body by entering it into an economy which
operates according to hues and tints, shades of light and dark.
As objectified, the black body becomes laced with legends, symbols, myths, and
fantasies—all of which are woven into it by the look of the white person and supported
by what Fanon calls a “historico-racial schema.”164 This schema, which is situated
anonymously below the body schema, calls upon or “hails” the black body to be more
than a practical, competent corporeality, or what Merleau-Ponty calls an “I can.”
Merleau-Ponty says that it is our competent embodied perception that weaves the fabric
of the real (PP x/iv-v). Fanon reminds us that it is the perception of the white body that
traces the contours of the world and forces the nonwhite body to respond accordingly. “I
wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours,” laments Fanon, “and to help
build it together.”165 To summarize this contrast, we might say that whereas the white
body is solicited by the world to actively complete it, the black body is made to perform
in a world that has always already been completed for it. It is in this economy of colored
skin that the dialogical theory of perception exposes its limitations.
Reading Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology, it is easy to feel that the world he has
in mind is for the most part a world filled with things to be handled or manipulated, or
what Heidegger called the ready to hand. The manipulation of things often leads to a
better understanding of them; this is where knowledge comes from. We can manipulate
163
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things because we are things ourselves, albeit a special kind of thing—the kind of thing
that directs itself toward goals and orders its surroundings into a meaningful habitat. The
problem of other persons and how we recognize them as such is certainly considered, but
the exemplary scenes in the Phenomenology involve a human being confronting an
inanimate object. When the human is incapable of maximizing its grip on the object, that
is, when the human is unable to adjust its body to the physiognomy of another body,
Merleau-Ponty signals a pathology (PP 136/158). Yancy’s description of the “elevator
effect” and Fanon’s theory of the racial epidermal schema, however, reveal corporeal
incompetence and dissymmetry as norms of embodiment. We too are manipulated by
objects, symbols, and stimuli, and not just in ways that enable our bodies or aid our
perceptual grasp.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of color-perception in the Phenomenology underscores
his more general point that our body’s communication with its environment happens
primarily at the level of perceptual meaning, or what he often calls “physiognomy” or
“motor physiognomy” (PP 209/243). The subject is not a pilot navigating the body from
within or a merely organic mechanism. The subject can negotiate its surroundings
because its corporeal composition is legible by other bodies, and other bodies are legible
for it. Bodies possess the power to read and respond directly to both formal and
qualitative features. Merleau-Ponty insists that perception is always laced with sense, and
it is this sense that enables the body to respond to “sensations.”166 To say that colors
induce the body to move in specific ways because they display a certain physiognomy is
to say that sensory experience is always figured, that even colors are never experienced
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as detached from a significant horizon.167 The body can negotiate this horizon because it
possesses its own physiognomy, one which is arranged by the physiognomy of the world
and displayed in the arsenal of gestures it typically deploys (PP 143/168).
Merleau-Ponty deploys many concepts to characterize the original unity of body
and world. In the Phenomenology, it is perception, physiognomy, and style; in the course
on nature, it is natural environment and the Earth;168 in The Visible and the Invisible, it is
the flesh of the sensible, “this generality of the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to
Myself” as Merleau-Ponty puts it (VI 139/183). Individual bodies for Merleau-Ponty are
always cut from the same impersonal cloth—personal individuation is something
achieved, not given. The meaning of the personal, however, can only be understood
against the backdrop of a prepersonal milieu, whether this is nature, the sensible realm as
such, or the world as an eminently expressive style:
The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles,
which guarantees for my experiences a given, not a willed, unity underlying all
the disruptions of my personal and historical life. Its counterpart within me is the
given, general and pre-personal existence of my sensory functions in which we
have discovered the definition of the body. (PP 330/381)
The notion of style gives us a clue to Merleau-Ponty’s view of corporeal identity as
something dynamically constituted by environmental conditions. In a strong sense, our
bodies are products of the sedimented meaning that makes up our cultural milieu.169 Born
into a stylized environment which calls upon it to adopt a compatible bodily
167
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comportment, the body is not inscribed with a style as much as it coherently expresses an
historical embeddedness, a set of social and physical limitations or constraints. The body
is “a certain style informing my manual gestures and implying in turn a certain style of
finger movements, and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing.” Its
identity is, in a word, “a work of art” (PP 150/176).
Style is not fixed in the visible form of the body; nor is it an abstraction from the
many postures a given body assumes. A style is nothing other than the specific animation
of a body, the invisible force that renders it recognizable in its singularity (PP
327/378).170 As Graham Harman writes, “style is a real force that animates the qualities
[of a body].”171 Style is not spontaneous expression, however, and in the last analysis the
general style of the natural and social worlds serves as the condition of possibility for the
emergence of individual style.172 “Expression,” therefore, “has the form not only of a
creative, but also of a responsive expression.”173
By defining it in terms of style, Merleau-Ponty lends a determinate fluidity to
corporeal identity. “A style,” he writes, “is a certain manner of dealing with situations,
which I identify or understand in an individual or in a writer, by taking over that manner
myself in a sort of imitative way, even though I may be quite unable to define it” (PP
327/378). As we know, style is recognizable across an array of individual examples.
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“One can hear a newly discovered Charlie Parker recording and immediately recognize
the style; one can and will say that ‘that solo is really classic Bird’, even though up till
now it was not part of the known Parker oeuvre.”174 Beyond a certain threshold of
differentiation a specific style begins to break up and morph into another style. We can
imagine a masterful jazz musician like Parker deviating so far from his usual delivery so
as to approximate John Coltrane. In such an instance, what is left of Parker? Has he not in
a sense become Coltrane, insofar as Coltrane’s identity just is his musical style? In a
strong sense, Parker and Coltrane are the sounds they produce. A visual example is given
in The Visible and the Invisible, where Merleau-Ponty explains how a pebble or a shell
exhibits an identity that persists throughout “their variations within certain limits.” On his
principle of identity, bodies maintain their identity so long as their sensible modifications
do not disintegrate the style that animates them. Identity is lost when a body moves
“beyond a certain range of their changes” (VI 161/213), or crosses a stylistic threshold.175
Merleau-Ponty does not fully explore the causes of these deviations of identity.
For Descartes, it is the mind that judges an object’s identity as continuous
throughout its modifications, or that determines a cloaked figure perceived from some
distance to be a person rather than an automaton.176 It is this same mind which, removed
from the mutable world of extended substance, retains its identity and subsists through
every modification of the body. For Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, it is the body that
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recognizes another human body beneath the cloak. “It is through my body that I
understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive ‘things’” (PP
186/216). The dialectic of recognition becomes a dialogue of styles that unfolds without
mediation. “The concept of style,” writes Linda Singer, “secures the Other’s direct
accessibility as a distinctive way of inhabiting the world. […] His integrity is not that of a
conceptual consistency, but of an existential project which is directly present, even if I
cannot reconstruct its inner workings.”177 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the other is, for me,
“an unchallengeable style” that relays an identity to my own body’s identity and makes
the other “in principle accessible to me as I am to myself” (PP 364/418; SB 222/238).
Style is one of the most plastic phenomena adduced by Merleau-Ponty. It
“ensures my existence of a stability, while allowing for the possibility of growth and
change.”178 It points to the fluid constitution of bodily integrity and defines the
intercorporeal realm as a sphere of immanence, where bodies communicate and influence
each other. This communication is at once personal and anonymous, inherited and
created.179 But corporeal style remains dependent on the body schema, which offers a
form of stability amid the fluid immanence of the intercorporeal dialogue. Gallagher
holds that the body schema should not be regarded as something that stands between
subject and object as mediator or “screen” (SB 219/236), but rather that “insofar as it is
dynamic in taking up certain postures and thus situating the body in respect to the
environment, it remains experientially invisible—absently available.”180 The body
schema does, however, play the “active role of organizer” of sensations and “reflects and
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determines the posture that is taken up by the lived body in its everyday situations.”181
This seems to suggest that the activity of the body schema plays a more fundamental role
in the organization of perception than any passivity.
Merleau-Ponty holds that a figure against a background is the simplest of sensible
experience. Lest we interpret this to be a merely empirical truth, he notes that “this is not
a contingent characteristic of factual perception” (PP 4/10). It is an ontological fact. But
like all transcendentals in Merleau-Ponty, one that is historically conditioned. Elizabeth
Grosz points out that the body schema (she says “body image”) is at work in the
structuring of this a priori. She says that,
The body image is necessary for the distinction between figure and ground, or
between central and peripheral actions. Relative to its environment, the body
image separates the subject’s body from a background of forces; but also within
the body, the body image establishes the distinctions—between movements of
limbs, say, and the rest of the body—which provide it with its corporeal context.
A single movement reorients the whole of the body, creating what might be called
a gait or posture, an individual and cultural bodily style.182
Sullivan calls such an ordering of the environment “projective intentionality” and, like
Grosz, sees such a view as problematic from a feminist ethical perspective:
Instead of being an account of the dynamic, co-constitutive relationship between
self and other, the model of intersubjectivity offered by Merleau-Ponty tends
toward that of a subject’s monologue with itself that includes a domineering
erasure of others in its projective ‘communication’ with them.183
Although invaluable for understanding the corporeal structures of lived experience,
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema is often blind to raced, gendered, and other
forms of embodiment.184 I would add that he equally neglects non-figured experience, or
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the experience of sensing an ungraspable—like wind or cold—that does not stand out
against a backdrop. This blind spot in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of embodiment informs
his mistaken view that body and environment are synchronized or reversible, and that our
primary mode of engagement with the world involves manipulation of things.
We have already noted that habits are rearrangements of the general body schema
underlying the habituated, stylized body which serves as the invariant against which the
modifications of the body are registered. We have seen, moreover, how Fanon calls into
question the historicity of the body schema and how Grosz and Sullivan raise problems
about its constitutive activity. For these reasons, we can say that the body schema’s
dynamic relation with its surroundings is fundamental to its individuation and its socalled invariance (PP 141/165) pertains only to its role as active regulator of movement,
not to the determinate regulations themselves. These regulations are determined
culturally, historically, intercorporeally; they configure the world we perceive. Despite its
variability, the body schema nevertheless operates as the dominant organizing principle
of perception. From the perspective of lived experience, the world cannot but appear as
complicit or synchronized with the body-subject’s practical agenda, even if this agenda is
laced with anonymous, impersonal, and unconscious prejudices.
On the one hand, it is possible to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the
body schema and habit as plastic, as Weiss does.185 This should not be taken to mean that
the lived body’s structure begins as a blank slate and only subsequently becomes
schematized and habituated. The lived body requires habits and body schemata in order
to perceive, and without them “perception is impossible” (Child 122/37). These basic
structures maintain their stability while also remaining open to modifications that would
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restructure them. Since perception is internally linked to the body’s constitution, any
restructuring entails a new style of movement, and thus a new perceptual experience.186
On the other hand, it seems to me that Merleau-Ponty does not want to grant that
the lived body is fully plastic. So long as it is a living (human) body, and not a body
reduced to its objective relations in the world, it maintains a set of invariants that do not
succumb to any transformation. These invariants include the figure-ground structure of
perception. The figure-ground structure rests on the body schema, which suggests that the
body schema must be always present in some form for the body to perceive. On this
reading, perception is no longer primary. An unschematized body will not be capable of
distinguishing figures and will not, therefore, be able to enter into dialogue with the
environment. Such a body would not be living in Merleau-Ponty’s terms.
Since perception presupposes a functioning body schema, and the body schema is
acquired dialogically, body and world must be synchronized for perception to occur.
Otherwise, the body schema could not develop. I think this synchronization is behind
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of reversibility. It is responsible for his later view that
subjects and objects are basically articulations of a single sensible element called the
flesh, where “seer and visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees
and which is seen” (VI 139/183).
Merleau-Ponty employs the language of synchrony on more than one occasion.
For instance, he speaks of impersonal biological life and personal life as for the most part
operating in concert, the former being “practically taken for granted” as something “I rely
on to keep me alive.” As Merleau-Ponty puts it, we exist “without…being able either to
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reduce the organism to its existential self, or itself to the organism” (PP 84/99). Citing the
biography of Saint-Exupéry, Merleau-Ponty notes that on rare occasions our organic life
can be almost completely suppressed by our personal life: “It may even happen when I
am in danger that my human situation abolishes my biological one, that my body lends
itself without reserve to action” (PP 84/99). Later on in the Phenomenology he explicitly
speaks of the synchronization of the biological and human, yet lends a certain primacy to
the biological:
…as we have indicated above, biological existence is synchronized
[embrayée]with human existence and is never indifferent to its distinctive rhythm.
Nevertheless, we shall now add, ‘living’ (leben) is a primary process from which,
as a starting point, it becomes possible to ‘live’ (erleben) this or that world, and
we must eat and breathe before perceiving and awakening to relational living,
belonging to colours and lights through sight, to sound through hearing, to the
body of another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human relations.
(PP 159-160/186)
Instead of taking this to be a glimpse into Merleau-Ponty’s latent naturalism, we should
see it as an example of his “empirically responsible” phenomenology. For, from an
existential point of view, the biological does not come first and the human is not built
upon the organic unity of the body. The lived body reciprocally expresses the
physiological and psychic because it always finds itself already absorbed in a meaningful
circuit of behavior.
This is one of the reasons that Merleau-Ponty will speak on the one hand of an
original syncretism of body and world, but then quickly dispel the notion that sensing
(sentir) is ever without a human sense. “The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who
takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a
power which is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or
is synchronized with it” (PP 211/245). And yet, Merleau-Ponty will speak of our
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sensibility as belonging to an anonymous life of the senses that thrives “on the fringe of
my own personal life and acts.” He writes, “Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that
it concerns not my own being…but another self which has already sided with the world,
which is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized [synchronisé] with them”
(PP 216/250). Now, this is a form of synchrony that the lived body is not in control of,
for it is established nonintentionally and concerns the body as something that senses
before it perceives, that lives materially before it grasps meaningfully.
It is here that we see Merleau-Ponty catching sight of the relation between sensing
and sensed that defines his notion of flesh. More importantly for us, however, we also see
the point at which the body-world relation becomes a volatile one. It is at the level of
sensing that the body is at its most vulnerable, where its hold on the world and its
capacity to dialogue with other bodies is not yet accomplished, and is even susceptible to
experiences that could disable its integrity.
Sensing relies on a synchronization or synthesis of the senses (with each other and
with their object) whereby each organ’s unique means of exploring is brought together in
the intersensory realm of perception. This realm is made possible by the “domain of
sense itself, the community of significance between [the visual and tactile] being
inadequate to ensure their union in one single experience” (PP 225/260). This union, as
we have seen, is effected by the body and the intentional arc that allows it to actualize the
“motor potentiality” of an object and thereby grasp its meaning effectively.
I am able to touch effectively only if the phenomenon finds an echo within me, if
it accords with a certain nature of my consciousness, and if the organ which goes
out to meet it is synchronized with it. The unity and identity of the tactile
phenomenon do not come about through any synthesis of recognition in the
concept, they are founded upon the unity and identity of the body as a synergic
totality. (PP 316-317/366)
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Thus, the dialogue of subject and object, of styles and physiognomies, only occurs when
the lived body is capable of conforming itself to the “logic of the world,” that is, when it
is capable of synchronizing with it (PP 326/377).
In his treatment of sensibility/sense experience, Merleau-Ponty seems to
acknowledge the diachrony of sensations and their capacity to disrupts body-world
synchrony. But, as we will see, he is reluctant to lend primacy to sensing over perceiving.
Indeed, these potentially distinct modes of experience are collapsed in most of MerleauPonty’s descriptions. Understood as a pre-perceputal and anonymous mode of
embodiment, the volatility of sensing poses a threat to synchronization of body and
world. It opens the body to forces foreign to perception.
The concept of flesh developed in The Visible and the Invisible follows up the
idea of synchronization with the insight that seer and seen, touching and touched, are
reversible or chiasmic phenomena. The subject-object dialogue, which retains the dualist
form, is transformed into an immanent ontology that regards subjects and objects as
individual expressions of the sensible in general. Now, I would not want to go so far as to
say that such a move “reduces the other to the same” or eliminates alterity from
intercorporeal relations. However, I agree with Levinas when he says that “[there is a]
priority of the flesh…to the detriment of another ambiguity or ambivalence, that of the
enigma of sensation-sentiment, which is played out in the passivity of the senses affected
[sens affectés] by the sensorial, between the pure undergoing or suffering and eventual
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pain, and the known [su] of knowledge that remains behind as its residue or trace.”187
This insight is what will orient Chapter 3 below.
Merleau-Ponty tames the volatility of sensation in two ways: first, by defining it
in terms of synchrony and treating it as something that for the most part enables our
perceptual competence; and, more radically, by arguing for a “fundamental narcissism of
all vision” which is supposed to describe the mode of being of the flesh. The general
reversibility signaled by this portrayal of the sensible may pertain to peaceful and
mundane experiences of others, but it neglects all the ways sensations can disable us, as
well as the uncertainty involved as our bodies move from one sensory environment to
another. It does not do justice to novel or extreme sensations, and it downplays the reality
of hostile or deadly environments. In a word, it trivializes the vulnerability of our
sensibility.
As we have noted, Merleau-Ponty does recognize a layer of sensation that
operates “below” perception. As pre-perceptual it does not solicit a dialogue from the
lived body. Instead, it remains out of sync with lived experience and presents the body
with a volatile situation.188 Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on body-world synchronization
obscures the asymmetry of intercorporeity at the level of sensation; this comes as a result
of his desire to assimilate sensation (as le sentir, sense experience or sensing) to the
model of perception as “communion.” The thesis of reversibility can only be advanced by
ignoring the alterity of the material world, that is, at the peril of sensation’s autonomy.
This is why neither the phenomenology of perception nor the ontology of the flesh can
187
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adequately address the problems of embodiment and why the metaphysics of bodies we
find in Spinoza or Nietzsche,189 for instance, is also needed.
In giving an account of subjectivity and the immanence of the body-world
relation, I think Merleau-Ponty does make significant advances past Kant and Husserl by
developing concepts like style and physiognomy. These concepts allow him to speak
coherently about perception and intersubjectivity as corporeal interactions that do not
require the mediation of a transcendental subject. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty should
be regarded as a kind of materialist.190 This ambition becomes even more apparent when
he is writing about sensing, or when he speaks of the “carnality” of the flesh in The
Visible and the Invisible. Here his theory of embodied perception shifts its focus from the
form of perception to the material of perception—i.e., sensations, the sensible as such—
even though he does not endorse the form-matter distinction. It is in his analysis of
sensation that we can best see Merleau-Ponty trying to negotiate the immanence of body
and environment. But his account of immanence is compromised by his endorsement of
the primacy of perception thesis and his methodological commitment to the principle of
intentionality. The limit of his materialism, moreover, appears when his theory of habit is
contrasted with a neurophysiological account like that given by James.
189
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CHAPTER 2
SENSING, REVERSIBILITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE

Let us return to sensation and scrutinize it closely
enough to learn from it the living relation of the
perceiver to his body and to his world.
– Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception

Merleau-Ponty begins his rehabilitation of sensation as early as Phenomenology of
Perception. After rejecting the modern view of sensation as a unit of content that must be
assembled with other units in order to build the objects of perception, he endorses a view
of sensation as sensing (which is a more appropriate translation of le sentir, sense
experience)191 which is adopted from Erwin Straus’s The Primary World of Senses, on
the one hand, and Husserl’s Ideas II, on the other. This notion of sensing, which regards
sensation as “that vital communication with the world which makes it present as a
familiar setting of our life” (PP 52-53/64-65) is central to Merleau-Ponty’s postdualist
perspective and the primacy of perception thesis that it defends. For my part, I will argue
that sensing is the body’s primary mode of engagement, that sensing operates below the
level of intentionality and is even more basic than operative intentionality, which is
defined as the “natural and antepredicative” form of perception. Operative intentionality
is what first opens us to the phenomenal field, “furnishing the text which our knowledge
tries to translate [via deliberate judgments] into precise language” (PP xviii/xiii). Like
operative intentionality, sensing lends continuity to the body-world relation and is
fundamental to the nondualism of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, although his privileging
of perception often threatens to reinstate a discontinuity between subject and object.
191

See Daniel Guerrière, “Table of Contents of ‘Phenomenology of Perception:’ Translation and
Pagination,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10, no. 1 (1979): 65-69.

49

Merleau-Ponty recognizes a distinction between sensation and perception.
Whereas perception is constantly striving to pull objects out of their ambiguous presence
and into a practicable relief, it is sensation that can occasionally breaks up the synchrony
accorded to perceptual experience. To claim that such an interruption is merely an
invitation to explore the undiscovered meanings contained in the perception horizon is to
miss the qualitative difference between an experience that engages our attention and one
that simply happens to our bodies.192 Sensation, however, is often assimilated to
perception in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. This entails a reduction of the alterity of sensation,
as well as a glossing of the problem of passivity posed by sensory experience.193 But a
healthy ambiguity inhabits the border between sensation and perception. For instance, it
is in his treatment of sense experience that the affective and passive dimensions of
embodiment turn up. The question now becomes, are these dimensions recuperated as
forms of (perceptual) activity or are they afforded an irreducible otherness?
Perhaps anticipating that privileging embodiment is not sufficient to free
phenomenology from transcendental idealism, Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is the
“primary layer of sense experience [sentir]” that allows perception to “break with the
critical attitude” (PP 238, 239/276). It is here that I think Merleau-Ponty most
deliberately departs from his precursors, Kant and Husserl, in order to champion the
existence of an experience that is not prey to any kind of subjective synthesis. By
beginning with the sensible, Merleau-Ponty begins with an always already synthesized
form and content instead of positing a form and content that can only be brought together
192
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by a unifying faculty.194 This latter way of proceeding begins with abstractions, not with
what is given, and is responsible for the mistaken view that the subject’s role in
experience is to imprint the chaotic world of sensation with form.
Merleau-Ponty’s concern is to keep the subject always in touch with the objective
world and to demonstrate how this immanent relation provides the sole content of
perception. This results in the view that the world does not achieve an explicit form
unless it is put into dialogue with a human agent (PP 320/370).195 Oftentimes the subject
of perception is described as immediately in touch with a semi-determinate, but never
amorphous, world of things which is always on its way to becoming more precisely
formed and therefore more hospitable to the body’s motor capacity. This ambiguous and
anonymous “lifeworld” provides the transcendental conditions of perception (PP
365/418-419).196 More fundamental than the lifeworld is, I believe, the realm of the
sensible.
Both sensation and perception are sometimes designated as anonymous, as when
Merleau-Ponty writes that “Sensation [sensation] can be anonymous only because it is
incomplete.” Or: “Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal ‘One’” (PP 216,
240/250, 277). These remarks have generated consistent criticism from feminist
philosophers who charge that by affirming the reality of an anonymous body, MerleauPonty overlooks the role that gender plays in the construction of experience. This
194
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criticism is justifiable, but it does not apply to all of the senses of “anonymous” intended
by Merleau-Ponty. That is, I do not think it applies to the anonymity of sensation insofar
as sensation is something undergone by the body unconsciously or prepersonally. Before
explicating this level of sensation, we need to see what anonymity refers to.
There are at least four ways to understand anonymity. First, there is the
precommunicative stage in the psychogenesis of the child, where his or her body is not
yet distinguishable from the other’s body. Here “there is not one individual over against
another but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life” (Child
119/33). Second, there is the anonymity of habitual actions. It is true that a person’s
habits inform their style, and thus their personal identity. But to the extent that habits can
be triggered unthinkingly or operate automatically, they possess a certain anonymity.
Third, Merleau-Ponty sometimes speaks of the body in general, by which he means the
organic body that lives “as a prepersonal cleaving to the general form of the world, as an
anonymous and general existence” (PP 84/99). The idea that there is a general—i.e.
gender-free, race-free—body “beneath” the personal is problematic because, as Sullivan
argues, it suggests a neutral ground upon which our bodies communicate with other
bodies. But no such ground exists, as our bodies are always individuated by habits and
other particularized bodily behaviors. When I assume that the gestures of the other are
understandable because we share a common body, then I run the risk of deciphering the
other in terms of my corporeity (or the myth of a universal body), rather than trying to
achieve a site of communication that preserves the other’s particularities.197
Johanna Oksala rejects the view that an anonymous body subtends the
intersubjective relation and that intersubjectivity is something that needs to be achieved.
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She argues that the body-subject is historically generated all the way down by “language,
tradition, and community.”198 Even the anonymous body is structured by environmental
and social conditions. We have already seen that Merleau-Ponty does not quite offer a
fully historicized body, that there are certain structural invariants that assume different
modes but are not open to historical transformation. Or, as Butler argues with reference to
his treatment of sexuality, Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to “the universal structures of bodily
existence” “prefigures the analysis of lived experience, investing the body with an
ahistorical structure which is in actuality profoundly historical in origin.”199 Whether he
subscribes to an invariant body in general or not, it seem that Merleau-Ponty recognizes
at least one anonymity that is at once historical and radically ahistorical—this is the
anonymity of sensation, “which remains forever anterior to our perception [qui reste
toujours en deçà de notre perception]” (PP 238/275).
There are two forms of sensation at play in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, one that
he criticizes (call it “substantive” sensation) and one that he endorses (call it “transitive”
sensation). The transitive form is conceived under two registers: the phenomenological
and the transcendental. Despite what has been said about Merleau-Ponty’s impure
transcendental philosophy, he does provide a concept of sensation that seems like a pure
a priori, in which case sensation would serve as a condition of perceptual experience. To
argue for the primacy of sensation in Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to read closely the
Sense Experience chapter of Phenomenology of Perception and contrast the notion of
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sensing (sentir)200 developed there with the classical conception of sensation (sensation)
found in modern philosophy, which Merleau-Ponty critiques in the opening chapter of the
Phenomenology. The classical notion of sensation views sensations as data, as discrete
bits of material received from the external world and processed by the mind into
representations. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view as a fiction that betrays the evidence of
experience. Merleau-Ponty’s positive thinking about sensation is often overshadowed by
his critique of sensation as a “unit of experience.” This is unfortunate because his own
theory of sensing forms the basis of his theory of painting in essays like “Cézanne’s
Doubt” and “Eye and Mind,” and since he proclaims that “any theory of painting is a
metaphysics” (EM 171/42), an understanding of his conception of sensing can reveal
features of his metaphysical commitments.
The classical conception which he rejects gets reinforced in everyday language when we speak of
sensations as discrete properties that cause us to see, for example, a book as red or to feel it as
smooth. Red and smooth, we say, belong to the cover of this book, but they affect our senses
separately. Color is received by the eyes; texture is apprehended by the fingertips. It is the task of
the mind to reassemble these bits of data into representations that correspond to the real world
objects that emit them. The problem with this view is that it puts metaphysical prejudices ahead
of experience (PP 5/11). As Taylor Carman puts it,

Nowhere in our perceptual awareness do we come across discrete qualitative bits
of experience fully abstracted from the external, perceptually coherent
environment. […] This is in part just to say that perceptual experience is
intentional, that it is of something, whereas impressions, sensations, and sense
data are supposed to be the nonintentional stuff from which the mind somehow
extracts or constructs an experience of something.201
200
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We perceive things, not sensory units. Sensations are inferred from perception when we
reflect on how it is that an object, which is “not completely our work,” can transmit its
qualities to us (PP 37/46). This line of thinking assumes that objects exist apart from us,
fully formed with sharp boundaries and fixed properties. It puts an objectivist
metaphysics ahead of the ambiguous content of perception, which for Merleau-Ponty is
the first and final arbiter of what exists. “Experience,” writes Carman, “rarely exhibits
such sharply defined features…and no analysis of perception into discrete attitudes with
crisply defined contents intending isolated qualities can capture the peculiar ‘perceptual
milieu’, always at once a ‘behavioral milieu’, in which things show up for us under
meaningful aspects.”202 When we attend to what we are actually given, we never discover
sensations. Instead, we find figures against backgrounds and semi-determinate bodies
which become more determinate via perceptual adumbrations. We find qualities that
entice and repel us, a sensible realm that perception “infuses” [imprègne] with
significance and style (PP 34/43).
What is required is a concept of sensation that does not reduce the style of the
sensible to the intentional life of the perceiving subject and which does not completely
subject the materiality of sensation, its affective and directive force, to the formality of
the understanding. Turning away from the language of sensation, Merleau-Ponty thus
begins to speak of sense experience (le sentir) as “an experience in which we are given
not ‘dead’ qualities, but active ones” (PP 52/64). This is what I am calling the shift from
a substantive to a transitive notion of sensation. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, “Sense
experience is that vital communication with the world which makes it present as a
familiar setting of our life.” It “invests the quality with vital value, grasping it first in its
202
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meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes about that it
always involves a reference to the body” (PP 52-53/64-65). By taking sensation to be
communal, Merleau-Ponty shows that there is an active and a passive dimension to
sensing. By making it a corporeal event, he puts the subject immediately in touch with
the object itself.
The insistence that sensing is a bodily event at once active and passive is taken
over from Husserl and Straus. In addition to the kinds of sensations that make up the
appearance or representation of what we perceive, Husserl’s Ideas II describes the role
that kinaesthetic sensations play in the constitution of perception. Kinaestheses are the
nonrepresentational sensations basic to motility. They denote “one’s inner sense of the
movements, tensions and possibilities of one’s own Body,” as Alia Al-Saji puts it. As the
body moves about its environment and encounters other bodies, it responds almost
automatically to the directives and solicitations communicated to it. This practical knowhow, or competence, requires no mediating idea or judgment in order to be executed,
although it typically draws on habits. As Al-Saji says, “there is no question of mimesis
between kinaestheses and the qualities of the perceived thing. It is rather by moving
around things and tracing their contours that kinaestheses make perception, as a concrete
dynamic process, possible.”203 She concludes: “Kinaesthetic sensations are hence a
function of my Body’s orientation in the world; they are my way of feeling the active
engagement of my Body with an outside.”204
A similar view of the nonrepresentational directive function of sensations is to be
found in the work of Erwin Straus, a figure Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology appeals to
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and whose analysis of sensing clearly influenced the latter’s own position. In his The
Primary World of Senses, Straus argues that Descartes is responsible for the view
pervasive that sensations are conscious, mental events. “As mere ideas of color, light, and
the like, sensations to Descartes lack any intrinsic contact with physical things. This
relationship is only inferred….”205 On this view, the subject has sensations but does not
suffer them. This is because the subject that senses, for Descartes, is “removed from time
and becoming” and “receives indifferently and unmoved.”206 For Straus, this entails the
elimination of the “life” of sensing, by which he means its dialogical or communal
character as well as it affective valence. He writes:
All sensory impressions are answers to questions; they are not simply there in the
way in which the physiological processes underlying them are. We receive
sensory impressions insofar as we orient ourselves within our primary relationship
with the world by questing, seeking, expecting.207
Sensing and knowing are sharply distinguished in Straus’s view. When we know
something, we grasp its meaning by suspending our vital commerce and rendering a
dispassionate judgment about the thing in question. This image of cognition is analogous
to what Merleau-Ponty calls intentionality of act. “Sensing,” which is closer to MerleauPonty’s operative intentionality, is “a sympathetic experiencing. It is directed to the
physiognomic characteristics of the alluring and the frightening.” Straus writes, in
language echoed in Phenomenology of Perception,
When we grasp an expression, a communion is established which seizes and
changes us, which holds and confines us; while in knowing, it is we who seize the
world, who appropriate it and detach ourselves from the particular, attaining the
full scope of an horizon which, ultimately, we transcend.208
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We see Straus here appreciating the ambivalence of sensations, their ability to provide us
with appearances as well as their capacity to direct and transform our corporeal identities.
He even acknowledges their disabling potentiality: “it is just in sensations of pain that we
feel the world attacking and invading us.”209 It is this last point that gets covered over
when the perceptual field is regarded primarily as a totality of tools or equipment to be
handled.
Straus’s theory of sensing is useful here because it brings out the material, vital
dimension of sensing that is endorsed by Merleau-Ponty but sometimes overshadowed by
the latter’s commitment to describing the body’s instrumental life. Straus demonstrates
that the body’s sensibility is neither constituted by a series of passively received stimuli,
nor is it the strictly human faculty which projects a spatiotemporal grid into the sensible
field. As Renaud Barbaras says of Straus,
sensibility must be apprehended in the form of sensing, understood as a specific
mode of relation, as the communication of the living being with a world. Sensing
is the mode according to which the living being as such is linked with the world
(and this is why it defines a common ground between human and animal), it
designates the living being’s originary mode of existence.210
This is a more naturalistic view of the lived body than we usually find in Merleau-Ponty.
Straus’s phenomenology of sensory communion is inflected with a biological perspective
adopted, however, by Merleau-Ponty in his Nature course at the Collège de France.211
But it is not so much a biological conception of human embodiment that Straus is
concerned with articulating. He is much more interested in drawing a distinction between
the affective and cognitive modes of existence, or what he calls the “pathic” and
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“gnostic” modes. These modes correspond for Straus to sensing and perceiving,
respectively, and do not display a continuity.212 Needless to say, Straus spends most of
his energy unpacking the mode of sensing, which Barbaras says “corresponds, in fact, to
a mode of immediate communication, to a sympathy with the world that does not entail
any thematic dimension.”213
Although he does not draw such a definitive distinction between sensing and
perceiving, Merleau-Ponty displays a similar concern with the immediate, affective
dimension of body-world contact. When describing the transitive form of sensation, or
sensation as communion, he refers to sensing as the “primary layer [couche originaire]”
(PP 238/) of perception. He does not regard sensing as modally distinct from perceiving,
although it is not always clear precisely what their relation is. One thing is clear,
however: sensation is not just the inferred material of perception or the passive reception
of stimuli; it is a material event undergone by the subject and constitutive of the body’s
integrity.
A purely physiological perspective cannot capture the phenomenon of sensation
because it is blind to intentional dimension of sensing, as the Phenomenology says:
Sensation is intentional because I find that in the sensible a certain rhythm of
existence is put forward—abduction or adduction—and that, following up this
hint, and stealing into the form of existence which is thus suggested to me, I am
brought into relation with an external being, whether it be in order to open myself
to it or to shut myself off from it. (PP 212-213/247)
As can be gleaned from this passage, “intentionality” does not just denote the fact that all
sensory experience is directed toward an object. It suggests that to have a sensation
involves being taken into or pushed out of an situation. Intentionality and affectivity are
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conflated here. To sense is to be directed by an external object, to be carried or assailed
by its rhythm. This is what it means for sensation to have a “motor physiognomy” or
“living significance” (PP 209/242-243). If it is the case that “the world ceaselessly assails
and beleaguers subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the shore” (PP 207/240),
then we must regard the directives of sensations as fundamental to the constitution and
“power” (puissance) of subjectivity (PP 210, 211/244, 245). We will see this theme
recurring in some of Levinas’s writings on sensation and aesthetics.
As Alphonso Lingis argues in “The Sensitive Flesh,” sensation for Merleau-Ponty
is able to play a part in the arrangement of our subjectivity because sensibility is
internally related to our postural schema and the practical objectives it means to
accomplish. Lingis writes that “the postural schema is not simply a diagram of the way
all the parts are equilibrated: the body does not tend to a state of rest, but tends to
maintain a state of tension centered in a particular direction.” This centering is directed
by the body’s posture, “that is, the motile way the body centers and converges all its
receptor surfaces upon an objective.”214 But we also cannot forget that the body “is itself
a sensible being that continually schematizes itself, makes a gait of its movement, a
gesture of its displacement, makes of each of its here-now particular configurations or
positions into a posture or attitude maintaining itself or varying itself continuously.”215
This means that the body’s rhythm remains always susceptible to the sympathetic and
antipathetic physiognomies of its environment.
For the most part, Merleau-Ponty regards sensing as an a amicable affair, the
mutual completion of subject and object. He speaks of it, after Straus, as a “sympathetic
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relation” with objects. “Apart from the probing of my eye or my hand, and before my
body synchronizes with it, the sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning [une
sollicitation vague]” (PP 214/248). Despite the fact that consciousness is “saturated” with
the sensible, Merleau-Ponty insists that “the sentient and the sensible do not stand in
relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of
the sentient by the sensible” (PP 214, 215/247-248).216 The tireless influx of sensory
stimuli is no affront to the subject’s sensibility, but rather an invitation to mutual
animation. Sensation under this rehabilitated model is the primary mode of contact with
being, neither completely active nor passive, and the means by which bodies originally
respond to one another.
Exactly what Merleau-Ponty means by sensation is perhaps best illustrated when
he is writing about painting. The painter, unlike the scientist, is someone who foregoes
the manipulation of objects and “returns to the soil of the sensible” (EM 159, 160/9, 12).
Bypassing the formal and practical aspects of things, the painter tries to capture the birth
of the thing by depicting the self-organization of its qualities and its “internal animation”
(EM 182/71). This is possible, says Merleau-Ponty, because the painter’s body is
“immersed in the visible” and can be used by the visible to give artistic expression to its
many senses (EM 162/17-18). The painter is in the midst of a sensory environment that
will direct his or her body’s affective and motor capacities, and so the painter must be
willing to lend his or her body to the visible in order to communicate its nascent meaning.
And this is precisely what painting is: it is the “transubstantiation” (EM 162/16) of the
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sensible from the sensory field to the canvas, a process which is made possible by
complicity of sensitive subject and sensible object.
By situating the painter and painted on the same plane—namely, the visible—
Merleau-Ponty is able to collapse the distinction between art and nature, on the one hand,
and the distinction between reality and representation, on the other. These distinctions are
replaced by a general economy of sensation and expression, which is to say that sensation
becomes for Merleau-Ponty the means by which the material and imaginary realms enter
into communion. He cites Cézanne in “Cézanne’s Doubt:” “Art is a personal
apperception, which I embody in sensations and which I ask the understanding to
organize into a painting” (CD 13/22). To do this, the painter must become an articulation
of the sensible, the mechanics of which are key to grasping Merleau-Ponty’s nondualist,
nonrepresentational theory of painting.
Central to his theory is the idea that painter and painted, the seer and the seen are
of the same flesh. In “Cézanne’s Doubt,” there is a flesh of nature, whereas in “Eye and
Mind” (which is contemporaneous with The Visible and the Invisible) it is the
visible/sensible that defines this flesh. In both instances Merleau-Ponty wishes to
demonstrate how subject and object participate in a “locus of reversibility”217 which
allows them to work together to generate the aesthetic dimension of being. In the role of
painter, the subject catches onto the rhythm of the visible and allows it to commandeer
his or her body’s intentions and gestures. In this way, “the visible world and the world of
my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being” (EM 162/17). It is this
overlapping of seer and seen, this chiasm of visibility, that disallows us from positing a
distinction between the interiority of the subject and the exteriority of the world.
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To understand the act of transubstantiation carried out by the painter, the image to
be rendered and the gestures required to render it must be seen as continuous with each
other. There cannot be a gap between the sensible and its representation, for this would
violate Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the flesh, which maintains the seer and seen are the
two sides of a single visibility (EM 163/19-20). As Michael B. Smith says, “MerleauPonty’s aesthetics of painting is grounded in a metaphysics of vision, and vision, in turn,
in an ontological description of the body subject as a seeing seenness.”218 Vision is not
something controlled by the viewer; it is not at first a form of thought, but rather
“‘incited’ [excitée] to think by the body” (EM 175/51). For the painter, this thinking is
embodied in the painterly gesture itself. The unique contours of the visible spectacle seize
upon the painter’s body and, catching the painter in a circuit of immanence, induces that
body to adopt a physiognomy that expresses the “carnal formula” of the object to be
painted. This entire process is made possible by the reversibility of visibility or, more
generally, the “duplicity of sensing” (EM 164/23, translation modified) which is the
animating principle of both body and world.
Sensing occurs neither inside nor outside the subject. It is a liminal event, and
originarily responsible for the style adopted by the body and the aesthetic style of the
painter. “Style is what orients and shapes in view of a revelation,” says de Waehlens.219
Before it becomes a defining trait of an artist, or an object of reflection for the artist, it
“germinates at the surface of the artist’s experience” (ILVS 53/66).220 The “exigency” of
style is compromised by an overly intellectualized encounter with the sensible.
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Intellectualism in philosophy and objectivism in art both eliminate the contingency of
experience (PP 38-39/48-49) and thereby undercut its volatility. Our style is our manner
of accessing the real or negotiating its rhythms. These rhythms are first received, as
directives of sens, by sensibility; secondarily they become habits, gestures, clichéd
expressions. The problem, for someone concerned with portraying their immediacy, like
Cézanne, is to portray these directives as communicated to sensibility—“to make visible
how the world touches us” (CD 19/33)—without imposing a form that is not given by the
sensible itself. Instead, the style of the painting should reflect the immanent negotiation
of subject and object that takes place at the level of “viscous, equivocal” appearance (CD
17/30), rather than at the level of pragmatic manipulation.221
It is Cézanne’s painting, argues Merleau-Ponty, which is exemplary in its attempt
to render perceptual the “chaos of sensations” (CD 13/22). This is why his work is
populated by figures which seem to be on the verge of breaking down or losing their
form; or, on their way to metamorphosing into an altogether different figure. It attempts
to bring to appearance what he refers to as the “unstable, and alien” element of “natural
perception” (PP 225/260). Cézanne, says Merleau-Ponty, “wanted to depict matter as it
takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous organization” (CD 13/23). If this
organization is to be truly spontaneous, and therefore not mediated by the artifices of
technique or idealization, then Cézanne would have to develop a style that matched the
immediacy of his theme: the emergent sensory order, or the world as it acquires its
contours. “The outline should therefore be a result of the colors if the world is to be given
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its true density. For the world is a mass without gaps, a system of colors across which the
receding perspective, the outlines, angles, and curves are inscribed like lines of force; the
spatial structure vibrates as it is formed” (CD 15/25-26). This conception of spatiality is
antithetical to Kant’s in that it makes spatial organization a product of the sensory
manifold, thereby locating the principle of animation in the matter, rather than the form,
of perception.222
How is the painter animated by the sensible? Like his or her chosen subject, the
painter possesses a physiognomy that can adapt to the physiognomy or “motif” (CD
17/29) of still-life objects, landscapes, the faces of others, etc. This motif, which is “no
more than a combination of colors” (CD 16/27), provides the body of the artist with
directives which initiate the creative event, “an event which grips [the] body, and this
grip circumscribes the area of [sens] to which it has reference” (PP 235/272). Art is not
first and foremost an act of symbolism. It is an affective response engendered by the
body’s sensibility. The artist’s body “is an object which is sensitive to all the rest, which
reverberates to all sounds, vibrates to all colors, and provides words [or lines, colors]
with their primordial significance through the way in which it receives them” (PP
236/273).
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Cézanne suggests a distinction, but not a division,
between sensation and perception. This is discernible in his remark that Cézanne breaks
with the Impressionists by rejecting the latter’s attempts to “capture, in the painting, the
very way in which objects strike our eyes and attack our senses.” This attack, he says,
occurs at the level of “instantaneous perception” (CD 11/19) and appears as the “chaos of
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sensations” mentioned above. The Phenomenology of Perception also implies that
sensation is part of perception, but distinguishable from what is ordinarily perceived—
whole objects projected against a background and graspable by the body. “What is called
sensation is only the most rudimentary of perceptions, and, as a modality of existence, it
is no more separable than any other perception from a background which is in fact the
world” (PP 241/279). Merleau-Ponty finds continuity (unlike Straus) between sensation
and perception because he wants to avoid making the latter the “form” and the former the
“matter” of experience. Phenomenologically, no such distinction exists.
Despite his allegiance to the thesis that all consciousness is both directed toward
an object and always projected against a horizon of meaning, Merleau-Ponty does
concede that a nonintentional form of sensing exists, which he describes as “forever
anterior to perception” (PP 238/275). This formulation opens a distinction between
sensing and perception and points to an originary, prephenomenological encounter with
the sensible. When Merleau-Ponty speaks of the anonymity of the body, it seems to me
that it is this encounter—rather than a neutralized conception of embodiment—that he
intends. Moreover, this conception of sensibility situates sensing on something like a
transcendental level, or in “a kind of original past, a past which has never been present”
(PP 242/280). It is into this original past that perception must reach in order to apprehend
what is there to perceive. This is because, as Al-Saji argues, “perception lags behind
sensibility—so that consciousness and being do not coincide, despite Merleau-Ponty’s
claim in the ‘Temporality’ chapter [of Phenomenology].”223
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There is, then, more than a distinction to be drawn between perception and
sensation. Sensation and the prepersonal actually take precedence over perception and the
personal on Merleau-Ponty’s model, even though he usually includes these disparate
experiences in the image of perception as communion. There is a fundamental diachrony,
or non-coincidence, at the heart of perception that breaks up its synchronization with the
sensible. This diachrony is the work of sensation, the “‘primary layer’ of sense
experience” (PP 227/262) “which at once grounds perception and assures its opacity and
non-coincidence,” in Al-Saji’s terms.224 Upon this ground lie at least three other layers
which comprise the perceptual experience. These are outlined in a discussion of hearing.
Admittedly, these layers of sound are only identifiable once the unified
experience of listening, say, to a piece of music is analyzed by reflection. After making
this phenomenological point, Merleau-Ponty ventures to speculate about the
multidimensionality of the sensation of sound itself: “there is an objective sound which
reverberates outside me in the instrument, an atmospheric sound which is between the
object and my body, a sound which vibrates in me ‘as if I had become the flute or the
clock’; and finally a last stage in which the acoustic element disappears and becomes the
highly precise experience of a change permeating my whole body” (PP 227/263). This
describes the liminal nature of sensation—it “is between the object and my body”—and
its capacity to subject the body to transformation. This transformation could manifest
itself in dance, which is arguably the most obvious example of the body communing with
its sensory environment. However, given Merleau-Ponty’s description here, we cannot
posit the dance as primary. What comes first is the “objective sound which reverberates
outside me in the instrument.” This reverberation reaches us in a highly complex
224
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situation, against a background of noise and silence, and in principle could drown out this
background by reaching an oppressively loud volume. That is, the sound is potentially
hostile to the body and the body’s communion with its aural environment. This power
results from the fact that its liminality places it outside the world as perceived: it is there
whether anyone is there to perceive it or not.
Since we never experience the pure reverberation of an instrument outside of an
aural context, and yet Merleau-Ponty claims that this objective sound occurs in the
instrument rather than in our ears, it is helpful to think of our perception of sound or any
other sensation as delayed, as Al-Saji does. “We learn to perceive according to MerleauPonty,” she says.225 The world possesses rhythms that solicit synchronization from our
bodies; it challenges us with dissonant rhythms; it meets our bodies’ gropings with
inconvenient designs and incapacitating rhythms. Our sensory environments are not
always ergonomically advantageous: they contain sensations that are “alien” and
“unstable,” but whose meaning we are nevertheless saturated by (PP 214, 215/248, 249).
In a sense, perception “converts the elements of the sensory encounter into recognizable
and representable identities” and effects a “transformation of the inherent ambiguity and
intertwining of the sensory—a transformation that the sensory suggests but as a result of
which it comes to be overlaid and forgotten qua sensory life.”226 On this reading, sensory
life becomes the virtual dimension of perceptual life. Always beyond the reach of
perception, but nevertheless serving as the “unreflective fund” (PP 242/280) that provides
it with phenomenal content, the sensory life of the body must be seen as the anonymous,
objective ground of any actualized perception. In Al-Saji’s words,
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Perception may be a prospective actualization, but it is experienced as the
discovery of what was always already there. It is this anteriority that makes
objects appear real to us—our experience of their presence being given though
their inexhaustibility and alterity. This inexhaustibility is due to the coexistence
and non-coincidence of rhythms in sensory life, a life which at once constitutes
the ground of perceptual experience while being irreducible to perceptual form.
What allows the experience of anteriority to be more than an illusion for MerleauPonty is that it relies on, and holds the trace of, a more original delay—that of
sensory life as forever past with respect to perception.227
So it is not so much that Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the view that there is an
anonymous body subtending the historically and culturally inscribed body, but that he
acknowledges a carnal sensibility which cannot be exhausted by consciousness. This
sensibility is basic to the prepersonal identity of the body, and thus is constitutive of an
“unconscious” dimension of subjectivity. Put otherwise, only a portion of what the lived
body senses makes its way into perception, and even less becomes the object of
reflection. When Merleau-Ponty writes that “Perception is always in the mode of the
impersonal ‘One’” (PP 240/277), we have to take this to mean that perception is at every
moment the renewal of the synthetic act228 which reaches into the past while projecting
into the future in order to fix the object of perception before us. Perception is an “everrecurrent failure” [échec perpétuel] to hold onto what is given in sensation (PP 240/277).
Perception apprehends a phenomenal field which is “never presented in any other
way than integrated into a configuration and already ‘patterned’ [‘mise en forme’]” (PP
159/186). Following Gestalt principles, this basically means that no sense experience
happens outside of the horizon subtended by my personal intentional arc and the
historico-cultural horizon in which I am always situated. However, this phenomenal field
227
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cannot be identical to the field engaged immediately by the senses, for the latter is
marked by a singularity which resists entry into the intentional horizon. Sensibility, then,
remains bound to a prepersonal field wherein “each sensation, being strictly speaking, the
first, last and only one of its kind, is a birth and a death” of the body which encounters it.
Moreover,
the subject who experiences it begins and ends with it, and as he can neither
precede nor survive himself, sensation necessarily appears to itself in a setting of
generality, its origin anterior to myself, it arises from sensibility which has
preceded it and which will outlive it, just as my birth and death belong to a
natality and a mortality which are anonymous. (PP 216/250)
The carnality of the subject inhabits two distinct spheres, the practico-personal, on the
one hand, and the sensual-impersonal, on the other.
The tension between the personal and impersonal body is palpable in MerleauPonty’s reluctance to disengage sensation from perception, and potentially allow the
former to devolve into the formless data of the empiricists or the pure sensory manifold
of Kant. This is why sensation appears sometimes as a rudimentary form of perception
(thus guaranteeing its inherent form) and at other times as the transcendental condition of
perception (which ensures Merleau-Ponty’s anti-idealist credentials). In the last analysis,
Merleau-Ponty wants to maintain the primacy of perception while at the same time
championing its irreducibly carnal dimension—which is clearly endorsed in his analysis
of Cézanne’s painting and its ability to express the dialogue of physiognomies which is
the body-world relation. By contrast, if there is a truly anonymous and preperceptual
form of sensing acknowledged in the Phenomenology, then there is reason to suggest that
the sensations undergone by the body’s organs house an a priori that is better depicted by
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the Impressionists, however speculative or nonphenomenological their aesthetic might
be.
As Merleau-Ponty tells us, Cézanne breaks with the Impressionists because the
latter try to portray how objects strike our senses (CD 11-14/19-23). The Impressionists,
then, are wont to paint what would be the pure a priori of perception, or sensation,
whereas Cézanne’s painting exhibits nature as it emerges into an organized form. On this
reading, the Impressionists would be the painters of the “non-thetic, pre-objective, and
pre-conscious experience” that depicts “sensation as a private phenomenon” (PP
242/279). It is this private sphere that is most problematic from the perspective of
perception, which “The Primacy of Perception” determines to be a fundamentally
intersubjective experience (PrP 17-18, 26-27/52, 70-71). As Merleau-Ponty writes in
“The Philosopher and His Shadow:”
The fact is that sensible being, which is announced to me in my most strictly
private life, summons up within that life all other corporeality. It is the being
which reaches me in my most secret parts, but which I also reach in its brute or
untamed state, in an absolute of presence which holds the secret of the world,
others, and what is true. (Shadow 171/215)
Sensation, then, appears problematic because it harbors a form of solipsism. The touch of
sensation opens the body to the world of objects, others, and communication. But in itself
it cannot be represented or articulated. The problem of solipsism raised by the
“aesthesiological” is resolvable only when it is assimilated to perception, for perception,
writes Merleau-Ponty, “is never a matter of anything but co-perception. I see that this
man over there sees, as I touch my left hand while it is touching my right” (Shadow
170/215). As he will write elsewhere, perception is always already reversible. If there is
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solipsism, then it must be wrested from the intersubjective sphere and therefore no
solipsism at all.
Merleau-Ponty’s entire critique of sensation derives from the observation that we
do not really encounter much of what the classical empiricists and rationalists say we do.
For the most part, he is right: we do not perceive sense impressions or sense data. We
perceive things. Against classical theory he claims that we only arrive at the
imperceptible through analysis, which must necessarily begin with the perceptible. This
may be true phenomenologically, but it does not foreclose the possibility that,
ontologically speaking, perception is a derivative experience, subtended by a more
rudimentary form of embodiment.
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the existence of imperceptible encounters with things, which is
why I think the realist strand of his analysis of sensing supports the thesis that perception derives
from the transitive form of sensation. When he speaks of the sound reverberating in the
instrument before it reaches the ears of the listener, he acknowledges the primacy of a liminal
sensory atmosphere: here lies the anonymity of sensory experience that saturates our bodies and
cannot be recuperated by the subject-object dialogue. The concept of flesh develops this
anonymous sensibility into a general theory of carnal being.

The flesh (la chair) radicalizes insights from the Phenomenology by replacing its
residual subject-object dualism with a monistic account of the sensible. Our bodies and
the bodies of others (humans and nonhumans) are said to only achieve full expression
through the co-constitutive dialogue of perception. This dialogue is made possible
because both subject and object belong to a common “element,” the sensible as such, or
the flesh. It is this element that brings together while at the same time separating the
poles of perception: “the thickness of flesh between seer and the thing is constitutive for
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the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity” (VI 135/178). The separation of
bodies, then, is derivative of the fundamental narcissism at the heart of the sensible. In
The Visible and the Invisible, it is no longer perception that gives birth to discrete objects,
but the so-called dehiscence (écart) of the flesh. Dehiscence is the name Merleau-Ponty
uses to describe the fission of the sensible into sentient body and sensible world; it
denotes the coiling back or enfolding performed in vision:
[The flesh] is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible
upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself,
touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, simultaneously, as
tangible it descends among them, as touching it dominates them all and draws this
relationship and even this double relationship from itself, by dehiscence or fission
of its own mass. (VI 146/191-192)
At bottom, it is the dehiscence of flesh that constitutes my body as an individual that
senses (VI 140/185) and can assume a distance from what is perceived. Since
individuation results from the separation (écart) of the flesh understood as a single
element, it entails a kind of reversibility between bodies. At the crossing where
reversibility occurs, “perception is born” (VI 154/202).
By “reversible,” Merleau-Ponty means that at any moment the one who sees can
become the one seen, or the one who touches can become the touched. The possibility of
a passive body becoming active or an active body becoming passive is immanent to
embodiment as such. He holds that the reversibility of the sensible is analogous to what
happens when I touch my left hand with my right. This is the narcissistic element of the
flesh: “the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees
and which is seen” (VI 139/183). Sensing is here attributed not to individual subjects who
exist apart from their worlds, but to the flesh as a substance that divides itself into
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sensible and sentient beings.229 Thus, sensing takes on less humanistic form. MerleauPonty explicitly points out that the presumed reversibility of sensible and sentient is
always imminent, never accomplished (VI 147/194). In other words, my left and right
hands cannot both be touching each other at the same time; one of the pair must play the
role of passive object while the other actively senses. More generally, sentient/subjective
and sensible/objective never fully synchronize.
The impossible coincidence at the center of reversibility is, in part, a product of
the analogy of self-touching employed by Merleau-Ponty. It does not seem to apply to
what we typically consider an intercorporeal relation, however. Nor does it apply
universally to sensing. For instance, smelling, tasting, and hearing do not bear the kind of
symmetry necessary for reversibility. Sure, I can be smeller or smelled, but the scent that
invades my nose is in no position to take in my scent. The same could be said of a taste or
sound. These sensations are more invasive than the tactile and give us a good idea of the
basically irreversible or dissymmetrical nature of sensing. Something like a handshake,
by contrast, appears to offer a better analogy for reversibility.230 But even the handshake
proves irreversible—perhaps it is exemplarily irreversible—since the strength and
delicacy of the persons shaking will most likely be disproportionate. This is why Beata
Stawarska argues that the flesh performs a “massive reduction of the specifically
intersubjective experience of the body manifest in an encounter with another embodied
229

This is the primary dualism, it seems to me, of The Visible and the Invisible. It is not clear, however,
how the flesh becomes sentient or why some beings achieve sentience while others remain merely sensible.
“For if the body is a thing among things, it is so in a stronger and deeper sense than they,” Merleau-Ponty
asserts. (VI 137/181). It seems possible to overcome this dualism by broadening the scope of sentience to
include any entity that can receive sensory stimulation. If this stimulation is regarded as an objective event,
and is not confined to the interior life of humans or other animals, then we can begin to speak of the
sensations experienced by inanimate objects. I will argue for a broadened view of sensation in Chapter 4
below.
230
Merleau-Ponty defends this point in VI 142/187: “The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself
touched as well and at the same time as touching.”

74

person to the corporeal dynamic operative within the body proper.”231 Self-touching
offers us a helpful image of reflection, but not an accurate account of the intercorporeal
encounter.
The experience of the handshake illustrates that intercorporeal touching and selftouching maintain a basic difference. The handshake exhibits an exchange of sensations
that is not present, in the case of self-touching, when I shift my attention and convert my
touched hand into the hand doing the touching. As Stawarska writes, “What distinguishes
the intercorporeal relation from the intracorporeal one is that the passivity of my hand
touched by the other—unlike the passivity of my hand that I touch—cannot reverse into
an activity (of touching) for me, even though I can respond to the other touching me by
touching them in turn.”232 The idea that bodies are reversible assumes that any passive
relation is potentially convertible into an active relation, even if this reversal is an
impossible one.233 (Torture and death are exemplary here.) Such a presupposition
effectively neglects a fundamental feature of violence: the bilateral nature of the
sensations exchanged. Bilateralism is precisely what makes intercorporeity irreversibile.
Rewriting the Cartesian cogito, Merleau-Ponty argues that the subject is an “I
can” [“je peux”] before it is an “I think” (PP 137/160). But this formulation is only
partially true, because the subject is also equally an “I can’t,” a perpetually constrained

231

Beata Stawarska, “From the Body Proper to the Flesh: Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity,” in Feminist
Interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 92.
232
Stawarska, “From Body Proper to the Flesh,” 99.
233
Elie Wiesel illustrates and emphasizes this point in a passage from Night, trans. Marion Wiesel (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 53, which recounts his experience in a WWII German concentration camp:
“One day when Idek was venting his fury, I happened to cross his path. He threw himself on me like a wild
beast, beating me in the chest, on my head, throwing me to the ground and picking me up again, crushing
me with ever more violent blows, until I was covered in blood. As I bit my lips in order not to howl with
pain, he must have mistaken my silence for defiance and so he continued to hit me harder and harder.
Abruptly, he calmed down and sent me back to work as if nothing had happened. As if he had taken part in
a game in which both roles were of equal importance.”

75

actor whose abilities cannot be privileged over its inabilities. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the disabled body or the corpse. If the subject, on Merleau-Ponty’s model,
is to be identified with the body in all of its materiality (not just the body insofar as it is
animated by an incorporeal consciousness or mind, i.e., the lived body), then each of the
body’s manifestations must be taken into consideration when embodied subjectivity is in
question. Moreover, the intercorporeal relation cannot just be the site where perception is
born. It must also serve as the site where perception disintegrates.
Merleau-Ponty does not completely neglect the reality of violence; he at least
recognizes the inherent vulnerability of the body in the face of the other. Not unlike
Sartre, who theorizes the gaze of the other as an instrument of objectification or seizure,
Merleau-Ponty considers how the presence of the other entails a conflict of
interpretations where the truth of the object is concerned (PrP 18/53). Just as I do, the
other seizes his or her grip on objects and appropriates them in the system of holds that
make up their own practical horizon. My body, too, can be seized by perception.
Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “passive vision…as in the case of a dazzling light,” wherein
perception is rendered incapable of making sense of what is seen (PP 315/364). He
recognizes the impact of pain and fatigue on our capacity for action (PP 441/504; SB
189/204). Ultimately, he will define the freedom of the body negatively as “tolerance” of
institutional and physical stimuli, thus eschewing the ideal of a pure subject who remains
invulnerable to material forces (PP 454/518).
In order to accurately portray intercorporeity (especially its violent form), a strong
notion of irreversibility or alterity must be provided. This does not mean that reciprocity
should be deemed impossible between bodies (which seems to be implied in Levinas’s
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ontology, as we will see in Chapter 3). What we need is a model that allows bodies a
distance from each other, but also enables them to exchange a common currency and
participate in a common economy. I think we can understand sensations as providing this
currency. Moreover, I think Merleau-Ponty noticed this possibility. It is present in his
recognition of sensation as the past that never presents itself to perception; it is there in
his acknowledgement of the affective quality of sensing (PP 53/65). These are the
moments of divergence and diachrony in Merleau-Ponty, places where he rejects the
happy alliance of body and world. The dehiscence of the flesh, what Hass calls the
“constitutive difference in the fabric of experience,”234 offers another form divergence.
But if it is not the work of perception, then the mechanism of this folding of the sensible
remains a metaphysical mystery. In the Phenomenology it is time that drives the
dehiscence of being, but time is conceived there as “born of my relation with things” (PP
412, 426/471, 487, translation modified). Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy does not
provide us with a metaphysical explanation of dehiscence or an adequate account of how
bodies are individuated from out of the singular flesh of being.235
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the (real or apparent) gap between entities
never reaches closure; that is, reversibility is “always imminent” (VI 147/194).
Nevertheless, his analyses most often suggest the possibility of convergence: the subject
is always on the way to better understanding the object; the left hand is always on the
verge of touching instead of being touched; perception is perpetually on its way to
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expression.236 This faith in reversibility effectively misrepresents, once again, the
intercorporeal relation by mitigating the volatility introduced by the transcendence of the
other. Levinas would say that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology ultimately reduces the other to
the same and that reversibility denotes a relation whose “terms are indifferently read from
left to right and from right to left” and which has been reduced to a “simple correlation”
(TI 35/5).
Levinas’s charge is a bit hyperbolic in the case of Merleau-Ponty since the latter’s
treatment of intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a simple correlationism and, indeed,
actively works to overcome such a reduction. He does, however, tend to subordinate what
Levinas calls the “enigma of sensation-feeling [l’énigme sensation-sentiment]”237 to the
competent grasp [prise] of perception. Merleau-Ponty writes:
my body, as the system of holds on the world, founds the unity of the objects
which I perceive, in the same way the body of the other…tears itself away from
being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of true communication, and
confers on my objects the new dimension of intersubjective being or, in other
words, of objectivity. (PrP 18/53)
The world is not what eludes my grasp; the other is not what threatens my subjectivity.
Both of these offer possibilities for being because they belong to the phenomenal field
which is open before me and essentially synchronized with my body’s practical horizon.
Between seer and seen there is “an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand”
(VI 130-131/173).238
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As Fred Evans, “‘Solar love’: Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and the Fortunes of Perception,” Continental
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The ideal of reversibility fails to notice that sensation, even in Merleau-Ponty’s
own terms, is precisely what cannot become phenomenal if phenomenality is
synonymous with perception. Sensation remains forever out of step with the unfolding of
perception; it is the dark side of visibility and ideality, what gives birth to perception and,
perhaps, what accounts for its disintegration.
If we are going to talk about the centrality of the body, then it is necessary to
attend to every aspect of its environmental sensitivity, the physiological as well as the
phenomenal, insofar as this sensitivity gives rise to the corporeal structures that inform
the contours of our perceptual and practical engagements. A neglect of the autonomy of
sensation, by which I mean the sensible events which take place below the level of
intentional consciousness and which remain “unstable” and “alien” (PP 225/260-261)239
can only hinder a philosophy that seeks to overcome the conceit of an idealism which
refuses to recognize the corporeal dimension of subjectivity, freedom, and responsibility.
Despite whether sensation is a viable phenomenological concept or not, it is necessary to
conceptualizing embodiment. And we risk misconception when we overemphasize the
constitutive activity of the subject, or when we reject its susceptibility, incompetence,
disintegration, and mechanical or autonomic240 responses.

wraps them in the touch of a visibility that is one with them, keeps them from ever being naked, envelops
them in a conjunctive tissue of visibility, an exterior-interior horizon in which, henceforth, they appear
without being able to be distinguished, separated, or torn away from it.” The privileging of vision effects a
“reduction of the tactile to the visible” and fulfills a form of “idealism, under its material, carnal aspects.”
Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993),153-154; 175.
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“Sensory experience [l’expérience sensorielle] is unstable, and alien to natural perception, which we
achieve with our whole body all at once, and which opens on a world of inter-acting senses [un monde
intersensoriel].”
240
I am thinking here of the function of our autonomic nervous system, which for the most part regulates
organ function and controls the body’s homeostasis. It is possible to see proprioception as a form of
autonomic regulation and to consider the sensory life of the body as a predominantly autonomic system.
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Merleau-Ponty’s privileging of perception entails a misrepresentation of how the
body’s identity is informed by its sensory environment. He endorses the dialogical notion
of identity offered by Cézanne. Though instructive, this view does not do justice to the
irreversibility of sensation. The pixelated images of the Impressionists, by contrast, may
offer us a better representation. Impressionism gives something like a snapshot of
sensation; it captures the sensory event which, “strictly speaking,” is “the first, last and
only one of its kind, is a birth and death” (PP 216/250). These images ring false from a
phenomenological perspective, but this is because the latter eschews speculation,
preferring to derive ontology from what is given to consciousness. For a philosopher like
Merleau-Ponty—unlike, say, Hume—the chaos of sensation can only be hypothesized
from the more coherent world of perception, which is why he favors Cézanne over the
Impressionists. But once again, Cézanne is a painter of reversibility, of sensing taken as
an amicable dialogue. He bypasses the immediacy of sensation.
One of the problems here is to theorize the distance between bodies without
succumbing to the allure of absolute transcendence, as Levinas does. Failure to concede
the continuity or immanence of the intercorporeal realm results in a failure to capture the
demands communicated directly to the subject by the sensory environment. A notion of
sensible directives or immanent imperatives is crucial to understanding the emergence of
the body’s competence and integrity. There are solicitations issued by the environment
that the body must respond to in order to effectively adapt. Thus, they are more than mere
solicitations: they are imperatives.241 Sometimes these responses are pleasurable,
sometimes painful. They can end in bodily obliteration, which is an extreme form of
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incompetence but nonetheless a form of responsiveness. Merleau-Ponty appreciates this
to some degree, but he mitigates the imperceptible quality of sensation, its objective
power, and pathologizes the vulnerability of the body. The tension between sensation and
perception, which is clearly evinced in excessive or limit situations that threaten the
coherence of perception and the organizational capacity of the body’s schemata, is passed
over in favor of a more sympathetic reciprocity or the ideal of “maximum
clarity”/“optimum balance” in perception (PP 318/367).242
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has the virtue of being grounded in the carnality of
life, and it does so without submitting to physicalism. Indeed, the depth of his
phenomenological descriptions are borne out of the concrete practices of the self as it
engages other bodies, human and nonhuman. The ontogenetic narrative Merleau-Ponty
tells about the subject’s embodiment, which is first and foremost a story of the body’s
anonymity and passivity, is grounded in the sensitivity of the body, what we could call its
carnal sensibility. This sensibility is at work in the sensuous communion of subject and
object in Phenomenology of Perception; it is at the heart of The Visible and the
Invisible’s notions of flesh, chiasm, and écart; and it is crucial to the psychogenesis of the
child in “The Child’s Relations with Others” and his analyses of Cézanne’s style of
painting. The problem we are left with is how to disengage the notion of carnal
sensibility—which is anonymous and productive of the body’s organizational capacity
rather than its product—from the intentional structure(s) of perception. Only after
sensibility is differentiated from perception can we understand both the passivity of the
body and its nonintentional responsiveness to sensations, that is, its obedience to the
immanent directives embedded in the environment.
242
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Reading Merleau-Ponty, it is easy to get the impression that the body is operating
as a tool or prosthesis of consciousness, rather than as a post-Cartesian surrogate. This is
because he sometimes speaks of perception or consciousness as though they were not
identical to the body: “Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the
intermediary of the body” (PP 138-139/161). In his more radical formulations we are our
bodies, nothing more. Establishing a nonreductive version of this identification of self
and body is the most promising prospect of working through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.
To overcome modern dualism, it is necessary that he collapse consciousness and
body. If we are going to avoid conceiving the body as merely a vessel for the mind or
consciousness or perception, there cannot be any mysterious elements of subjectivity or
suspicious gaps between subject and world. This means emptying transcendence from
ontology, something Merleau-Ponty only begins to accomplish in his unfinished later
work. The challenge is formulated by Deleuze in Pure Immanence when he says that
“consciousness becomes a fact only when a subject is produced at the same time as its
object, both being outside the field and appearing as ‘transcendents’.”243 In other words, a
truly immanent ontology, like the one championed by the primacy of perception thesis or
the ontology of the flesh, has to embrace an impersonal transcendental field, one free
from the syntheses of a subject and the configurations of intentionality.
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of sensing in Phenomenology of Perception is the
most promising concept upon which to develop an immanent conception of embodiment.
Here we find a concept of sensibility that reverses the Kantian view which maintains the
formality of the subject’s aesthetic faculty. Merleau-Ponty provides us with the means to
envision sensibility as a kind of material transcendental. Recasting the continuities and
243
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discontinuities of the intercorporeal relation in terms of sensations and affects, rather than
perception or flesh, resolves many of the problems raised by Merleau-Ponty’s carnal
ontology. Indeed, his reversibility thesis is more persuasive when we distinguish the
sensible and perceptual life of the body, and restrict reversibility to the level of
perception while assigning an irreducible alterity to sensing.
The relation between perception and sensation has a double character. In one
sense, these two activities are coextensive; in another sense, perception is the product of
sensation, the latter serving as the “rudimentary” form of the former (PP 241/279). A
tension between the impersonal, nonintentional layer of experience (sensation) and the
personal, intentional (perception) arises at this point. If perception is given primacy in
this tension, then experience must be always regarded as organized by the telos of our
intentional arc. By the same token, if sensation is cast as the most basic form of
perception, it can only appear as phenomenal and, in some sense, coordinated by the
subject. But certainly there are sensations received by the body (what Leibniz would call
petites perceptions)244 that are never elevated to the level of consciousness and remain at
the level of proprioceptive information.245 Merleau-Ponty insists that every perception
has something anonymous about it and that this is linked to the body’s habits and
schemata as well its “unsophisticated” (i.e., sensory) life (PP 238/275). Therefore, to
244

In Leibniz’s philosophy of mind, petites perceptions are perceptions which are not apperceived, that is,
are in a sense “unconscious.” Macroperception, or perception of things, is said to arise from aggregates of
these microperceptions. See the Preface to G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, eds. Peter
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Proprioception is the body’s means of maintaining its posture and keeping aware of its ecological
positioning. Gallagher distinguishes proprioceptive awareness, a conscious process, from proprioceptive
information, a nonconscious process. The latter is denoted as “the result of physiological stimuli activating
certain proprioceptors, but not consciously experienced by the subject. On this view, proprioceptive
information, generated at peripheral proprioceptors and registered at strategic sites in the brain, but below
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delimit the sensory life of the body and see how it functions transcendentally for
perception, it is necessary to remain open to speculation about the “impersonal ‘One’”
(PP 240/277) whose sensations condition the perceptual life of the phenomenological
subject.
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CHAPTER 3
TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS AND THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE BODY

Even when unformed, or deformed, by knowing,
sensible intuition can revert to its own meaning.
– Levinas, Otherwise than Being

In Levinas’s philosophy of the body we find an explicit commitment to the primacy of
sensation that is only implicit in Merleau-Ponty. Levinas’s analyses of embodiment
display a marked interest in the materiality of the subject, which is most evident in his
remarks about sensation and the affective life of the I, as well as in his critique of
intentionality and opposition to phenomenological method. In his early texts Existence
and Existents, Time and the Other, and Totality and Infinity this materialism appears
through an ontogenetic account of the emergence of subjectivity; later, in Otherwise than
Being, it is via accounts of sensibility and vulnerability that we find Levinas defending a
materialist ontology. It is in the later work that Levinas’s emphasis on the vulnerability of
the body—i.e., its susceptibility to wounding—goes too far in its appreciation of the
reality of violence. The enabling aspects of the body-world relation are overshadowed by
the exigency of violence that Levinas sees as basic to intersubjectivity. Here I will not
rehearse the drama of the same and the Other (autrui)246 which dominates Levinas’s
ethics, but I will reinscribe Levinas’s phenomenology into the discourse of ontology and
focus on the significance of sensation in this ontology. This is admittedly an heretical
reading of Levinas, but one that is not forced upon him.
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Following convention, when I capitalize “Other,” I am referring to the human other. Otherwise, “other”
refers to otherness generally, whatever is not-I.

85

Levinas is not the first person invoked when the philosophy of the body is up for
discussion. His exploration of embodiment is not as broad as Merleau-Ponty’s; it is
certainly less direct. To unpack Levinas’s ontology of the body the theme must be
approached obliquely through his treatment of concepts like sensibility, alimentation,
fecundity, living from, and enjoyment. These concepts and others fall into line with
Levinas’s general concern with affectivity. As does sensation: following Merleau-Ponty,
Levinas affirms sensation as basic to embodiment and the constitution of subjectivity. He
goes further than Merleau-Ponty in pursuing sensation as a transcendental phenomenon,
however. His analyses of sensation and sensibility try to fully appreciate the primacy of
sensation and, in particular, its materiality.247
Claiming that Levinas is engaged in ontology is contentious because so much of
the force of his philosophy operates as an evasion of ontology. This is because he regards
ontology as fundamentally violent toward beings in their singularity. Instead of
approaching beings as unique individuals, ontology subsumes, or “totalizes,” their
uniqueness under a general system, thus reducing their otherness. To avoid this violence,
Levinas consistently argues that ethics, rather than ontology, is first philosophy. This
means that we maintain a peaceful, responsible, and heteronomous relation to the Other
which is prior to our representation or understanding of him or her. Civil discourse forms
the basis of the community of knowers, and therefore is the condition of possibility of
any theory of being or epistemology (TI 72-77/44-49).248
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The thrust of Levinas’s argument depends on a particular construal of ontology.
Levinas can assign a priority to ethics only if he understands ontology as an
epistemological endeavor. It is only if he construes discourse as basically an
expressive/revelatory affair, and ontology as a theory of our knowledge of being (and the
being of Others), that he is able to claim the ethical relation—which is, at bottom, a
relation between beings—as a non-ontological condition.249 He writes in Totality and
Infinity about how ontology “reduces the other to the same” by making the Other appear
through a “third term, a neutral term, which is itself not a being” (TI 42/12). This third
term, through which the “shock of the encounter of the same with the other is deadened”
is the theory of being, or ontology understood as a system of knowledge about being.
Prior to any conceuptualization of the Other, Levinas argues, is the “calling into question
of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other,” or ethics (TI 43/13). But is not this
calling into question an event that requires us to understand its conditions and terms?
That is, is it not necessary for us to comprehend the constitution of the subject and the
Other in order to realize the force of ethics?
I think Levinas’s critique of ontology is strongest when it is seen as an internal
critique of prior ontologies, rather than as an evasion of ontology. Moreover, it seems that
Levinas’s position would be strengthened if he would allow that what he calls ethics is
actually endemic to ontology. On this reading, our understanding of ourselves, Others,
and our basic relationality would be seen as at least equiprimordial with, if not prior to,
249

In his defense of Levinas’s critique of ontology, Heidegger in particular, Manning conflates, like
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our ethical responsibility.250 This reading gains plausibility when we consider that it is
not possible to see what is “called into question” by the Other until we have laid bare the
constitution of the egocentric subject—the individual who cultivates a life of enjoyment
and material security.
An understanding of the ontology that informs Levinas’s theory of the subject is
essential for contrasting Levinasian and Kantian ethics.251 It is through a rejection of the
Kantian subject as an immaterial agent that Levinas is able to make his case for the
vulnerability of the subject and, consequently, the ethical responsibility entailed in that
vulnerability. Levinas argues in Existence and Existents that the Kantian subject, the
transcendental ego, remains always at a distance from the effects of the world. As that
which allows things to appear and be apprehended by cognition, the Kantian ego presents
“a way of relating to events while still being able to not be caught up in them. To be a
[Kantian] subject is to be a power of unending withdrawal, an ability always to find
oneself behind what happens to one” (EE 42/77). The Levinasian subject, by contrast, is
caught up in, produced as an “ontological event” by the world. Indeed, the entirety of
Existence and Existents can be read as the tale of the subject’s emergence from bare
existence, the taking up of a “position” in what Levinas calls the il y a (EE 66-67, 88/120,
149; TI 175/149). This positioning is the material substantialization, or “separation,” of
the subject, which is recounted in Totality and Infinity in terms of the body which enjoys,
nourishes, and “lives from” (vivre de) the world: “Enjoyment accomplishes the atheist
separation: it deformalizes the notion of separation, which is not a cleavage made in the
250
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abstract, but the existence at home with itself as an autochthonous I. The soul…dwells in
what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the ‘other’” (TI
115/88). At bottom, it is the “invulnerability” of the subject—interpreted as an
untraversable distance separating subject and world—in the face of affection that Levinas
objects to in Kant.252 It is in this context that Levinas will highlight the affectivity, and
ultimately the a priori vulnerability, of the subject.
The story of the emergence of the embodied subject, especially in Totality and
Infinity but in other texts as well, is guided by the concept of enjoyment (jouissance). It is
precisely the being that enjoys life—and is individuated as a responsive agent by this
enjoyment—that is summoned by the Other to respond. So what does it mean to enjoy,
then? The analysis of enjoyment is wrapped up with companion concepts like living
from, nourishment, alimentation, and need. These concepts possess physiological and
phenomenological senses, both of which Levinas attends to. The scope of enjoyment is
not restricted to what can be consumed, nor is it interpreted as a phenomenon that is
exclusively attached to the practice of living, using, and doing. Enjoyment is what effects
our separation and enables our manipulation of things; it conditions the
economic/practical life that Heidegger sees as primordial to human existence.253 The
content of this individuation, or independence, is primarily affective:
One does not only exist one’s pain or one’s joy; one exists from pains and joys.
Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity. To
live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on it
nor to act by means of it. To be sure, it is necessary to earn one’s bread, and it is
necessary to nourish oneself in order to earn one’s bread; thus the bread I eat is
also that with which I earn my bread and my life. But if I eat my bread in order to
labor and to live, I live from my labor and from my bread. (TI 111/83)
252
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Sallis is too quick to reduce enjoyment to a consumptive form of alimentation when he
characterizes enjoyment in the following way: “the determination by which to comport
oneself to an object is to appropriate the object, that is, to cancel its otherness and affirm
its sameness with oneself. As in eating.”254 This not only overlooks affective
engagements with what could never be consumed (the elemental, the non-possessable), it
also restricts the meaning of the alimentary. As we will see, alimentation has a much
broader sense.
Enjoyment is a phenomenon analogous to desire255 in that it feeds upon and
produces itself, unlike need which is satisfied once its lack has been filled. Hunger, for
instance, results from a privation of food, and when I eat my hunger subsides. The
structure of nourishment which is displayed by enjoyment is of a different order than
satiable hunger. Levinas’s treatment of enjoyment belongs to his general phenomenology
of alimentation and his exposition of the concrete features of the interiority, or economy,
of subjectivity.256
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the
same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other,
recognized…as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment,
my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this sense alimentation. (TI 111/83)

To live is to enjoy life and to have that life nourished by the acts which make up living:
sensing, knowing, imagining, and so on. Each of these brings us an immediate joy that
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feeds the egoism at the core of life (TI 112/84). And it is in this enjoyment that the “very
pulsation” of the I occurs (TI 113/85). “Subjectivity originates in the independence and
sovereignty of enjoyment,” says Levinas (TI 114/86). This conception of enjoyment is
significant because it makes little to no appeal to the absolute transcendence which is
often cited as the condition of possibility for subjective individuation.257
Correlative with Levinas’s emphasis on the irreducible and absolute
transcendence of the Other is an attempt to think the immanent production of subjectivity.
This is evident in the language he employs to describe the movement of the subject in
enjoyment. He speaks of the subject as “coiling” (enroulement), “folding back” (repli), as
“spiral” (spirale) and “involution” (involution) (TI 118/91; EE 81/138; OB 73/92).
Enjoyment is denoted as the “eddy of the same” (le remous même du Même) (TI 115/88).
The imagery here suggests that Levinas is trying to conceive individuation without
recourse to some external factor.258 It is true that the call to responsibility commanded by
the Other singles me out, or individuates me as an ethical agent, but this can only occur
once I have become someone capable of responding—that is, become a subject who can
be subjected. Individuation and subjection can be equiprimordial, of course. But for the
subject to be responsible and capable of substituting him- or herself in the place of the
Other, which is precisely what Levinas wants to affirm of each one of us, must not the
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subject already have something to give? That is, it seems necessary for the subject to
have not only emerged as an individual, but to have also already acquired possessions
which it can offer to the destitute Other, before it can be designated as a
responsible/responsive being. There must be some form of subjectivity in Levinas’s
thinking which is not a subjection to the Other.
Levinas seems to be grappling with the problem of immanent individuation in
Otherwise than Being when he writes that,
Matter “materializes” in satisfaction, which, over and beyond any intentional
relationship of cognition or possession, of “taking in one’s hands,” means “biting
into….” It is irreducible to a taking in one’s hands, for it is already an absorption
of a “within” including the ambiguity of two inwardnesses: that of a recipient of
spatial forms, and that of an ego assimilating the other in its identity, and coiling
in over itself. (OB 73/92)
And a little further along, he remarks how “there is enjoying of enjoyment before any
reflection, but enjoyment does not turn toward enjoyment as sight turns toward the seen.
Beyond the multiplication of the visible in images, enjoyment is the singularization of an
ego in its coiling back [enroulement] upon itself” (OB 73/93). What Levinas calls the
“advent” of the subject from out of the anonymity of existence is not a movement of
transcendence, but the taking up of a position through effort, labor, and the consequent
enjoyment which results from these acts. As this enjoyment multiplies, it folds back upon
itself and wrests the I free and gives substance to the individual (EE 81/138). The
substance of this subject would be little more than the thickness or viscosity of its
affective life.259
259
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to the affective realm before they become cognitive objects (EE 11/30). They belong to a prereflective
sphere which, if it does not precede, it at least takes priority over, consciousness. And insofar as, for the
phenomenologist, subjectivity requires conscious reflection, a preconscious event would have to be granted
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Levinas’s apology for the primacy of affectivity and the sensuous life of the
embodied subject operates as a response to a perceived deficiency in the
phenomenological method devised by Husserl, in particular its principle of objectifying
intentionality. It also continues his critique of the Kantian subject sketched above.
Against these two figures, he attempts to rethink the subject as a material event, rather
than as a transcendental ego that would be the condition of possibility for representing or
giving meaning to events. Insofar as his philosophy attempts to supplant the privileged
place of intentionality in phenomenology; as it attempts to install affectivity, alterity, and
the like at the base of experience, Levinas’s philosophy works against phenomenology in
the name of a materialist metaphysics. His interest in phenomenology comes less out of a
desire to contribute to a science of phenomena than it aims to give a nonreductive
account of events that could otherwise be explained by the physical sciences or
recuperated by a representationalist epistemology. In a strong sense, Levinas’s critique of
intentionality is an allergic reaction to what he sees as the hegemony of representation in
phenomenological approaches to otherness (TI 122-127/95-100).
Levinas’s objection to phenomenological method is straightforward: if the
objectifying acts of theoretical consciousness, what Husserl calls meaning-giving
(Sinngebung) acts, are our primary mode of access to things, then those things can only
appear to us as representations whose content are predetermined by intentional acts. In
short, phenomenology becomes transcendental idealism. The problem is that this kind of
transcendental philosophy leaves no room for the kind of radical passivity Levinasian

a certain anonymity, and thus belong to no subject in particular. What is perhaps needed here is an analysis
of maternity (Levinas provides content for this in OB) and the prenatal life of the infant. Intrauterine
existence seems a good contender for anonymity from the perspective of conscious reflection, but of course
it is beyond the reach of the phenomenologist.
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ethics requires, and it fails to appreciate the ambiguity of the given (TI 123, 125/96, 97).
“The ‘act’ of representation discovers, properly speaking, nothing before itself” (TI
125/97). From the practical perspective, the subject who constitutes the content of its
world through representations retains an identity that remains the same throughout all of
its experiences. The spontaneity of its freedom to represent is never compromised by the
objects to be represented. As Levinas says, “in representation the I precisely loses its
opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the
multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain
the same is to represent to oneself” (TI 126/99).
Levinas supplants objectifying acts of consciousness in the order of experience
and installs sensation at the beginning. An analogous move is made by Merleau-Ponty
when he places operative intentionality before intentionality of act. Levinas’s move is
more radical, however, because it makes sensation discontinuous with perception and
cognition. It is prior to intentionality of any form that Levinas situates sensibility. This
means that our sensuous contact with what is exterior remains forever anterior to our
representations. Our sensuous contact with the Other, as well as with matter and the
sensible as such (the diminutive other), constitutes the transcendental in Levinas’s
philosophy. This does not mean that Levinas must break completely with phenomenology
in order to rediscover the force of sensation; in fact, he finds that “intentionality
rehabilitates the sensible [réhabilite le sensible].”260 How so? Levinas points to the tacit
dimension of intentional acts, or that which “consciousness sees without seeing.”261 This
tacit dimension is not just the unintended horizon of unfulfilled intentions which
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accompany explicit intentions, but is the very excess of intentionality which “is
inconstestably akin to the modern conceptions of the unconscious and the depths.” There
is then a reciprocal constitution at play in intentionality, whereby the object which is
supposedly constituted by consciousness proves to contain more than its explicit
constitution and this “more than” reveals itself as always already conditioning thought.262
“A new ontology begins: being is posited not only as correlative to a thought, but as
already founding the very thought that nonetheless constitutes it.”263 Levinas’s new
ontology signals the “ruin of representation” and the decentering of the Kantian subject.
Kant’s schema requires an imperceptible layer of content that lies below the level of
representation, but his transcendental method disqualifies the admittance of such a layer:
The idea of a necessary implication that is absolutely imperceptible to the subject
directed on the object, only discovered after the fact upon reflection, thus not
produced in the present, that is, produced unbeknownst to me, puts an end to the
ideal of representation and the subject’s sovereignty, as well as to the idealism
according to which nothing could enter into me surreptitiously. A deep-seated
passion is thus revealed in thought.264
As the transcendental support of representation, the sensible and sensible qualities
constitute the milieu in which the subject perceives. Totality and Infinity gives a lengthy
description of this ungraspable milieu of things under the name “the element.” The
element has no profiles, is a pure quality that we enjoy before we make categorical
judgments about it (TI 131-133/104-107). As Sallis characterizes it, the element is
“irreducible to a system of operational references” and “has its own thickness and
density…[a]nd unlike the things that come to us in the medium, the medium itself is
262

John E. Drabinski, “From Representation to Materiality,” in International Studies in Philosophy 30, no.
4 (1998): 30, writes of this sensible horizon: “The sensible surrounds and structures the movement toward
the object and thereby structures the very possibility of the noematic horizons that form the field of
transcendental exposition. The sensible is transcendental, not in the sense that it is already and ideality, but
rather that it is a presupposed condition of all reflective life.”
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nonpossessable.” “The depth of the element does not, as with a thing, conceal a series of
other profiles that could be offered to various perspectives.”265
Lover of ambiguity that he is, the element appears to be missing in MerleauPonty. For Levinas, on the other hand, the element is the very locus of ambiguity; this is
its value. The elemental/sensuous milieu “is privileged, because within it that ambiguity
of constitution, whereby the noema conditions and shelters the noesis that constitutes it,
is played out.”266 Levinas notes that Husserl wanted to designate the sensuous as
objective, i.e., independent of subjective constitution, but that Husserl’s adherence to the
primacy of intentionality prevents him from doing so. This is because intentionality
“plays the role of an apprehension with regard to those contents upon which it bestows an
objective meaning and which it animates or inspires.”267 By contrast, Levinas insists that
we live through the objectivity of sensations and that Husserl recognized this too. We
should say that the “materiality of sensations [matérialité des sensations]”268 is,
borrowing Levinas’s own expression, lived from or enjoyed, never apprehended or
grasped by the intellect. In addition to acting as a resistance to representational thinking,
sensation would provide the aliment which gives birth to the subject who is capable of
representing. Sensation, then, would not be an effect of the objective on the subject, but a
“complicity” between the materiality of subject and object: “the corporeity of
consciousness is in exact proportion to this participation of consciousness in the world it
constitutes, but this corporeity is produced [produit] in sensation.”269 In Otherwise than
Being this complicity is explored in Levinas’s analysis of sensibility and in terms of
265
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“contact” with otherness, all of which contributes to Levinas’s transcendental aesthetics
of embodiment.270
The complicity in sensation between subject and object recalls Merleau-Ponty’s
idea of sensing as communion. The key difference between the two thinkers, however, is
that Merleau-Ponty sees this communion as synchronous, whereas Levinas recognizes it
as the locus of vulnerability and diachrony. What is also lacking in Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding is the idea that corporeity is produced materially by sensations. In
Merleau-Ponty’s subject-object dialogue, it is movement of perception and the posture of
the body that is produced, whereas for Levinas sensation actually produces the body qua
living, sensing, enjoying being.271 In biology there is a name for this process—
metabolism.272 For Levinas, sensing is a metabolic event. It is an intimate kind of
transaction, beyond mere commerce or exchange.
There is a distinct shift of emphasis in the analyses of sensibility given in Totality
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. In the earlier text Levinas concentrates in his
narrative of the constitution of the subject on the enabling features of sensibility and the
dependence of the body on the material environment. In the later text he tends to cast
sensibility as that which leaves the subject precariously exposed to the outside and
vulnerable to wounding. That is, a nonreciprocity is implied between subject and other:
270

I am skeptical that there is a continuity between Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of the sensible. I
have noted a few of my concerns with Husserl’s theory of sensation in my introduction. Because I cannot
here explore the merit of Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl here, I point the reader to John E. Drabinski,
Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of Phenomenology in Levinas (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2001).
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“Brains in the Flesh: Prospects for a Neurophenomenology,” Janus Head 9, no. 1 (2006): 138). For
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living, we can say that sensations are converted into material life.
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the Levinasian body ultimately becomes a susceptible body, where susceptibility is
understood as a radical passivity. In both instances sensibility is given a prereflective and
prerepsentational role, and it is clear that Levinas understands it as prior to the emergence
of objectifying consciousness. He affirms, following Descartes, the irrationality and
ambiguity of sensation. And, like Kant, he separates sensibility from the understanding
and relegates “matter” to a place beyond “the synthetic power of representation” (TI 135136/109). I will try to adduce in the remainder of this chapter Levinas’s “phenomenology
of the sensible” (TI 136/109) and his divergent perspective on sensibility.
Totality and Infinity ties sensibility to enjoyment, calling enjoyment the “essence”
of sensibility. Conversely, sensibility is determined as the “mode of enjoyment” (TI 134,
135/107, 108). Sensibility is therefore determined as a mode of affectivity or point of
access for pleasurable and painful encounters. Its modality is undirected and sufficient to
itself (TI 135/108-109), which means that it does not belong to the order of
instrumentality that Levinas assigns to the economy of possession—the hand that grasps
objects as tools/implements (as in Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty) or the mind which grasps
objects as concepts (as in Hegel).273 Sensibility is neither a means to… nor in the service
of…, despite it being basic to labor, work, effort, dwelling, and so on. Above all, it is an
encounter with the otherness which is given through sensations and materiality, which is
not for Levinas simply a question of resistance to action or opposition: sensibility
establishes our relation to the elemental through our corporeal enjoyment of qualities (TI
273

In TI 167/141 Levinas speaks of the action of the body which would seek to escape its entrenchment in
being as unfolding according to a “final” causality which is guided by the hand. “The end is a term the hand
searches for in the risk of missing it. The body as possibility of a hand—and its whole corporeity can be
substituted for the hand—exists in the virtuality of this movement betaking itself toward the tool.” This
criticism of this discussion is certainly aimed at Heidegger’s ontology (with its primacy of the ready-tohand), but it applies as well to the privilege of the grasp or hold (prise) in Merleau-Ponty, as does Levinas’s
examination of “the caress.”
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136/109). This enjoyment is discontinuous with the synthetic acts of consciousness; it is
not a stage toward representation, but a pulsating rhythm of the I; or, as Merleau-Ponty
has put it, a mode in which the subject is born and dies as each instant (TI 136, 143/109110, 117; PP 216/250).
Silvia Benso adduces the concrete form of this process: breathing. Breathing is a
twofold process, inspiration and expiration. Inspiration and expiration, which are
structurally equivalent to birth and death, embody the animation of the subject by the
element. “Such an animation does not occur as the level of cognition, theory, or
intentionality, claims Levinas. Rather, it is only possible at the level of the body, through
an incarnation.”274 This interpretation of sentience disengages the body from its reliance
on the soul by localizing the animation of subjectivity in the intercorporeal, rather than
spiritual, realm. “The body thus is retrieved from its confinement in that Cartesian…order
of materiality for which the body and the soul ‘have no common space where they can
touch’.”275
The pulsation of the I is supported by the sensible, but the sensible itself remains
groundless, anarchic. The insecurity entailed in this anarchy is not a precisely a material
threat, but a question of the temporality of the sensible. The sensible world “precedes me
as an absolute of an unrepresentable antiquity” that is perhaps only apprehensible by
imagining the total destruction of the world, an impossible thought experiment (TI
137/111; EE 51/93). We cannot know from whence it comes or whether it will continue
in the future. Its promise is precarious, without guarantee.
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It is true that we always access the sensible in the present and, affective
encounters notwithstanding, via representation. But “the represented, the present, is a
fact, already belonging to a past” (TI 130/103). To apprehend the sensible as such would
be analogous to encountering the il y a, bare existence, in its purity. Despite the
impossibility of this feat—since we are always already caught up in a world of thought,
language, perception—Levinas says that we do in fact come face to face with formless
phenomena (TI 139/112). In Totality and Infinity he speaks of how our identities are
haunted by the elemental and the insecurity this brings us,276 while in Existence and
Existents he speaks of the horror of the il y a that we experience in the night. But how are
these senseless phenomena revealed, that is, accessed phenomenologically?
Existence and Existents traces the genesis of the individuated existent out of the
anonymity of pure existence, being qua being. This anonymity, although not temporally
prior to individuation, maintains an ontological priority over the subject who thinks, acts,
and feels as a singular ego or person. On Levinas’s account, the existent breaks free from
anonymity by taking up a position or assuming an identity—exerting itself against the
indeterminacy of being. It is only when we make an effort through labor that a rift is
created in being: “Effort is the very effecting of a present,” says Levinas (EE 23/48),
because the fatigue which results from effort dislocates the existent from its synchrony
with the uninterrupted duration of existence.277 As an affective (the experience of pain)
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The anarchic and unrepresentable source of the elemental belongs to an unstable future that brings with
it the disintegration of what has been done in the past. It is the promise of insecurity, the constant threat of
the end of enjoyment, “menace and destruction.” We combat this insecurity with work and labor. (TI 141142, 146/115, 120).
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Levinas is drawing here upon a tradition in French philosophy concerned with thinking the autoaffection
of the body as the initiation of subjectivity. This tradition includes modern figures like Maine de Biran and
Ravaisson, and is best represented contemporarily by Michel Henry. Ravaisson notes how effort is
suspended between action and passion, and how effort comprises “not only the primary condition, but also
the archetype and essence, of consciousness.” It is evident that he, like Levinas, is trying to conceive the
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rather than reflective event, this retroactive movement awakens us to our interminable
contract with existence; it is not an escape from existence: “Fatigue is to be sure not a
cancellation of one’s contact with being. The delay it involves is nonetheless an
inscription in existence…” (EE 25/51). We catch sight of our struggle with existence in
insomnia as we seek, through what Levinas calls “vigilance,”278 to wrest ourselves free
from the indeterminacy of the night.279 The insomniac experiences a wakefulness at night
that contests the spontaneity of the will: he or she wants and wills sleep, but sleep will not
come. Instead, “One watches on when there is nothing to watch and despite the absence
of any reason for remaining watchful” (EE 61/109). It is as though, in the grip of the
night, the restlessness of the insomniac’s body has extinguished the freedom of the ego.
“I am, one might say, the object rather than the subject of an anonymous thought” (EE
63/111). And this, says Levinas, is a horrifying condition (EE 55/98).280

birth of consciousness in the voluntary initiation of a position against the resistance of the material world.
See Ravaisson, Of Habit, 43.
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Vigilance is the condition of the ego “riveted” to being, that is, unable to not exist. “The ego is swept
away by the fatality of being,” says Levinas (EE 61/110). Whereas consciousness would be an escape from
existence, vigilance is an encounter with existence that lacks intuition, illumination, and attention. Indeed,
it is an event wherein the ego given over to the existence as though existence, rather than the ego, were
consciousness. In the vigilance of insomnia the ego becomes the object of the night which subjects it (EE
62-63/EE; TO 48-51/27-30).
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Particularly in Existence and Existents the night figures as the experiential form of the il y a, or pure
being. In the night, Levinas tells us, things lose their form and the dark matter of existence encroaches upon
us. Being takes on a menacing aspect through which we are confronted with the anonymity of our own
existence. In the night, in insomnia, we are reminded that we are not completely in control of our own
being. Levinas suggests that a direct encounter with the il y a is perhaps possible through a thought
experiment wherein we imagine the total destruction of everything, but such a feat of the imagination
seems dubious. In any case, it is nonphenomenological. See Levinas, EE 31, 35, 44, 51/60-61, 66, 80, 9192.
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From a methodological perspective, it is important to note that Levinas sees his descriptions of
vigilance, insomnia, and so on as going beyond the limits of phenomenological description. They are
beyond intuition and argued for analogically (see EE 8/26, where Levinas writes that our relationship with
being “is called a relationship only by analogy”). The subject is cast as an object, the ego is suspended, and
the phenomena being examined are supposed to take place before the advent of consciousness. Thus,
Levinas writes: “Our affirmation of an anonymous vigilance goes beyond the phenomena, which already
presupposes an ego, and thus eludes descriptive phenomenology” (EE 63/112). The direct experience of
insomnia allows us to infer a possible relationship with being in which we are rendered anonymous beings.
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The horror of existence is articulated with the insecurity bestowed upon our
bodies by our sensibility, a condition which is warded off (for a time) in dwelling (TI
137/110-111). In dwelling we shelter ourselves from the elements, and this sheltering
offers the nourishment of enjoyment. We shelter ourselves because we are incapable of
getting a hold on or containing the elements that, beyond a certain threshold, begin to
deteriorate instead of nourish us. The themes of fatigue and effort found in Existence and
Existents recur in the narrative regarding dwelling and possession contained in Totality
and Infinity. The phenomenon of dwelling is elaborated against the backdrop of
enjoyment, on the one hand, and the insecurity involved at the heart of enjoyment, on the
other.
Dwelling is an event of alimentation which gives rise to representation and,
ultimately, possession of objects. There is more than one kind of alimentation involved in
dwelling, some of them affective and some consumptive. In the home the subject takes up
a position and takes refuge from the elements. Only after this position is established can
labor be undertaken, and it is labor, for Levinas, that gives form to matter and produces
the world of graspable/consumable things—possessions (TI 156, 157, 159/130, 131,
133).281 “A subject does not exist before the event of its position. The act of taking a
position does not unfold in some dimension from which it could take its origin; it arises at
the every point at which it acts” (EE 81/138). Taking a position, which is a condition of
laboring, is not yet acting, which is a transcendent movement. It belongs to the immanent
281
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movement, or involution, of effort and fatigue. Positioning and dwelling are the concrete
modes through which the subject comes to be situated in the objective world. They lend
us a support from which to take hold of the elemental through labor (TI 158/131). Yet,
this is the kind of support that must be constantly taken up, rebuilt, and maintained: a
Sisyphean labor.
Labor leads to possession and is guided by what Levinas calls the final causality
of the hand. “Possession is accomplished in taking-possession or labor, the destiny of the
hand” (TI 159/132).282 It is contrasted with the enjoyment of sensibility, which is
characterized precisely by its nonpossession. Levinas wishes to designate possession as
an ontological affair, but one which assuages the insecurity brought on by our exposure
to the elemental: “Possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of
the element—its independence, its being” (TI 158/132). Despite its attachment to
ontology, however, Levinas refuses here to call labor a violence. This is because “it is
applied to what is faceless, to the resistance of nothingness” (TI 160/134).
All of this involves and influences the constitution of the body of the dweller or
laborer. First of all, the hand is what substantializes things, traces their contours and
draws them out of the pure quality of the element. Things are not first there, waiting to be
given.283 Second, Levinas argues that the subject is originally influenced by its affective
commerce with the element; it is “the product of the medium.” Life is the lived body and
the body-effect, active and passive at once. This is not an endorsement of the duality of
282
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the body, but of its “ambiguous” nature, which Levinas identifies with consciousness (TI
165/139). Consciousness, he says, is not an incarnation, but a “disincarnation,” a
“positioning of the corporeity of the body” which emerges in the “concreteness of
dwelling and labor” (TI 165-166/140). Consciousness, then, arises out of the body’s
pulsations in labor: the rhythm of labor, and the tension involved therein, give rise to
consciousness. One is reminded here of Nietzsche’s remarks on the origin of
consciousness in On the Genealogy of Morality, where the inhibition of our physical
activity gives birth, in a folding back upon oneself, to the “internalizing of man”—
conscious reflection.284 Only after the fact of embodiment does representational activity
become possible. Appreciating the ambiguity of the body’s relation with the other,
Levinas writes:
In its deep-seated fear life attests this ever possible inversion of the body-master
into body-slave, of health and sickness. To be a body is on the one hand to stand
[se tenir], to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on the earth, to
be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body. But—we repeat—this
encumberment is not produced as a pure dependence; it forms the happiness of
him who enjoys it. (TI 164/138)
The body’s capacity to work on things acts as a consolation for its inability to rend itself
from being; its consciousness relieves it from the physical realm, postponing the
disintegration and death proper to it. Nevertheless, and at the same time, the body
remains prey to the other which “paralyzes possession” (TI 170, 171/145).
Levinas’s prioritizing of sensibility over the grasp and comprehension works as a
critique of Merleau-Ponty, in particular the latter’s insistence that our basic modus
operandi involves an initial hold on things which increasingly converges upon an even
better hold. While Levinas certainly appreciates that our practical relations with things,
284
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our treatment of them as implements, is our primary means of handling the world, he
likewise wants to remind us that below the equipmental and perceptual level lies the level
of sensation. Sensation is not perception: perception belongs to the intentional sphere, the
realm of consciousness, whereas sensation has a transcendental affective function that
remains anonymous.285 “The very distinction between representational and affective
content is tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other
than that of perception” (TI 187/161). Levinas realizes that such claims stretch the limits
of phenomenology, but he aspires to a phenomenology of sensation nonetheless. His
entire ontology of the sensible is built on his claim that the pure quality of existence is
independent of us, anarchic, and ungraspable—and yet, it is given. There is no
reversibility between us and the purely sensible because its exceeding of our
representational and practical capacities leaves us vulnerable to its precarious future. At
the heart of sensibility is a diachrony, or dehiscence, that interrupts the synchrony of
body and world just as a caress of the skin defers the immediacy of contact.286
In “Reality and Its Shadow,” one of his most sustained treatments of aesthetics
and art criticism, Levinas argues for the diachrony of aesthetic experience. Here he is
close to Deleuze in at least one respect: both thinkers see the effects of aesthetic
“rhythm” as constitutive of aesthetic experience. For Levinas, rhythm is the means by
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which we are affected, against our will, by the work of art. This affection, however, is
different from that which we undergo when faced with the il y a, which Levinas says
“lacks rhythm” (EE 62/111), suggesting that the pure encounter with being is basically
outside aesthetics. Rhythm conducts the passive moment of sensing, the moment in
which our active representation is converted into a passive reception:
Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent,
assumption, initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried
away by it. The subject is part of its own representation. It is so not even despite
itself, for in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from
oneself to anonymity.287
This is applicable not only to music, but to poetry and painting as well. Rhythm is
precisely that sensible content that detaches itself from the artwork and seizes upon our
sensibility, bypassing consciousness, and folds us into the aesthetic event.288 “To insist on
the musicality of every image is to see in an image its detachment from an object, that
independence from the category of substance which the analysis of our textbooks ascribe
to pure sensation not yet converted into perception (sensation as an adjective), which for
empirical psychology remains a limit case, a purely hypothetical given.”289
Apart from the figure and form of representational content lies the sensory content
which informs the rhythm of the aesthetic. Granted, we may not apprehend the latter
content phenomenologically. But that is just the point: the function of sensation is to
affect sensibility directly and render the viewer/listener captive. This is why Levinas says
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that sensibility is “realized only by the imagination.”290 Only the imagination can
represent the aesthetic event which sensibility comes into contact with, i.e., pure
sensation. Sensation is an interpellation, a kind of imperative that cannot be dodged
because it operates immediately on the body, below the level of perception or
apperception. Insofar as it engages us simultaneously at the level of perception and
sensation, the aesthetic dimension operates diachronically. Since the sensory event is
always happening behind the scenes, animating the present representation but never
rising to the level of representation, it remains forever in the past.291
Rhythm affects sensibility directly, as a “distinct ontological event.”292 Deleuze
has argued a similar point about the effects of Francis Bacon’s painting. For Deleuze,
rhythm is the “logic” of sensation, or what animates/unifies the senses and their discrete
sensory experiences.293 This logic does not correspond to the physiological layout of the
organic body, but rather it grasps the body “at the point where rhythm plunges into chaos,
into the night, at the point where the differences of level are perpetually and violently
mixed.”294 Because the body is not just an organized set of organs, but also an event (“at
one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the
sensation…”)295 whose integrity is constituted by thresholds and limits, the body can be
seen as organized by the sensations it receives or gives off. Deleuze speaks of how
sensation is in the body and how the sensory event, rather than the stable form of the
body, is what Bacon aims to paint: “what is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar
290
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as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this
sensation.”296 In a sense, what Bacon paints is the “accumulation” of sensations that
make up the identity of the body—its sensory fingerprint, so to speak. This fingerprint is,
however, never fixed or properly personal: it belongs to the anonymous rhythm of the
sensible and is always prone to the “violence” of sensations emitted by other bodies.297
Taken together, Levinas’s and Deleuze’s analysis of rhythm allow us to glimpse a
dynamic conception of identity. On this model, identity is constituted by the exchange of
sensations between bodies. Corporeal identity, by the same token, is determined by the
process of aesthetic exchange: bodies are delimited by the sensations they offer to and
receive from other bodies. They are, as Spinoza has it, capacities to affect and be
affected. Or, as Hume might have said, I am only the sensations which pass across my
body. I, for instance, am little more than the sounds, smells, images, and so forth emitted
from my body. We saw a similar notion of identity take shape in our discussion of
Merleau-Ponty and style in chapter 1.
The significance of this conception of bodily identity is ramified in Levinas’s
work because he regards sensation as foundational. Levinas’s brief discussion of the
“transcendental function” (TI 188-189/162)298 of sensation circles back to the analysis of
enjoyment and testifies to the immanent constitution of the subject by its other. But we
must always keep in mind that sensation, for Levinas as for Deleuze, is never just a
matter of the “ambivalence” of feeling.299 With the explicit affirmation of its
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transcendental function we see Levinas appreciating the force of sensation more than
Merleau-Ponty.300 To do so, however, Levinas must venture outside of phenomenology
and into metaphysics, affirming the reality of sensation not only as something that
informs the content of cognition, but also as something that directly shapes the integrity
of the subject. Sensation, then, names a fundamental, but not radical, passivity of the
subject. (Radical passivity is proper to the human other for Levinas, because the human
other is elevated to a quasi-divine status which renders their vulnerability unique, even
sacred, and my responsibility for them infinite.)301 The subject, as a body, finds itself
always already in a heteronomous position—affected and nourished by what is other than
it. Its first receptivity is its sensibility; it lives from sensations which provide the
alimentary content of its representations. This alimentary layer of sensation “recovers a
‘reality’ when we see in it not the subjective counterpart of objective qualities, but an
enjoyment ‘anterior’ to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and
object” (TI 188/162).302 Sensation here names the experience of the body in immanence,
but an immanence which is constantly broken up by the tension between the temporality
of the represented and the temporality of the sensed.
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No one has appreciated the alimentary or enabling dimension of sensation more
than Alphonso Lingis. In fact, Lingis goes so far as to defend the ethical valence of the
direct force in sensation. Before any formal imperative imposed on the intellect by reason
is the imperative we receive from the environment, which orders our bodies to adapt
themselves to the contour of the land, the tool we take up in our projects, or the elements
which envelop us.303 This contact with things is received as sensations which are
assimilated into the posture of our bodies and, ultimately, our body schema. Or, to put it
more radically, the body is schematized by the sensuous environment. Sensation and
schematization name an identical process:
The imperative in our environment is received, not on our understanding in
conflict with our sensuality, but on our postural schema which integrates our
sensibility and mobilizes our motor forces. It is received on our sensory-motor
bodies as bodies we have to center upon things that orient our movements, bodies
we have to anchor on the levels down which our vision, our touch, our listening
move, on which we station ourselves and move in the heart of reality. It orders
our competence.304
Of course, we always negotiate with the layout of the environment as we make our way
through it. But there is a sense in which our bodies are made to move in certain
nonnegotiable (i.e., imperative) ways: reflexes and other autonomic responses, for
instance. Levinas speaks of how the face of the other does not compel me to accept its
solicitation after I have considered it: “In the proximity of the face, the subjection
precedes the reasoned decision to assume the order that it bears.”305 Lingis finds this kind
of subjection in sensation writ large, not just in the human face. In any case, these
303
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responses cut straight to our sensibility and would be apprehended as pure sensations if
our perception were not permeated by representations. This is the speculative point. We
live from these responses because they enable our bodies to move through and work
competently on the material world. However, we do not constitute them. And all of this
because our bodies are immanent to, and in many respects dependent upon, other bodies
like (animate) and unlike (inanimate) our own. Violins, animals, flowers, and people
impress us with their sensuous content.
Immanence takes on a graver tenor in Levinas’s late major work, Otherwise than
Being, or Beyond Essence. As Stella Sandford argues, “Both stress the corporeality of the
subject as sensibility, but in Totality and Infinity the emphasis falls on pleasure, while in
Otherwise than Being the keynote is suffering.”306 The heteroaffection307 of sensibility
now becomes a kind of transcendental vulnerability and the animation of the subject is
cast as the “body exposed to the other” (OB 69/87). The alimentary function of sensation
which is apparent throughout Levinas’s exploration of dwelling and enjoyment in
Totality and Infinity is displaced by a desire to articulate the way in which sensibility
leads to the break up of identity, and is the means by which the subject is subjected to the
diachrony of the sensible (OB 14-15/17-19).308 Levinas goes so far as to identify
subjectivity with the vulnerability of sensibility (OB 15, 50, 54/18, 65-66, 70). This
vulnerability is given a carnal form, the skin, but a phenomenological interpretation.
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Levinas once again points to labor, fatigue, and effort to highlight the embodied
aspect of subjectivity. But the exposure of the subject to the other is interpreted as
obsession, pain, and the interruption of enjoyment. Corporeality “is the pain [rather than
enjoyment] of effort, the original adversity of fatigue, which arises in the upsurge of
movement and in the energy involved in labor” (OB 54/70). Levinas has replaced the
originary enjoyment of labor with an originary suffering: “As a passivity in the paining of
the pain felt, sensibility is a vulnerability, for pain comes to interrupt an enjoyment in its
very isolation, and thus tears me from myself” (OB 55/71). It is difficult to discern
whether enjoyment or pain takes precedence now, or whether they are equiprimordial
modes of existence. For instance, Levinas says that, “It is with savoring and enjoyment
that the analysis of sensibility will have to begin” (OB 56/72), but this does not mean that
sensibility is originally savoring and enjoyment. Nor does this statement outweigh what
he says in defense of the primacy of pain in Otherwise than Being. What is clear is that
pain and enjoyment both belong to sensibility, which in either case provides the body’s
first opening onto its other.309
The immediacy and materiality of sensibility lends it its susceptibility. Levinas
writes of how matter “materializes” in enjoyment and satisfaction, “which, over and
beyond any intentional relationship of cognition or possession, of ‘taking in one’s hands’
[‘prise en mains’], means ‘biting into….’” (OB 73/92). The materiality of enjoyment can
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then be correlated with the excess of meaning involved in alimentation.310 But, at the
same time, what we are nourished by is what threatens the stability or integrity of our
embodied being. The material which we come into contact with through our sensibility
contains a basic ambivalence: it enables us, but remains perpetually capable of disabling
us. Sensibility, as a form of contact, is the reversion of our grasp on things into our being
grasped by them, a situation which can be described “in the ambiguity of a kiss” (OB
75/94). This ambiguity cannot be equivalent to the reversibility that Merleau-Ponty sees
in the handshake, because for Levinas the supposed imminence of reversibility is
precisely what remains in question and precarious.311 It is as though the ambiguity of the
kiss as well as the handshake is what short-circuits or prevents reversibility: one never
knows whether the encounter is reciprocal or violent; both are equally viable possibilities.
“[Sensibility]” writes Levinas, “reverts from the activity of being a hunter of images to
the passivity of being prey, from being aim to being wound, from being an intellectual act
of apprehension to apprehension as an obsession by another who does not manifest
himself” (OB 75/95).
Contact has a technical sense for Levinas and describes a precise situation. It is
basic to the embodied form of the subject and it describes the “proximity of the other” as
“the immediate opening up for the other of the immediacy of enjoyment, the immediacy
of taste, materialization of matter” (OB 74/94). Contact likewise describes the original
exposedness of sensibility to the other, that is, the transcendental aspect of
310
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heteroaffection. The subject who enjoys and is born from enjoyment is always already
enjoying the other as element, sensation, matter. Levinas gives contact/proximity a carnal
signification:
Sensibility—the proximity, immediacy and restlessness which signify in it—is not
constituted out of some apperception putting consciousness into relationship with
a body. Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of a subject that is situated in
the midst of a world it represents to itself; the sensible experience of the body is
already and from the start incarnate. The sensible…binds the node of incarnation
into a plot larger than the apperception of the self. In this plot I am bound to
others before being tied to my body. (OB 76/96)
Proximity, then, is prior to the emergence of the subject who can represent or whose body
is an “I can.”312 It opens the subject to the approach of the other, which arrives “as though
from an immemorial past, which was never present, began in no freedom” (OB 88/112).
Our contact with this transcendental past is embodied in the skin, which Levinas,
sounding like Merleau-Ponty, calls “the divergency [l’écart] between the visible and the
invisible” (OB 89/113). The skin is not a flesh in which each one of us participates, but a
surface that at once keeps us separated and yet in contact. It is the liminal site, “the gap
[décalage] between approach and approached,” where alterity is produced (OB 90/114;
TI 26-27/xiv-xv).313
The skin is naturally vulnerable because it is a permeable surface. As Rudolf
Bernet explains,
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Even a tight and thick skin has small and large holes that one can adequately call
‘openings’. There are natural openings as well as artificial or forced openings
called ‘wounds’. Natural openings are still subject, however, to being forced and
wounded. The natural openings allowing for a passage and exchange between the
inside and the outside of a body cannot prevent the violence of a traumatic
intrusion or expulsion.314
Levinas must have something like this in mind when he argues that sensibility is
vulnerability and exposure to the other. Bernet goes on to point out that the singular
nature of the skins involved in contact lend their quality to the intersubjective encounter,
and help to determine whether the encounter is friendly or violent.315 The skin, or
contact/proximity, cannot be deemed violent a priori. And if we are going to allow
Levinas to say that the sensitivity of the skin—sensibility generally—is susceptibility,
then this condition must be taken in an ambivalent sense. Above all it should be
maintained that my exposure to the other equally enables and disables my body, and that
a priori this exposure is neither painful nor pleasurable.
I have tried to argue here that the aesthetic dimension of existence is foundational
for Levinas’s ontology of the body. In fact, I would go so far as to say that aesthetics—
understood broadly—must be first philosophy for Levinas.316 The subject’s primary
opening onto the other is the body’s sensibility—that is, its capacity to sense and be
affected by the material it lives and dies from. Sensibility is the condition of possibility
for enjoyment, and therefore a condition of possibility for ipseity, or selfhood. It is this
ipseity which is interpellated by the Other and called into question. But this ipseity must
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first be won through effort and labor before it can answer the call of the Other
responsibly.
We have also seen that for Levinas sensation has an affective dimension, as is
connoted in the French sentir, but it is also a distinct ontological event. This event it
marked by the passivity of the subject who undergoes the sensation, on the one hand, and
the objectivity of the sensation which comes from the outside and directs sensibility, on
the other. Levinas’s disqualification of the view that sensation is purely subjective,
something that happens inside the mind, commits him to a form of ontological realism.
Unlike Kant or Husserl, whose methodological commitments prevent them from
speaking about what lies beyond the bounds of the phenomenal, Levinas is entitled to
make claims about the noninentional/transcendental realm of sensation. He openly admits
that these claims are metaphysical and beyond the phenomenological method. They are,
however, not unintelligible: “This is the whole point,” says Sandford.317
It is precisely because sensations come from outside that Levinas can characterize
sensibility as vulnerability. Indeed, he requires this corporeal vulnerability in order to
prioritize ethics before any other branch of philosophy. Or, as David Michael Levin has
said, “The embodiment of the categorical imperative cannot be understood…until our
way of thinking about the body undergoes a radical revision.”318 If sensibility were
merely ambivalent, then the exigency of ethics would dissolve and ontology would once
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again become first philosophy. Levinas would have us believe that our bodies are
constantly under attack from the outside, and at times it seems as though he were arguing
that intercorporeal encounters are essentially violent. He speaks of our openness to
exteriority as “the vulnerability of the skin exposed, in wounds and outrage” and of
sensibility as
a nakedness more naked than that of the skin which, as form and beauty, inspires
the plastic arts, the nakedness of a skin presented to contact, to the caress, which
always—even, equivocally, in voluptuousness—is suffering for the suffering of
the other. Uncovered, open like a city declared open upon the approach of the
enemy, the sensibility, prior to all will, action, declaration, all taking up of
positions, is vulnerability itself.319
Like a faithful phenomenologist, Levinas notes that this susceptibility is not reducible to
the physiological body’s causal relations. No, this susceptibility is a passivity “more
passive than every passivity,” which is to say, a transcendental passivity. “It is the
aptitude…‘to be beaten’, ‘to receive blows’.” “In vulnerability there then lies a
relationship with the other which causality does not exhaust, a relationship antecedent to
being affected by a stimulus.”320
It is one of the virtues of Levinas’s analyses that they fully appreciate the reality
of violence and the fact that an adequate account of alterity is needed in order to render
this reality intelligible. A conception of alterity which acknowledges that some of our
experiences do not submit to our representational capacities, that is, exceed what we can
know or think about them, is required to explain the inevitable encroachment of death, for
instance. Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity (224/199-200):
The notion of a mortal but temporal being, apprehended in the will…differs
fundamentally from every causality leading to the idea of the causa sui. Such a
being is exposed, but also opposed to violence. Violence does not befall it as an
319
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accident that befalls a sovereign freedom. The hold that violence has over this
being—the mortality of this being—is the primordial fact.321
There is no need, however, to accept that the susceptibility of the body is basically a
vulnerability. Of course, it is that too. But it is also a capacity to be affected with joy or
pleasure and to have the body enabled in its posture and kinaesthetic responses by the
sensations it receives from the other. In short, the sensitivity of the body is a priori
ambivalent. We can have this ambivalence while at the same time affirming the
constitutive alterity of embodiment, as Merleau-Ponty does. “Merleau-Ponty,” writes Dan
Zahavi, “can describe embodied self-awareness as a presentiment of the Other—the
Other appears on the horizon of this self-experience—and the experience of the Other as
an echo of one’s own bodily constitution.” For Merleau-Ponty, the Other can be received
as such because its exteriority mirrors my own exteriority to myself. “The reason I can
experience Others is because I am never so close to myself that the Other is completely
and radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself and
therefore open to Others.”322 It is not necessary for alterity to be a matter of pure
transcendence—a transcendence, it must be said, whose alignment with humanism and a
certain religious tradition excludes the nonhuman from ethical consideration323—for it to
command ethical consideration. That our relation with otherness is ambivalent, and that
we can be enabled as well as disabled by that which we rely upon for our very being, is
enough to give us pause.
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It is true that Levinas gives a richer, more complex description of alterity than
Merleau-Ponty. As well, he does much, contra Kant, to give a corporeal form to
subjectivity and, consequently, the ethical imperative. But in the process he sacrifices our
actual experience of embodiment in the name of a transcendental responsibility whose
foundation remains a hyperbolic claim about the vulnerability of subjectivity. This
hyperbole respects the reality of sensation while at the same time betraying the plasticity
of our sensibility. To avoid the ethical exclusivity of Levinas’s anthropocentrism, which
is most pronounced in the moral privilege he grants the human others,324 and remain true
to the ambivalence of our sensuous existence, it seems advisable for us to develop a more
mundane or immanent form of the imperative, situating its force in the sensuous economy
in which existents and objects interact. But first we need a conception of embodiment
that avoids the excesses of both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. That is, we need an
adequate account of the plasticity of the body.
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CHAPTER 4
ON CORPOREAL PLASTICITY

…we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively,
really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces,
energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc.
– Foucault, “Two Lectures”
…sensation is the master of deformations, the agent of bodily deformations.
– Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation

The argument thus far has followed two main trajectories, one critical, the other
productive. First, it has argued that the two visions of embodiment offered by MerleauPonty and Levinas are inadequate for thinking how our bodies actually interact with the
material world. Second, it has assembled evidence which suggests that both
phenomenologists were cognizant of the function which sensation plays in the
constitution of experience, Levinas perhaps more so than Merleau-Ponty. The precise
function of sensation, and in particular its difference from perception, has been adduced.
In this chapter I will build upon the analyses of sensation and sensing given by the
phenomenologists as I develop a conception of embodiment that balances their
competing views. In place of the reversible and susceptible bodies I offer the plastic
body, whose dynamism is truer to the aesthetic dimension of existence and the
transactional nature of intercorporeal encounters.
Methodologically, there is more than one way to elaborate and defend the body’s
plasticity. Because plasticity is at work in poststructuralist philosophers like Foucault and
Deleuze, and increasingly dominant in the work of embodied cognition theorists, a
wholesale assault on the phenomenological body could be launched from a
nonphenomenological camp. This could be construed as a clash between modern and
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postmodern views of the body.325 Such a neat division, however, does not do justice to
the degree of overlap which obtains between phenomenological and
nonphenomenological treatments of embodiment. This is why I have chosen for my
defense of plasticity to synthesize the insights of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas with a
number of nonphenomenologists, from Spinoza and James to Mark Johnson and
Catherine Malabou.
It should be noted, however, that what I find most productive in the
phenomenologists is not always what they produce from a phenomenological perspective.
In fact, as I have argued in earlier chapters, it is often the phenomenological method itself
which constrains some of the most fertile insights stumbled upon by Merleau-Ponty and
Levinas. Oftentimes it is when these two thinkers are on the verge of transgressing the
strictures of phenomenology that their thinking takes off in (metaphysically) interesting
directions.
What does it mean for a body to be plastic and why is it necessary to conceive the
body in this way? The term has a popular aesthetic sense and is now common currency in
the discourse of neuroscience. But I first ran across the term reading William James, who
writes in The Principles of Psychology that plasticity broadly “means the possession of a
structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at
once.”326 Plasticity not only provides a useful means of imagining the structure of the
body, it also offers a means of thinking the dynamic integrity of the embodied subject.
325
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Assuming, with Merleau-Ponty, that we simply are our bodies. This absolves us from
positing a self-identical core of subjectivity which would remain untouched throughout
any and all intersubjective (physical, social, cultural) engagements. In short, it gives a
fully immanent version of subjectivity, and yet it does not force us to grant the body an
indeterminate fluidity which would make it difficult to explain how stability emerges and
is maintained.
There are empirical and ethical reasons for favoring the plastic body over the
reversible and susceptible bodies. First, the body disintegrates, decays, and dies. Its
relation to other bodies—and sometimes to itself, as in the case of autoimmune
disorders—is often violent, as I have argued. Innumerable examples of nonreversible
situations can be given. These are defined by the powerlessness of human beings in the
face of a materiality which exceeds them. As Ronald Bruzina expresses it, “human
powerlessness is fundamentally that of being subject to structures around and within itself
that are not of a human individual’s own doing.”327 A piano is pushed out a window and
crushes someone on the sidewalk below. An airplane plunges into the ocean and is
obliterated along with all of its passengers. These are situations wherein the bodies
involved are not on the verge of reversal: the person on the sidewalk has no chance of
becoming the crusher, nor will the piano become the crushed in this scenario. The airline
passengers will be killed, their perceptual capacities extinguished, but the material reality
which destroyed them will remain. Perhaps the perceptual situation is reversible, but
asymmetrical bodily contact between bodies powerful and powerless is certainly not. Our
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bodies, I would contend, sense this in themselves and build upon this sense when forming
bonds with other bodies.328
On the other hand, the body is a resilient thing. It resists disintegration by
nourishing itself, defends itself from assault, and deftly assembles resources which enable
it to postpone death. It clothes and shelters itself, devises means of repairing itself when
wounded, and takes measures to prevent further wounding. It gathers these resources
from its environment and from others; it is enabled by otherness just as much as it can be
disabled by it. It is true that tragedy can befall the body at any moment, so it is indeed a
susceptible entity. But the threat of violence cannot be the ground upon which the body is
defined as a body. It is much more than a passivity: it preserves itself and pushes itself to
become more powerful; it adapts and evolves, yes, but it also destroys and gives form.
These are Nietzsche’s lessons.329 That the body is threatened by violence and prone to
disintegration, but at the same time enabled by what resists its efforts and movement,
leads us to consider the ethical import of its plasticity.
A body whose integrity is plastic is determined by its thresholds. This means, as
we saw with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of style, that its identity is constantly shifting and
constituted by temporary, fragile relations. These shifts can be induced by a breakdown
in the body’s own maintenance or by pressures exerted by an external force. In both cases
what gets compromised is an alliance maintained between a collective of bodies
functioning together as a singular body (friendship, neighborhood, soccer team) and
working together to reciprocally determine each individual body’s identity. Such a view
328
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of identity obliges us to imagine the substance of identity as fleeting rather than enduring
and self-sufficient. As Mach proclaims, “The ego is as little absolutely permanent as are
bodies. That which we do much dread in death, the annihilation of our permanency,
actually occurs in life in abundant measure.”330 The meaning of death is likewise
reoriented.
Spinoza employs the term ratio to denote the alliances that compose corporeal
identities. He speaks of thresholds as ratios of motion and rest, speed and slowness.331
Following on his heels, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the Spinozan conception of bodily
identity with concepts like assemblage, machine, multiplicity, and body without organs.
These concepts provide an understanding of bodily identity that makes no appeal to an
immutable organic (biological, physiological, neuronal) structure: they leave the body
fully open to deformation and reconstitution, and therefore to the aleatory and to alterity.
Spinoza begins to build the plastic body.
For Spinoza, a body is never purely individual in an atomistic sense; it is always a
composite or collective of bodies. What individuates a body from the single substance
(God, or Nature) in his monistic ontology is its effect, which is always singular.332 A
body, then, is determined as this body by what it can do or what it can effectuate
materially (efficient causes), psychologically (affects), politically (uprisings, policing),
and so forth. The capacity of the body to create a singular effect, or what we can call the
body’s power, will always remain variable and vulnerable to disintegration because this
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power will only subsist so long as the collective of bodies working together to create a
singular effect maintain their particular ratio of motion and rest. Spinoza writes:
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form close contact
with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they are
moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying
relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united with
one another and all together to form one body or individual thing, which is
distinguished from other things through this union of bodies.333
Now, this ratio is not precise: it is plastic, which is to say its identity is marked by a
threshold of formal variability.334 The form is not what determines the body ultimately, it
is the kinetics of the body’s composition that expresses its individuality. “The important
thing,” Deleuze tells us, is to see individuality “as a complex relation between differential
velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles.” This is what Deleuze calls
Spinoza’s “kinetic proposition.”335
Deleuze distills the Spinozan problematic regarding bodies into the question,
What is a body capable of? He asks the question in this way in order to suggest that the
power of the body is unknown to us and that we are far from fathoming the possibilities
for action, change, and enhancement that new technologies and new modes of collective
existence have in store for us. (I am thinking in particular of human-computer interfaces
(cyborgs), prostheses, genetic manipulation, and the whole range of what Deleuze and
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Guattari call “unnatural participations.”)336 But Deleuze’s question also pinpoints the
ontological claim advanced by Spinoza: bodies just are their capacity to affect and be
affected. Deleuze writes, “a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is
this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its
individuality.”337 This notion of individuality yields a new method of taxonomy, one
whose principle of differentiation is produced immanently along with individuation
itself.338
This method prefers a genetic conception of form over ancient hylomorphism and
regards the genesis of form as initiated by the contact of heterogeneous material
elements, which result in multiplicities that endogenously give rise to singular bodies.339
Dewey’s definition of aesthetic form is representative here: “Form may then be defined
as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and
situation to its own integral fulfillment.”340 This formulation crucially acknowledges the
centrality of circumstance for the determination of capacity, and locates the operations of
form in the materials and energies which compose an aesthetic event which is, at bottom,
rhythmic.341 Similarly, Deleuze writes about how
relations of speed and slowness are realized according to circumstances, and the
way in which these capacities for being affected are filled. For they always are,
but in different ways, depending on whether the present affects threaten the thing
(diminish its power, slow it down, reduce it to the minimum), or strengthen,
336
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accelerate, and increase it: poison or food?—with all the complications, since a
poison can be a food for part of the thing considered.342
The point here is that the maintenance of corporeal identity is not only a matter of
intersubjective/intercorporeal relations; identity is also dependent on environmental
conditions and the nourishment they provide (or fail to provide)—the ambivalence of the
environment is recognized as fundamental to corporeal power and action.
One of the advantages of working with the Spinozan definition of bodies endorsed
by Deleuze is that it frees us from entrenched binaries like artificial/natural and
organic/inorganic. This results from the fact that, for Spinoza and Deleuze, all bodies
belong to the same ontological plane and can be evaluated in terms that do not force us to
distinguish between, say, the human and nonhuman. As a consequence of undoing old
binaries we are free to imagine new composite bodies and, therefore, new possibilities for
embodied experience and bodily identity. Hybridization becomes the norm. As Elizabeth
Grosz puts it,
[Deleuze and Guattari] provide an altogether different way of understanding the
body in its connections with other bodies, both human and nonhuman, animate
and inanimate, linking organs and biological processes to material objects and
social practices while refusing to subordinate the body to a unity or a
homogeneity of the kind provided by the body’s subordination to consciousness
or to biological organization. Following Spinoza, the body is regarded as neither a
locus for a consciousness nor an organically determined entity; it is understood
more in terms of what it can do, the things it can perform, the linkages it
establishes, the transformations and becomings it undergoes, and the machinic
connections it forms with other bodies, what it can link with, how it can
proliferate its capacities….343
The model of embodiment described by Grosz regards the body, in Deleuze and
Guattari’s language, as a “machinic assemblage.” This concept is radically democratic in
so far as it counts a wide range of phenomena as bodies and refrains from privileging one
342
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kind of body or relation over another. There is nothing special about a naturally occurring
body; human bodies are not elevated above their vegetal counterparts. Corporeal
difference is a matter of degree: what counts is the effects and affects produced by the
body, irrespective of its compositional heritage. The consequences for environmental
ethics implied in the concept of machinic assemblage will be explored later.
Thinking bodies as machinic assemblages extends the Spinozan notion of bodies
as essentially composites whose identity is determined by the unified effect they produce.
An assemblage for Deleuze and Guattari is a multiplicity, or a heterogeneous event that
derives its consistency (or integrity) from a certain threshold for change. This threshold is
governed by the active conjunctions which make up the assemblage. Assemblages are
always provisional, nonhierarchical, and precariously organized.344 They subsist only as
long as they actively maintain their constitutive ratio of motion and rest, that is, their
intensity.345 An intensity is a bodily event directly related to the “capacity to enter into
relations of movement and rest”.346 It is the body’s power, which can be assembled in
myriad ways and with a variety of inorganic and organic components. Think of a wolf
pack or a school of fish darting through the sea. These are natural events, and thus would
seem to be governed by a fixed natural law. But this is not the case according to Deleuze
and Guattari. Assemblages are dynamic unities, immanently organized and constructed
ad hoc—haecceities.
Deleuze and Guattari conscript the medieval concept of haecceity because it
allows them to think identity and individuation in terms of events, intensities, and
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becoming. This notion is behind their idea of a body without organs, which is something
like an impersonal, roughly delimited, field of desire. An haecceity, in short, is an
“accidental form.”347 It contrasts clearly with the notion of substance, substantial form,
person, subject, thing, and so forth, each of which is held to be self-sustaining and in
some sense necessary. Again, they are thinking along with Spinoza when they define a
body as an haecceity, here presented in cartographic terms:
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate
substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfills. On
the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in
other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of
the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential
(latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds.348
The concept of haecceity enables us to think of individuation, and therefore identity, as a
contingent intercorporeity, or plasticity. This is helpful because we have been arguing
against a substantial view of identity while simultaneously trying to articulate a theory of
identity which displays fluid as well as stable elements, and determines these elements
immanently. Following Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari provide a number of resources for
thinking corporeal plasticity, although they seem to push the fluidity of their body
without organs to an untenable extreme. What opens up on this understanding is the
potential meaning of “individual” and “body.” Consequently, what a body is, as well as
what it can do, becomes a perpetually open question; the body’s power becomes free to
proliferate, and the individual free to develop, under the right conditions. The pragmatic
function of conceiving the body as an assemblage will become clearer as we progress.
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What is more salient in the Deleuzian/Guattarian development of the composite
body is the machinic feature. In Anti-Oedipus, a machine is defined as what introduces
interruptions into otherwise continuous flows of material (hyle): a machine is “a system of
interruptions or breaks.” The orifices of our bodies are machines because they interrupt
the flow of air (mouth) and the flow of sound (ear) and the flow of feces (anus).349 Our
bodies, then, are complex machines insofar as their sensory apparatus works as a unified
device for cutting up the manifold of sensory material which it encounters. At the same
time that it cuts, the machinic body is apt to create linkages to other bodies, that is,
assemblages composed of intensive relations and affective transactions. Machines engage
in transactions that assemble “disparate elements,” which means that they cut into and
synthesize material from any and all realms. Think of a soldier with a titanium prosthetic
arm. Think of a person whose masochistic desires require leather or stone or plants for
them to reach sexual satisfaction.350 These people are machines; their identity, materially
composite. There is a certain technique or artisanship to this process,351 which the body
already possesses insofar as it effortlessly hooks into environments which produce effects
that are natural, artificial, physical, linguistic, and abstract. Since the body is never
without a nourishing environment composed of disparate elements, or prostheses/tools,
we could reasonably assert that it takes no stretch of the imagination to see that the
human body just is a machine in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense.352
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Before going any further I want to gather a fuller account of the meaning of
plasticity and suggest some of its implications for embodiment and identity theory. This
will enable us to understand how the machinic body is plastic and how the integration of
body and environment is critical to understanding corporeal plasticity. Finally, it will
prepare us to see how the body’s plasticity is determined by its aesthetic constitution, that
is, the history of its sensory apparatus.
If it is at least plausible to claim that the modern account of embodiment is
marked by the view that there is a substantial core or stable structure to the body, whereas
the postmodern era is characterized by a desire to see the body vanish into an anonymous
field of desire, pleasure, and fluctuation, then the concept of plasticity belongs to neither
historical period.353 Given this partition, it would seem that Merleau-Ponty belongs in
neither the modern nor postmodern camp, for he downplays bodily anonymity just as
much as he discards modernist substance ontology. Regardless, he does not deliver us a
plastic body; the operation of his reversible body is more akin to elasticity. Elasticity is
here understood on the model of the rubber band. The rubber band is flexible and
deformable, but in the absence of resistance or external force it tends toward a specific
formal state. Accordingly, it is not open to permanent deformation. Permanent
deformation means breakage and the elimination of the precise disposition which
constituted the rubber band—elasticity. The disappearance of its elasticity is equivalent to
death for the rubber band.
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In the Merleau-Pontyan lived body there are a number of features which exhibit
an elasticity, the absence of which would spell the death of the body-subject. These
include the structures of consciousness (intentionality, perspectival perception), the body
schema, practical freedom or ability (the “I can,” which effectively operates as a
transcendental norm and therefore makes inability a secondary mode of comportment),
and the general tendency toward convergence attributed to perception.354 Throughout
each of its engagements with the world, others, alterity in general, the reversible body
maintains its relative stability by championing a series of quasi-transcendent structures
which are admittedly malleable, but not indeterminately so. If anything, their malleability
is always seeking to return to the equilibrium point which we defined earlier as bodyworld synchronization. This view of embodiment is accomplished only by quarantining
the objective body and suspending the question of how its physiology and materiality
interfere with, as well as support, the phenomenological world of perception. As I have
argued, what threatens to undo or undermine the body’s elasticity is the sensory field and
its contact with the autonomic system, along with the material composition of the body
more generally. This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty lacks any notion of plasticity. On
the contrary, style and habit display a marked plasticity in his thinking. And we must take
care to situate their plasticity at the material level in addition to the phenomenal.
Plasticity is opposed to both malleability and substantiality. It is, at bottom,
neither stability nor instability. Remarking on current research on the brain, Catherine
Malabou writes that “the word plasticity has two basic senses: it means at once the
354
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capacity to receive form (clay is called ‘plastic’, for example) and the capacity to give
form (as in the plastic arts or in plastic surgery). Talking about the plasticity of the brain
thus amounts to thinking of the brain as something modifiable, ‘formable’, and formative
as the same time.”355 This conception of plasticity is not meant to suggest that the brain is
merely flexible, for as Malabou goes on to show, the brain is at once prone to historical
deformations and capable to effecting historical deformations. “To be flexible is to
receive a form or impression, to be able to fold oneself, to take the fold, not to give it. To
be docile, to not explode. Indeed, what flexibility lacks is the resource of giving form, the
power to create, to invent or even to erase an impression, the power to style. Flexibility is
plasticity minus its genius.”356 The brain is docile to a degree, but this docility is at once a
matter of tolerance and creation, taken together as a single trait: creative tolerance. Our
brains are, to an extent, genetically determined, but it is this necessary determination that
allows for “a possible margin of improvisation” that is at once singularly determined and
historically singularizing.357 Every body’s experience will likewise be singular, which
means that no two bodies will encounter the same object in identical ways.
Plasticity describes the simultaneous determinacy and indeterminacy of
morphogenesis. In other words, the potential of the body to transform its initial
determination.358 Even if it is granted that the human brain displays a universal anatomy,
or that its physical makeup is structurally invariable, learning and memory—history in
general—will guarantee that no two brains are the same. In this history, “repetition and
habit play a considerable role, and this reveals that the response of a nervous circuit is
355
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never fixed. Plasticity thus adds the functions of artist and instructor in freedom and
autonomy to its role as sculptor.”359 The singular identity of the individual brain will
emerge from that gap opened up between freedom and determination, which is to say, in
the space of history. The integrity of the individual will be determined by how the body’s
mechanisms are transformed by the experiences it suffers. Plasticity is the “eventlike
dimension of the mechanical,” which,
between determinism and freedom, designates all the types of transformation
deployed between the closed meaning of plasticity (the definitive character of
form) and its open meaning (the malleability of form). It does this to such a
degree that cerebral systems today appear as self-sculpted structures that, without
being elastic or polymorphic, still tolerate constant self-reworking, differences in
destiny, and the fashioning of a singular identity.360
Our brains are machines, but machines that repair themselves and reprogram themselves
according to information they receive from their surroundings. The identities they
achieve strike a balance between passivity and activity, infinite possibility and finite
determination. At the end of the day, however, their constitution will give way to the
exigencies of the material world, leaving only the trace of their singular destiny.
A similar line of thinking is pursued in Foucault’s work on history and
embodiment. He employs the term “docility” to describe the body invested with power
and disciplinary techniques, but the manner in which he is thinking docility resonates
with the notion of plasticity under discussion. The docile bodies populating Discipline
and Punish seem, on the one hand, merely pliable, or “flexible” in Malabou’s sense. They
are made to take on a preprogrammed form, rendered automatic or mechanical by the
machinations of state power. Foucault writes of how “the soldier has become something
that can be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be
359
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constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through
each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently
into the automatism of habit.”361 But this is only half the story. The body would not take
on this apparent automatism were it not for its capacity to take on any number of
historically determined forms. When Foucault says that the body has to be broken down
and rearranged, he is acknowledging that disciplinary techniques must grapple with
corporeal determinations that offer resistance and harbor their own power. “Discipline
increases the forces of the body…and diminishes these same forces…. In short, it
dissociates power from the body” and transforms the body into an “aptitude” or
“capacity.”362 Recalling James’s definition of plasticity, the disciplined body is given a
structure strong enough to resist power, but weak enough to yield to a sufficiently
technical and more intense power.
The event-like structure of the body is given further expression in “Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History,” where Foucault explicitly rejects the view that the body is an
ahistorical, physiologically determined entity: “The body is molded by a great many
distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is
poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs
resistances.” Ultimately, its history is “without constants,” which means that it is plastic
in the sense we have been discussing.363
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Malabou’s investigation of plasticity is following, in the philosophical tradition,
the naturalistic insights of James and Dewey, although she never writes of either. She
finds plasticity prevalent in Hegel; I have been arguing that it is basic to Spinozism. What
she says about the brain can be profitably broadened to describe the constitution of the
body. This need not lead to a reductive physicalism, however. Phenomenology, and the
phenomenological sympathies of the pragmatists, can help us avoid that course. For
instance, Bernard Andrieu, following Francisco Varela and others, is undertaking a
program which he calls “neurophenomenology,” which focuses on the genesis and
plasticity of the cognitive body, but considers equally legitimate the phenomenological
and neuroscientific descriptions of this process. Central to this “dynamic materialism” is
an updated notion of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, which Andrieu says “defines the historic
construction of the nervous system through the interaction of the body with the world and
the progressive embodiment of these incorporations.”364 The temporal dimension of the
construction of the body is linked to the principle of plasticity, which says that the body
“must first be understood as an interaction with its environment because it is itself the
receptive matter both informed and informing.” Merleau-Ponty may not have been
willing to subscribe to this materialist program for the flesh, but his thinking does exhibit
sympathy for the kind of mutual formation described by Andrieu and Malabou. This is
evident in his conception of habit.
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Recall that for Merleau-Ponty habits are like original prostheses of the body.
Habits offer a stability to the body without fixing it completely. They render the body
automatic to a degree, but this automatism is never complete. The body is not born with a
set of specific habits, but almost immediately the body adopts habits which endow it with
a specific integrity and allow it to negotiate its situations with relative ease. Habits belong
among the historical a priori which condition perception and action; they arrange and
rearrange the body schema, while leaving the body open to receive new habits. Habits are
not just passively received, however: they are projected out into the environment as
actions whose repetition wears down the environment in specific ways. The possibilities
for habituation are limited by the effects of habit introduced into the layout of the
environment. Now, I think a general conception of habit is essential to understanding
body plasticity. In fact, we might say that habit is emblematic of plasticity, but it is not
sufficient to keep our discussion of habit at the level of perception, without serious
consideration of its material aspects. We saw in our earlier discussion that an account of
habit is provided by the pragmatists. I turn to them now to consider habit from a
naturalistic perspective which is not incompatible with, but rather supplemental to, the
phenomenological.
In James’s account in the Principles of Psychology, habituation takes hold in the
neural network of the brain. And it is precisely this network’s plasticity which enables the
body’s acquisition of habits. The “physics” of plasticity, in this case, implies that the
nervous system is susceptible to a series of sets of habits which make up its structure at a
given historical point; each successive phase of the structure contains a specific integrity,
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which resists alteration while at the same time remaining susceptible to influence.365 The
influence of the body’s sensory life carves pathways in its nervous system, predisposing
it to particular patterns of behavior which correspond to these pathways.366
Habits, then, display internal and external aspects.367 Neither of these can be
reduced when considering the identity of the body. On the one hand, the neural pathways
which are recorded in the material of the body physically determine the range of actions
and passions it is capable of at any given time. On the other hand, the range of behaviors
which the body exhibits at a specified point in its life will make up its style and will make
it recognizable as an individual. The variability of this style—which can come from
reflection or situational changes, for instance—introduces a degree of indeterminacy into
the practical life of the body that can effect an alteration of its habitual set.
Just as the neural pathway is a kind of circuit along which habits flow, the
behavioral aspect of habits can be regarded as circuitous. Doing so allows us to see how
the habits which each one of us adopt can come to constitute our bodily identity. Habits
economize our actions by locking us into certain behavioral patterns, while also releasing
our attention to explore new modes of action. James’s description of an habitual circuit of
behavior is as mechanical as much as it is phenomenological. “In action grown habitual,
what instigates each new muscular contraction to take place in its appointed order is not a
thought or a perception, but the sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just
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finished.”368 The idea here is that habits are chains of sensations and muscular responses,
set in motion by a single intellectual impulse. The sensations occur below the level of
conscious attention, but this does not mean that they are not registered by the body.
Indeed, they are situated somewhere between the physiological and phenomenological
body: “that they are more than unconscious nerve-currents seems certain, for they catch
our attention if they go wrong.”369 Quoting a certain Schneider, James dubs habits
“processes of inattentive feeling.”370
Favoring a more holistic rendering of the habitual act, the phenomenologist will
want to downplay the inattentive and reflexive elements of this description of habit.
Interestingly, it is the phenomenologist who would provide us with an expansive
description of the series of sensations and muscular contractions which comprise a given
habitual behavior. The key difference between the mechanical and phenomenological
accounts of a circuit of behavior will rest with the latter’s insistence on the intentionality
motivating the circuit. Now, there is no reason why we cannot regard habits as motivated
by intentional aims, but proceeding mechanically. To do so, however, we must admit a
certain autonomy—i.e., a degree of nonconscious activity—to the sensations propelling
the mechanism.
James’s account of habitual circuits leads us to see that our corporeal identities, insofar as
they are comprised of sets of habits, are made up of a series of responses which is
correlated to a series of sensations. In other words, our body’s integrity is at least partly
determined by the sensory circuits to which it responds. These circuits have aesthetic,
phenomenological, and affective elements. They constitute the substratum of our
368
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everyday lives. Of course, we carve out our own circuits, but we just as often adopt them
from the rituals and routines of culture. We may commute, dine, and shop like everyone
else, but we might also invent, collaborate, and produce like no other. These rituals and
routines find themselves recorded in the musculature of our bodies and driven by the
mundane sensations of the everyday. These circuits coalesce into a system that subtracts
from the abundance of incoming sensations and outgoing efforts required to sustain life.
They make up what Schneider calls our “body’s attitude,”371 which is analogous to what
we have called proprioception. As Massumi shows, the “habitual autopilot” of our daily
navigation is linked to the body’s proprioception, and is predominantly a noncognitive
orienting.372 Our body’s attitude, its individuality and orientation, emerges from its
habitual economy.
To better capture the complexity and diversity of our identities, the notion of
circuit can be generalized and applied to all aspects of our existence. This is because
circuits, as plastic structures, display a relative stability. This would allow us to speak of
political and moral circuits, for example, which might include the patterns of thought,
action, and speech typical of a particular political ideology or moral framework.373 At the
base of any circuit would have to be a consideration of the sensory and affective content
of that circuit, for these are what regulate and keep us attached to the circuit, even if our
attachment results from a diminished or indifferent concern for the circuit’s value. It is
arguable that, although we are quasi-automatically attached to our habits, we remain
attached to them only insofar as they retain a degree of importance. Importance can come
371
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from the understanding, yes, but ultimately importance can only dictate our actions if we
are passionate about it.374 What we are passionate about is what gives our body
incomparable pleasure and draws it near, or what infests our body with frustration and
rage, thus repelling it. In short, our affective responses keep us locked into a circuit of
behavior or induce us to switch to another circuit. Affects are a currency traded in the
habitual economy.
We can think of the totality of the circuits which orient our individual lives as
defining our territory, while considering each individual habit as a milieu. These two
terms bear a mutually determining relation in the work of Deleuze and Guattari; they
likewise are conceptually specific. Territory is relatively demarcated and abides by a
specific set of laws: it is stratified. If we are thinking about bodily habits, their fixed or
automatic aspect would be symptomatic of the body as territorialized, or “coded.” The
milieu, by contrast, is defined by its instability and liminal nature: a milieu occurs
between two clearly defined spaces, like a border, and maintains only a relative or
fleeting stability. A habit is like a milieu in that it is susceptible to deformation and
dependent on the stability of surrounding environmental conditions; it maintains its
integrity in virtue of these conditions, but it is not fully determined by them. This is its
plasticity.
Deleuze and Guattari consider milieus in terms of rhythm and haecceity. This will
give us a means of understanding the sensory link between our body and its environment.
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Their position can be compared with Dewey’s theories of form and growth, which focus
on the qualitative and aesthetic dimensions of embodiment and, not unlike Levinas, offers
us an account of the alimentary function of sensation.
Considering the way in which they invest the bodies that populate them,
territories, or “territorialities (habitual constellations of affects and patterns of
movement),”375 are not very different from what we have been calling circuits. A territory
lays down certain laws or codes which organize and are obeyed by the bodies inhabiting
their space. Nomos becomes ethos: This act is performative.376 Territories emerge when
the qualities of a milieu or a rhythm are forced to express the marks/coordinates of the
territory.377 When formalized or afforded a certain propriety, this expressiveness becomes
a signature, or style. Territorialization occurs when an otherwise nonsignifying set of
qualities are made to signify or represent a particular style: “One puts one’s signature on
something just as one plants one’s flag on a piece of land.” A birdsong, or refrain, works
in this way. The birdsong delimits a territory by marking the sonic boundaries of the
bird’s property. This is accomplished by a “little tune” or “melodic formula” whose
performance enacts a territorialization.378 In the same way, our bodies come to function
by innumerable cultural refrains, some of which we enact for ourselves, like the
frightened child who, “gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath.”
Like any body whose posture or gesture reproduces the body language of a particular
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cultural setting, he builds a little space of comfort around him with a sound that shelters
him from the indeterminacy that haunts his imagination.379
Despite the fixity of territory, bodies and spaces display characteristics which
operate against and undo territorial codes. Improvisation, for instance. Improvisation, or
any chance encounter, is made possible by the “cracks” in territories, which Deleuze and
Guattari call milieus. A milieu is like an unstable, but not inconsistent, qualitative
dimension of a territory. And just as territorialization operates on milieus, milieus rely
upon territories for expression of their style or integrity. The dialectical relation here is
not pure, however, because milieus take ontological priority over territories. “The
territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus and rhythms.”380 Milieus bear
within them rhythms which produce their identities. The rhythm of a milieu is its code,381
but it must be noted that this rhythm is never proper to a milieu, but resonates between
two or more milieus. The rhythm is an haeceeity, an intensive threshold which is
constantly produced and reproduced—by a movement of involution—by the difference or
in-between that constitutes the milieu. It is this “difference that is rhythmic, not the
repetition, which nevertheless produces it.”382 Milieus present the transactional space or
passage between two heterogeneously coded stabilities, “the interior milieu of impulses
and the exterior milieu of circumstances,”383 for instance. As a threshold between inside
and outside, a body operates as a milieu and is prone to the same kind of instability and
determination.
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This gets a straightforward naturalistic presentation in Dewey’s work on habit, a
process he explicitly characterizes, following James, as plastic. Dewey explicitly presents
two phenomena that are for the most part latent in the phenomenologists: the material
dependence and growth of the subject on its environmental circumstances. It is true that
Levinas gets at this aspect of existence in his notion of living from, but his analysis fails
to consider dependence from the perspective of natural life and is virtually silent, as is
Merleau-Ponty, on the growth of the body.384 In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey
speaks about the “plasticity of impulse,” whereas in Democracy and Education he
considers growth in terms of plasticity as well as dependence. In the former text,
plasticity prima facie denotes a state of complete indeterminacy, as though our impulses
were an unrestrained chaos of drives. But we quickly learn that plasticity signifies for
Dewey an “original modifiability” that is initially determined by its interactions with the
environment. Plasticity, then, signifies neither pure novelty nor pure docility, neither
activity nor passivity: “the most precious part of plasticity consists in ability to form
habits” which are (1) flexible and (2) modify sedimented customs and institutions.385
Impulses are creative in that they instigate the renewal of habit, which is itself an ability
and an art.386 Habits “are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it. At the same
time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural.”387 Our habits
are as diverse as the environments they respond to; the latter take on the dispositions we
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impart to them, the former are symptomatic of how we have been compelled to adapt to
resistances.
Much of this sounds like Merleau-Ponty, and we might be inclined to think that
the lived body is plastic in some respects. This is correct. Especially with regard to his
concepts of habit, style, and postural schema, there is much plasticity in Merleau-Ponty’s
body-subject. What it leaves out, however, is an account of the growth and disintegration
of the body. Even in “The Child’s Relations with Others,” the body is presented as
mature and capable; its relations, habitual yet regulated by “a single global phenomenon,”
perception. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the internal characteristics of the subject always
intervene in his way of establishing his relations with what is outside him. It is never
simply the outside which molds him; it is he himself who takes a position in the face of
the external conditions” (Child 108/17). Absent here is the physical growth of the child,
which will determine the manner in which he or she will receive and process—or fail to
do so—environmental relations. And while it is true to say that this physical development
is never simply a matter of the outside “molding” the inside, it must be admitted that the
internal relation between subject and object entails, at least initially, an asymmetrical
relation of dependence whereby the subject (child) is deeply susceptible to outside
influence. This dependence signifies the need for growth as well as a state of immaturity.
Neither of these should be interpreted negatively, however. Dependence and immaturity,
as Dewey shows, assert their own productive forces.
The child’s body is exemplary, but all human bodies develop. After development,
disintegration. Both of these stages can be given positive treatments, provided they are
taken on their own terms rather than comparatively. Immaturity is not simply an absent or
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nascent maturity: immaturity is a power, the capacity to grow. This capacity is at once a
dependence and a plasticity, for Dewey. Plasticity hear indicates the “specific
adaptability of an immature creature for growth.” This is not equivalent to “a capacity to
take on change of form in accord with external pressure,” but rather it is the “power to
modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop
dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible.” Dewey locates the
subject’s plasticity below the level of disposition and habit, thus giving it a transcendental
aspect. But this aspect is nothing more than the volatility of organic processes. It is not
that biology is prior to culture, but that structure is emergent, resilient, and susceptible. In
other words, the condition of possibility for habit acquisition is experimentation, or the
indeterminate determinacy of a socially embedded impulse and instinct. Growth comes
with the acquisition of habits, which enable independence and maturity. This
independence comes with increased control of the body, adaptation to the environment,
as well as creation of the environment. And it is only when our habits become routine,
when we get locked into circuits of behavior, that our plasticity is paralyzed. The
tendency toward decreased plasticity, the dissolution of the power to grow, often
quickens with age.
Dewey explicitly links the habituation of the subject with his/her qualitative
surroundings—the aesthetics of the environment. Our growth depends on the sensations
our bodies exchange with others like and unlike our own. Like Levinas, for Dewey we
live from our sensations. This is because we are sensitive and susceptible organisms
whose habits serve to increase “susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness.” An
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individual’s capacity to exist, their power, is directly determined by the exchange of
habits for new sensations:
Thus even if we think of habits as so many grooves, the power to acquire many
and varied grooves denotes high sensitivity, explosiveness. Thereby an old habit,
a fixed groove if one wishes to exaggerate, gets in the way of the process of
forming a new habit while the tendency to form a new one cuts across some old
habit. Hence, instability, novelty, emergence of unexpected and unpredictable
combinations. The more an organism learns—the more that is, the former terms of
a historic process are retained and integrated in this present phase—the more it
has to learn, in order to keep itself going; otherwise death and catastrophe.388
Given that sensitivity here entails a capacity to take on and annihilate form, i.e., indicates
a certain plasticity, increased exposure to different sensory environments can lead to the
sedimentation or explosion of an individual’s ethos (understood here as habituated
identity). It is important to note that Dewey regards death here as the inability of an
organism to continue learning. In other words, death is the extinguishing of growth, or
the slackening of plasticity. Life is the force which enables novelty by replacing old
habits with new ones.
In The Meaning of the Body, Johnson shows how important the aesthetic
dimension is for the body to make sense of its environment. He notes that the aesthetic is
usually downplayed in our discussions of experience, precisely because we mistakenly
take a conceptual limitation to be a limitation on meaningful experience. Put otherwise,
we disregard the qualitative dimension because it belongs to the affective realm, rather
than the cognitive or perceptual. Even phenomenology, Johnson notes, “has a hard time
with the qualitative dimension, for it is easier to describe the structural aspects of
experience than it is to describe felt qualities. The tendency is thus always to look for the
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constituting structures of experience, at the expense of the actual experience of qualities.”
Following Dewey, Johnson shows that qualities—which occur between bodies, and are
thereby liminal events—are felt, and as such allow the sentience of the body to
immanently discriminate the meaning of events and objects. “Once we are struck, caught
up, seized,” writes Johnson, “only then can we discriminate elements within our present
situation.” Sensations instigate the dialogue between subject and object.
What discriminates? Our bodies, whose sensorimotor and neural makeup, both the
products of material growth, “determine what stands out, for us, from a situation or scene.
Therefore, how we ‘take’ objects would change if our bodies, brains, or environments
changed in some radical way.”389 Rarely radical, our bodies are constantly adapting to the
aesthetic provocations of their surroundings. Only upon this instigation are they moved to
adapt and make sense of things. As Johnson concludes, “we are living in and through a
growing, changing situation that opens up toward new possibilities and that is
transformed as it develops. That is the way human meaning works, and none of this
happens without our bodies, or without our embodied interactions within environments
that we inhabit and that change along with us.”390 Our bodies take on the qualitative
meaning of their environments, and thus their integrity depends on these environments.
The body’s sensibility is just this capacity to be formed and deformed, charged with
affects and sensations which it encounters in the qualitative realm.
It must be noted that a similar idea is available in Edward Casey’s work on place.
Casey’s phenomenological perspective runs up against the same limitation that we find in
Merleau-Ponty, but it helpfully explicates this limitation. Understanding this shortcoming
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allows us to see that the reversible (phenomenological, lived) body must be supplemented
with an account of the irreversible and excessive dimension of embodiment. Casey writes
of the disorienting effect of wild places or wilderness on the body. Built places, by
contrast, serve to orient and sustain the properly human dimensions of the body.391
Disorientation in wild or natural places is, he writes, “often radically independent of
human corporeal intentionality, to the point of challenging and undermining this
intentionality.”392 This point is precisely what we indicated (in terms of violence) as
deficient in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses. What we realize in the wilderness, for Casey, is
that body and world are only reversible in familiar, manageable places. Everyday places.
And yet, the radical independence that wild places present to us is only radical as an
excess of intentional content. That is, their independence is only relative to the reach of
intentional experience, which means that the source of their disorienting effect can only
be inferred. Wild places tell us that the intentional arc of our bodies does not constitute
the world. The phenomenology of wild place stops here, however. It cannot tell us what
the excess of intentionality is made of.393
Places are liable to orient as much as disorient us. This is just as true of built
places as wild ones, contrary to what Casey says. This is precisely what makes
architectural design so important, and why specialists are needed to carry out this design
work. Otherwise, disorienting places are more likely to be constructed. My claim at this
point is that disorientation as well as orientation spring from the sensory environment, not
just the perceptual or intentional realms. On this view, our bodies respond to directives
391
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imparted to them below the level of structured perception. These directives cannot
become the object of intentionality, or if they can it is only from the perspective of
reflection, because they contact the body’s sensibility directly—they animate us,
sometimes to the point of disorientation. It is in this sense that they exceed the
phenomena of perception. These directives, what Lingis calls imperatives, are thus
ambivalent. This is their volatility. Every place, I would argue, harbors this volatile
dimension because every place is constituted by an aesthetic dimension that affects us in
diversifying as well as stultifying ways.
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea that sensations operate on our bodies
as imperatives. Following Kant’s distinction, we could say that sensuous imperatives
command either hypothetically or categorically.394 As we pursue our practical aims, the
aesthetics of our environment offer numerous dimensions and pathways, each with its
own sensory atmosphere. In many case I am able to choose from a finite set of routes the
one I wish to take. I leave my house for groceries. There is a busy street with cars, buses,
and pedestrians that leads to the market; there is a quieter residential street that also leads
to my destination. I must take a street, but the specific one I choose is up to me. This is
the hypothetical dimension. Now, once I am committed to a single route I find myself
inserted in a sensory milieu that makes unique claims on my body’s sensory apparatus.
My body is commanded categorically by the sensations comprising the milieu; it cannot
but receive and respond to these sensations, which are “not reactions to physical causality
nor adjustments to physical pressures, nor free and spontaneous impositions of order on
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amorphous data, but responses to directives.”395 Our carnal sensibility obeys
environmental commands, but not necessarily as a form of subjection. Sensibility,
because it is of the same environment it responds to, is what precisely enables the body to
get along in the environment. Sensibility is the body’s freedom.396
To flesh out the sensuous form of the imperative, Lingis takes up MerleauPonty’s notion of the levels of perception. Lingis writes of “the level of light which our
gaze adjusts to and see with as it looks at the illuminated contours that surface and
intensify, the level of the sonority our hearing attunes to as it harkens to sounds and
noises that rise out of it, the level of the tangible our posture finds as our limbs move
across the contours and textures of tangible substances….”397 What makes the levels
different from the objects of perception is that the former are decidedly ungraspable.
Their adumbrations cannot be explored and enumerated. Our bodies cannot pursue a
better hold on them, cannot enter into a dialectical relation which will slowly converge on
their essence. To engage a level, the body “adjusts to it, is sustained by it, moves with it
and according to it.”398 In a word, the body is animated by the sensoriality of the levels. A
place—the world as a whole—is composed of a nexus of levels. Its style is determined by
this nexus, and it is a style we cannot “survey from above.” The style of a place is
something our bodies “catch on to by moving with it;” it is not given to us in perception,
but engaged as an imperative whose force comes from the “sensorial patterns” which
order intentionality.399
395

Lingis, The Imperative, 3.
Lingis, The Imperative, 4.
397
Lingis, Sensation, 33.
398
Lingis, Sensation, 33.
399
Lingis, Sensation, 33, 35, 36-37. Lingis’s thought here is that if perception wants to perceive things, it
must adjust itself to the levels in which things are situated. To pursue the adumbrations of an objects, the
body must subject itself to shifting dimensions of the levels. In a general sense, the levels are elemental and
396

151

From an aesthetic perspective, we can think of the identity of places as defined by
the sensations they harbor, the nexus of levels they contain, and the circuits of behavioral
responses they elicit. The body is susceptible to the imperative force of each of these
environmental aspects. And insofar as these elements are perpetually shifting and prone
to variation, we could say that a place’s sensory identity is never fixed in its form, but
maintains an integrity which is that of an haecceity—a relatively stable and coherent, yet
precarious, aggregate of sensory qualities. Of course we can say that this aggregate points
us toward a thing, but does that not unnecessarily reduce the complexity of the sensory
content to a simple substance? Now, given that the bodies which populate a place are
partly responsible for the sensory content of the place, and the sensory directives of the
place command bodies to respond in particular ways, the identity of the bodies situated
within a place will have the character of an haecceity. Consequently, the range of
sensation and affects the body will be capable of will be determined by the range of
sensations and affects it will be subjected to by its environment. This constitution is made
possible by the body’s plasticity. The critical point I am driving at here can be illustrated
with an appeal to the biological conception of metabolism.
In our consideration of the aesthetics of place, the identity of bodies, and the
alimentary aspect of sensation, we have worked toward a philosophical encounter with
metabolism. Biologically, metabolism is a fact. Ontologically, it describes the genesis of
form and exemplifies the plastic nature of bodies, both organic and inorganic. Organic
bodies are aggregates of matter and void, “void mostly, crisscrossed by the geometry of
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force,” as Jonas puts it.400 Through the metabolic process, the organic body trades its
matter with the matter of its surroundings. This exchange gives rise to a “living form”
whose matter is never the same. No identical core persists through the metabolic process,
which means that an organism is not the same as a machine understood in the typical
sense. As Jonas says, “Metabolism thus is the constant becoming of the machine itself—
and this becoming itself is a performance of the machine: but for such performance there
is no analogue in the world of machines.”401 Writing of the body-world interface,
Andrieu strikes a similar note about the nonmechanical individuating effect of
metabolism:
As an interface, the body doesn’t remain passive: it doesn’t obey the orders of the
nervous system in a servile manner, neither is it an objective reflection of the
world. Failing to be this recording chamber, according to the mechanical
metaphor, the human body is the way in and out, through which the inside
communicates with the outside (and vice-versa). This crossing is subjectifying in
the sense that the matter of the body is the result of this building up interaction.
By ‘subjectifying’ I mean the movement which singularizes each human body by
successive incorporations. Subjectivity is a result, in continuous movement, of
adaptation and regulation.402
From the perspective of biological metabolism, the organism is a material event, a
function of metabolism, not the converse.403 From the ontological perspective,
metabolism offers us a conception of identity as active self-integration and renewal, as
the integrity of a fluctuating multiplicity. On the one hand, the material exchange our
bodies conduct with the world replenishes our form. On the other hand, our perceptual
dialogue enables us to maintain a balance on the phenomenal world; it helps to keep the
world intact, manageable. The individual on this view—which Andrieu calls “dynamic
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materialism”—develops a certain degree of freedom in its form, but it remains bound to
the environment by and for its matter. In Jonas’s words, the individual is “needfully
free.”404 Freedom is our ability to unpack the determinate indeterminacy offered by the
world.
The biological concept of metabolism applies only to organic, living beings. It
need not be limited to this application, however. The concept can be profitably co-opted
by the carnal ontology we are developing here, and extended so as to describe inorganic
relations. To best illustrate this we can turn to Yukio Mishima’s autobiographical
meditation on identity, Sun and Steel. In this text Mishima recounts his turn away from
words and toward the body, in particular his initiation into the world of bodybuilding.
Mishima recognizes the human tendency toward automatism of mind and body.
But he also sees that habits are not destinies: they can be molded and redirected, not just
intentionally but also materially. We are not automata. As Bergson has also shown,
following Ravaisson, habits link us into the mechanisms of nature and often act as
efficient responses to the directives contained in nature.405 The sun provides such a
directive for Mishima.406 Its rays are absorbed into the body and incorporated onto the
surface of the skin. Similarly, the steel of the weights he lifts is incorporated into his
musculature. Mishima writes: “Little by little…the properties of my muscles came
increasingly to resemble those of the steel. This slow development, I found, was
remarkably similar to the process of education, which remodels the brain intellectually by
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feeding it with progressively more difficult matter.”407 Mishima does not literally ingest
steel, although his body does certainly take in the vitamins provided by the sunlight.
Nevertheless, Mishima’s body lives from, metabolizes the sun and the steel. His body
engages organic and inorganic matter and converts both into muscle. Deleuze and
Guattari would call this a “double becoming.”408 According to Lingis’s description,
In the coupling of organism with steel, the vital substance with the extreme
condensation of night and death, there was not competent intentional force
shaping inert substance into implements, but transference of properties. The
properties that came to compose the excess musculature came from the steel and
were its own properties. In the contact with the substance of steel, Mishima found
a body become ferric substance.409
This muscle does not only give him strength, it gives him form as well. The form
emerges from the circuitous relation which obtains between organic body and
organic/inorganic world.410
The idea that Mishima metabolizes the sun and the steel is more than a metaphor.
His body is sculpted and polished by a repetitive exposure to steel and sun, respectively.
He exchanges for these his sweat, energy, calories, pallor. In his words, he transforms
“the silence of death into the eloquence of life.”411 His writer’s body, with its distinctive
habits and traits, is molded into the body of a weightlifter and begins to signify
differently. This signification is transmitted through a new set of sensations. The
bodybuilder’s circuit of training lends Mishima’s body its stability, its integrity—its
power. His circuit enables him to cut into certain material flows and generate a new form.
Mishima is a machine, not in the sense invoked by Jonas, but in Deleuze and Guattari’s.
407
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The organic/inorganic metabolism of Mishima exemplifies the machinic process, and
allows us to see that insofar as each one of us metabolizes materials from the natural and
social environment—I mean affects and sensations, signs and gestures, rituals and
mannerisms—our corporeal identity is literally formed by what we live from. Metabolism
demonstrates plasticity just as well as any other process.
Some architecture theorists think about body-building relations in a similar way.
They consider the sensory design of a building to be fundamental to the experience of a
space precisely because the body’s sensibility is susceptible to the qualities endemic to a
particular built space. There is both an aesthetics and an ethics of design at work in this
sentiment. Peter Zumthor writes about how the “atmosphere” of a building is its rhythm,
which we pick up “through our emotional sensibility.”412 He elaborates a series of points
on how to generate atmosphere, which include sensory and material considerations: “It’s
like our own bodies with their anatomy and things we can’t see and skin covering us—
that’s what architecture means to me and that’s how I try to think about it. As a bodily
mass, a membrane, a fabric, a kind of covering, cloth, velvet, silk, all around me. The
body! Not the idea of the body—the body itself! A body that can touch me.”413 He
considers temperature: “It is well-known that materials more or less extract the warmth
from our bodies.”414 In his meditation on atmosphere, he exhibits a distinct sense of how
the body is immediately affected by the building it inhabits, and how the body demands
certain architectural qualities for its well-being.
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Juhani Pallasmaa writes, in “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” about how our
bodies adopt the structure of buildings in their skeletal structure and bodily sensations.415
He says that “Every touching experience of architecture is multi-sensory; qualities of
matter, space, and scale are measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue, skeleton
and muscle. Architecture involves seven realms of sensory experience which interact and
infuse each other.”416 The identity of a space is distinct and can be apprehended by the
senses. Hollow spaces resonate with emptiness, whereas furnished spaces will have an
aural identity specific to the arrangement, quantity, and quality of the furnishings.417 He
summarizes how the identity of architect and building merge through interaction, and
how this identity is passed on to the building’s users:
…an architect internalizes a building in his body; movement, balance, distance
and scale are felt unconsciously through the body as tension in the muscular
system and in the positions of the skeleton and inner organs. As the work interacts
with the body of the observer the experience mirrors these bodily sensations of
the maker. Consequently, architecture is communication from the body of the
architect directly to the body of the inhabitant.418
Pallasmaa’s phenomenological convictions win the day, however, and he concludes that
while sensations engage the physical body, “the generative force lies in the intentions.”419
I would contend that while our intentions do indeed propel our engagement with places, it
is the directives embedded in places—built and natural—that initially strike us. It is
strange that Pallasmaa does not concede this point, for his analysis emphasizes the role of

415

See Juhani Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” in Steven Holl et al., Questions of
Perception (San Francisco: William Stout, 2008), 36-37.
416
Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” 30.
417
Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” 31. The “Sounds” chapter of Thoreau’s Walden
illustrates the aural identity of its namesake. The birdsongs, train whistles and cars, bells, etc. that Thoreau
records get coded as “Walden.” From the standpoint of the ear, Walden just is this aggregate of sounds.
418
Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” 36. Pallasmaa sees the skin as central to this process.
He explores this further in The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses, second edition (Academy
Press, 2005).
419
Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” 41.

157

the skin in the experience of architecture. The skin, it seems to me, only takes on an
intentional aspect when it directly touches some object. And even then it is questionable
whether or not it is intentional in the sense that vision or imagination is. I would claim,
following Levinas, that the skin is precisely that sense organ which testifies to the
primacy of sensation over perception because it is constantly processing environmental
information that never rises to the level of consciousness.
Our bodies are of the environment, but not identical to it. Merleau-Ponty says the
same thing about the flesh, but his exposition leaves us wanting a fuller account of how
bodies are individuated from and annihilated by the flesh’s general element. The concepts
of metabolism and growth offer us a picture of the individual as at once attached to and
independent from its environment. This is not a relation of reversibility, but one of
volatile transaction. The transaction can go off well; it can go badly. The individual is not
fully determined by its situation, although it is fundamentally enabled by it. Who is this
individual? It is this body which refers to itself as “I” and understands itself as a singular
locus of sensations, passions, and actions, and which feels itself to be limited by a
particular set of material, cultural, and linguistic circumstances.
Following up this view of individuation, we can conceive a body as a singular
locus of sensations (an haecceity), or as a specific confluence of environmental
impressions which define an exact position, a longitude and latitude (Deleuze and
Guattari).420 On this reading, sensations are neither mere epiphenomena produced in the
mind nor merely inferred content. They are productive of clearly demarcated bodily
responses, what we might call, with Dewey, “experiences.” “An experience has a unity
420
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that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of
this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of
variation of its constituent parts.”421 This quality need not be simple. Indeed, most
experiences are differentiated by a singular complex of qualities. That bodies undergo or
suffer experiences implies that experiences are objectively given and generate their own
form. That we metabolize the qualities which pervade experiences—that experiences
shape who we are and what we can do—means that we become who we are along with
our experience. Subjectivity is produced as this becoming.422
Qualities are neither atomistic nor indeterminate. They do not derive their form
from a thing or lose their autonomy just because they are “attached” to a thing, but rather
they give rise to the formal identity of the thing as an aggregate of potential sensations.423
They do the same thing for a space, as well as the bodies that populate that space. As
James writes, “Space means but the aggregate of all our possible sensations.”424
Consequently, the body is the site of these sensations, each and every one of which leaves
a trace that makes it impossible for the body to undergo the same impression twice.425 In
this sense, bodies are individual aesthetic events whose power to produce sensible effects
is constituted by the aesthetic experiences they suffer. Power, then, is a plastic
disposition—autonomous in effect but relational in constitution. Death, on this view, is
421
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simply the exhaustion of the individual’s power, or the transgression of the threshold that
defines it as this particular event. When your body ceases to produce the sensations that
defines you, you have become something else. You begin to produce new sensations,
engender a new power, however enfeebled. Your matter continues, reincarnated, in an
infinite succession of new metabolisms. This is your immortality.
There is no reductionism involved here. What I have attempted is to render life
and individuality in aesthetic terms, and to do so according to an ontology of embodiment
that avoids, as much as possible, transcendent appeals and an anthropocentric worldview.
This is not in the interest of homogenizing the diversity of life, but in affirming the
singular complexity if each individual. Toward this end I have adduced a theory of
corporeal plasticity which is both phenomenological and materialist, and derived from
this theory an immanent form of the imperative as well as a principle for valuing the
diversity of aesthetic experiences. We can call this the principle of aesthetic
individuation, which reads: since a body’s sensory identity is determined by the sensory
blueprint of its environment, that body’s power to affect and be affected will only be as
complex as the totality of its aesthetic experiences. Since this principle has relied on a
certain conception of sensation (which I have developed piecemeal in each of my
chapters), I would like to summarize the several aspects of this conception here.426
First, sensations are objective. An object, for instance, is recognizable as an
aggregate of qualities which our senses apprehend. We imagine that even when we are
not there to apprehend it the object retains a real power (or disposition) to produce
roughly the same aggregate of sensations. In some cases, pain, for instance, we feel
ourselves attacked from outside by sensations. Levinas says that sensation breaks up
426
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every system. The objective aspect to is needed to explain where disruptive and violent
sensations come from.
Second, sensations are relational. They only affect, or make sense, when they
come into contact with bodies. Their effects are a matter of contrast, as James notes.427
Put otherwise, we could say that the meaning of a sensation is diacritical; it depends on
the field of sensations it is embedded in. As diacritical, a sensation’s effect will be neither
intrinsically nor extrinsically determined. Its effect will be determined between subject
and object, or object and object. This leads us to a more democratic view of bodies which
maintains that sensations are traded, liminally, between any and all bodies (inanimate as
well as animate). The strange idea that two inanimate bodies can exchange sensations is
found in Hippocrates, who “has the verb aisthanesthai characterize the effects of the
wind on lifeless things.”428
Third, since sensations harbor the potential to enable or disable bodies, they are
said to be ambivalent. This aspect has particular import for the ethics of embodiment. The
volatility of sensations must be taken into consideration when designing buildings and
public spaces, or when considering the preservation or destruction of a natural
environment, for example. We live from our sensations, but we also die by them. This is
the fourth aspect: sensations are alimentary. But since they are also ambivalent, they need
to be regarded as both nourishment and poison. Their quality will determine whether they
enable or disable our bodies. Our corporeal plasticity remains needfully vulnerable to
them.
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Finally, sensations belong to no one: their liminality, objectivity, and ambivalence
entail a certain anonymity. When we say that we “have” sensations, what we are
describing is a certain bodily response to a sensation. The response operates below the
perceptual level which would determine it as “mine,” as personal. Once we have noticed
it, the sensation has already seized us. When we project sensations from our bodies, they
can be attributed to us only to a degree. But insofar as our bodies are a composite of
sensations, and we are nothing more than our bodies, there is no substantial person to
which the sensations attach as properties. Sensations affect a body; they produce this
body. Never is this body properly “mine.”
I have here presented an image of the body as plastic, which I believe to be
superior to both the reversible body of Merleau-Ponty and the susceptible body of
Levinas. This image could not have taken shape without certain insights into embodiment
ascertained by the phenomenologists. I take my efforts to have balanced their perspective
with supplemental evidence from nonphenomenological theorists, and to have
rehabilitated the concept of sensation. If my notion of plasticity or the several
characteristics of sensation I have gathered and advocated here have already been
collected in an earlier theory, then I favor a return to that theory.
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CONCLUSION
THE INTEGRITY OF AESTHETICS: TOWARD AN ETHICS OF EMBODIMENT

The palace is the body of the king. Your body sends you mysterious messages, which you
receive with fear, with anxiety. In an unknown part of this body, a menace is lurking, your
death is already stationed there; the signals that reach you warn you perhaps of a danger
buried in your own interior. The body seated askew on the throne is no longer yours, you
have been deprived of its use ever since the crown encircled your head; now your person
is spread out through this dark, alien residence that speaks to you in riddles. But has
anything really changed? Even before, you knew little or nothing about what you were.
And you were afraid of it, as you are now.
– Calvino, “A King Listens”

To conclude, I want to briefly consider some of the ethical consequences of conceiving
the body as plastic, and to sketch how these consequences unfold in a few competing
theoretical frameworks. Directives for further study will be suggested.
An ethics based on the plasticity of the body as I have described it will necessarily
be a kind of environmental ethics. It will pay specific attention to the aesthetics of the
environment and the ways in which aesthetics foster and diminish our body’s power to
exist. Generally, it will be concerned with the sensory aspect of places, but a theory of art
could likewise be envisaged. Above all, given that the body’s composition relies on the
composition of its environment, the concept of integrity—taken in its structural and
moral senses—will be central. What I called the “principle of aesthetic individuation” in
the last chapter dictates this.
One of the primary benefits of shifting the discourse of embodiment to the
aesthetic level is that it allows us to displace the problematics of environmental
philosophy—in particular the animality/humanity, artificial/natural, and nature/culture
debates—onto a different plane. This opens new, non-anthropocentric avenues for
interrogation and new possibilities for solving old problems. It might be objected that
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such a shift of emphasis leads to a reduction of the complexities of our experience and is
an attempt to translate the myriad qualitative aspects of life into quantities of stimuli. The
preceding analyses, I would maintain, have sought to establish a concept of sensation
whose richness and complexity resists such a reduction.
I have used the Kantian language of imperatives to describe the kinaesthetics of
embodiment and how it informs bodily integrity. A Kantian or deontological approach to
plasticity seems possible. Kant holds that our practical maxims must conform to the
categorical imperative which tells us whether or not our maxims can be universalized as
moral laws. Maxims that are inconsistent or contradictory cannot be so universalized;
maxims that can be universalized may be designated as duties.429 It could be argued that
since the integrity of the body is necessarily tied to the environment, any maxim that
wills a disabling environment would contradict the rational desire to have one’s bodily
integrity maintained. Only practical laws which support enabling environments would be
possible on this model.
The Kantian route seems to get around the naturalistic fallacy, which forbids
deriving an “ought” from an “is.”430 And thinking about imperatives as grounded in the
body relieves us from appealing to a transcendent form of reason. In order to test our
maxims, however, we need such a conception of reason. Only a transcendent reason
whose laws are a priori and absolute can forbid us from consistently maintaining
contradictory principles of action. Absent this, there is nothing categorically wrong with
willing, say, environmental conditions which will lead to bodily harm.
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Naturally, a utilitarian option presents itself. This perspective asks us to consider
the consequences of our actions on the environment, with special attention paid to how
these consequences end up affecting our well-being and our capacities for action. I favor
a form of utilitarian ethics that is grounded in our affective and aesthetic life because it
requires no appeal to transcendent law. It is naturalistic, and perhaps commits Moore’s
fallacy, but it does so with appeal to an image of community which is not arbitrary.
Before saying more about this I want to indicate how the virtue ethicist might construct
an environmental ethics of the type under consideration here.
An ethics interested in sustaining the environment and the bodies that populate it
will assuredly make a virtue out of preserving places that promote bodily integrity. And
insofar as our body’s develop their capacities for action or enhance their well-being
through intercourse with a diversity of enabling environments, the proliferation of such
environments would be considered virtuous as well. Practical wisdom on this model
would entail a set of virtues which promote sustainable living from the point of view of
aesthetic experience. This view seems to make a tacit appeal to consequentialist ethics,
however. Namely, it says that we should be virtuous because it leads to pleasant
consequences and engenders a diversity of pleasurable experiences.431
Even if it is not refuted by the utilitarian argument, virtue ethics remains open to
the objection that, like deontology, all of our ethical decisions are compelled by our
desire for pleasure. A further advantage of the utilitarian position is that it is grounded in
our affects and is “sanctioned,” in Mill’s language, by our cultivated desire for a
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generalized well-being.432 Now, we may doubt whether our good will towards others is
founded upon a natural sociality, but there is something compelling about the view that
once we see that our integrity, and the pleasures it enjoys, is necessarily linked to the
integrity of the sensory environment writ large, we will be more inclined to preserve and
proliferate the diversity of that environment. Our plasticity entails this possibility, as
Malabou insists: “It is precisely because—contrary to what we normally think—the brain
is not already made that we must ask what we should do with it, what we should do with
this plasticity that makes us, precisely in the sense of a work: sculpture, modeling,
architecture.”433 The inclination toward aesthetic creation will be enhanced when the
affects derived from proliferation induce further proliferation. That is, when we become
passionate about our passions.
The sensory environment, as noted earlier, is characterized by its volatility.
Ethically, this dimension is quite significant, as evoked in Diane Ackerman’s A Natural
History of the Senses: “It is both our panic and our privilege to be mortal and sense-full.
We live on the leash of our senses. Although they enlarge us, they also limit and restrain
us, but how beautifully.”434 If aesthetic volatility is the hinge upon which the ethics of
embodiment swings, then we require an ethics which cultivates diverse and enabling
aesthetic environments. Environments which threaten bodily integrity should be avoided.
The objection will arise at this point that nature harbors countless disabling aspects from
the perspective of human bodily integrity. Does this mean we should work to eradicate
these aspects? No, because these aspects contribute to the diversity of nature’s aesthetics.
There are ways to experience dangerous natural places without being disabled by or
432
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degrading them. In general, we have to consider natural and built places as unique
sensory milieus contained within the general system of aesthetics. One of the difficulties
of the ethics I am advocating here bears on the criteria for deciding if and how disabling
environments can be sacrificed without compromising the integrity of the aesthetic world.
The exigency of disabling aesthetics is greater in the built environment.
Presumably, we want to avoid painful engagements and habitations. Above all, we want
to avoid predicaments which compromise our integrity by pushing the tolerance of our
plasticity beyond its breaking point. This is death. We want to multiply the possibilities
of pleasure by increasing our capacity to affect and be affected, that is, by increasing our
power. The sentiment is at once Nietzschean and Spinozan, but here again we can turn to
the guidance of architects and designers.
Architect Michael Benedikt offers a useful definition of value that resonates with
the ethics being sketched here: “‘positive value’ is what we attribute to that which
intensifies and/or prolongs life. (Conversely, ‘negative value’ is what we attribute to that
which dilutes and/or shortens life.”435 Benedikt acknowledges the anthropocentrism at
work in his definition, but nothing prevents us from applying it to life generally. The
point is to increase pleasure and extend its possibilities wherever we can, whether we are
constructing or building or restoring or conserving. Whose pleasure? Any sentient
creature’s. Does this exclude inanimate objects? Not necessarily, for they too belong to
the aesthetic economy and participate in the intensification and prolongation of life
understood as an integral system. The obvious obstacle here is adjudicating situations
where pleasure needs to be sacrificed in the name of some other end.
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Perhaps the basic ethical principle guiding us here is the following: avoid and
accommodate disability. That is, design built places that conform to and, when possible,
enhance the bodies inhabiting them. The principle is drawn from the specialized field of
ergonomics, but what we are moving toward here is something like a generalized
ergonomics. Ergonomic designers aim to improve human well-being by creating
workspaces and devices that minimize or eliminate the stress caused by human-world
interaction. It is the science which studies the interface between humans and the systems
in which they operate, and then attempts to make this interface as accommodating as
possible.436 In our language, ergonomics designs aesthetic interfaces which maintain the
integrity of tool and user, machine and machinist, space and occupant.
The posture and movement of bodies are susceptible to deformation by prolonged
contact with unaccommodating environments.437 Their plastic structure allows them to
take on forms that over time decrease their capacities for action, quite apart from the
typical effects of ageing. Ergonomics attempts to avoid premature and unnecessary
deformation; it takes its cue from the plasticity of bodies. Ergonomics is a great example
of something that is both natural and artificial, or something that blurs the distinction
between animate and inanimate life. Its ethical framework, if we were to identify it, is
basically utilitarian. That is to say: its motivation is to maximize pleasure and minimize
pain, and not just for humans, but for the totality of bodies.438 But the scope of this ethics
must extend beyond any extent form of utilitarianism to encompass all of the bodies that
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participate in the corporeal community without feeling pain or pleasure, namely,
inanimate objects and events. These things do not “feel” in the ordinary sense, although it
would be wrong to exclude them from the affective community as we have defined it
here, following Spinoza.439
It seems to me that the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright displays an ergonomic
motivation. This does not mean that his buildings aim above all to conform themselves to
the human form, but rather that his design pays particular attention to the interface of site
and building, and tries to preserve the integrity of both while at the same time introducing
a new aesthetic dimension. As a result, the building site is intensified, not degraded or
diluted. Wright’s essay “Integrity” draws the moral conclusion:
What is needed most in architecture today is the very thing that is most needed in
life—Integrity. Just as it is in a human being, so integrity is the deepest quality in
a building…If we succeed, we will have done a great service to our moral
nature—the psyche—of our democratic society…Stand up for integrity in your
building and you stand for integrity not only in the life of those who did the
building but socially a reciprocal relationship is inevitable.440
If we take Wright’s idea of integrity in the structural sense (not in the moralizing sense
connoted in the quotation), the ergonomic ethic comes through and indicates a means by
which we can think ergonomics as both a constructive and preservative practice, and not
just a tool for optimizing human work. If there is to be an ethics of embodiment which
takes its clue from the plasticity of bodies, and whose principle is the intensification of
pleasure and the preservation of integrities, then it must focus its energy on the volatile
interface between bodies. Or, as Irigaray nicely puts it: “Architects are needed. Architects
of beauty who fashion jouissance—a very subtle material. Letting it be and building with
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it, while respecting the approach, the threshold, the intensity.”441 What is this beauty but
the fragile alliance of composite bodies, working actively together to form a singular
joyful body that desires to maintain its ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness—that
is, its integrity.
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